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Abstract 
Oceania is an example of a region where traditional security theory based on 
historical enmity and competition does not fit. A history of amity and 
cooperation has evolved through regionalism and the region’s pre-eminent 
organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum). In 2004, the Forum was 
tasked to develop the ‘Pacific Plan’ (the Plan) to facilitate closer cooperation 
and deeper integration. Security is one of the four pillars of the Plan. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the institutions of the Forum as 
facilitators of regional security cooperation. The Forum is reviewed and the 
idea of a logic of action is introduced. To help explain security in an 
environment with a history of cooperation, traditional security theory is re-
defined. A security environment equation is created as a framework to help 
analyse the Forum’s structures and security mechanisms. The Forum 
Regional Security Committee is examined closely resulting in suggestions to 
strengthen the region’s security environment.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
…Security is a precondition for 
 economic growth and sustainable development. 
     Forum Secretary General, Greg Urwin1
 
Security – being and feeling safe from harm or danger – is a basic need and 
the means of survival.2 A dichotomy however exists in the pursuit of security. 
The end, ‘a peaceful and secure world,’ is threatened by the means, as 
frequently the ‘how to…’ becomes a source of tension and in itself causes 
conflict. The process or way is often determined by the nature of relationship 
between those seeking to secure a particular space. Cooperation and pooling 
resources is a way to maintain security especially when vulnerability is high 
and threats are imminent.  
 
This thesis includes a real-time narrative analysis of events unfolding as they 
occurred within the region during 2004-2005. The objective of this thesis is to 
analyse the institutions3 of the Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum) as 
facilitators of regional security cooperation.4 It concentrates on the transition 
of structures, mechanisms and systems within the region. Presenting what 
exists and investigating how institutions work will expose the flaws in the 
security environment resulting in recommendations for improvement.  
                                            
1 Greg Urwin, 2005, ‘Need to close gaps’ Forum Press Release, 14 June 2005 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2005/June /06.htm 
2 Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick Morgan, 1999, Security Studies Today, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, p 1 
3 The term ‘institutions’ is used here in a wider meaning to include systems and processes such as 
norms, conventions and standards as well as actual organisations. 
4 The definition of region will be discussed later in this chapter. In this context it refers to Pacific Island 
countries, including Australia and New Zealand but excludes Pacific Rim countries such as China, the 
United States of America, Japan and South East Asia states. 
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A single theory with the capacity to explain security in a historically 
cooperative environment facilitated by a regional organisation does not 
appear to exist. The foundation of this thesis therefore is built from a variety of 
theories and these are discussed through out the chapters. Combining them 
in one chapter was considered to be unwieldy and risked losing their 
explanatory value.  
 
‘Regionness theory’ therefore is discussed in this chapter. An update and 
description of the Forum is in chapter two where the idea of a ‘logic of action’ 
is introduced to test the effectiveness of the Forum’s security structures.5  The 
history of Pacific cooperation is examined in the literature review in chapter 
three. Security theory is described and redefined in chapter four with the 
purpose of providing a more relevant explanation of the Pacific security 
environment. The creation of a universally applicable security equation is 
used to create a full picture of the region’s security environment. The region’s 
main mechanism for closer security cooperation – the Forum Regional 
Security Committee – is analysed in chapter six along with recommendations 
made to strengthen the security environment. The conclusion asserts that a 
regional organisation through its various institutions is the most appropriate 
vehicle to facilitate closer security cooperation but that its members must 
increase political responsibility to ensure cooperation is effective.6
 
                                            
5 Logic of Action is a term introduced in this thesis to explain the how and why of regionalism and 
regional institutions. Chapter two will explain the concept further. 
6 Political responsibility is used here as a term to describe a standard of responsible behaviour expected 
from governments. This includes for example, obligation, accountability, dependability and the 
commitment to implement a certain set of actions as agreed collectively. 
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This chapter makes a number of propositions and uses the theory of 
regionness to define Oceania. An introduction to Oceania’s security 
environment follows below and by borrowing Greg Fry’s claim that “regions 
matter in world politics in a way they did not before …” it is asserted here that 
regionalism is a given.7 The sources of research, opportunities for fieldwork, 
the limitations faced in the study and the rationale for this thesis are then 
described.  
 
1.2 Propositions 
The main proposition of this thesis is that: regional security can be 
strengthened by an organisation facilitating the means for closer cooperation. 
Other propositions that may support this include: 
• If a regional organisation is to facilitate closer cooperation, then its logic 
of action must be explicit;8 
• If closer cooperation is to be effective, then a sense of good regional 
governance is required which includes transforming ‘political will’ into 
‘political responsibility’; 
• If cooperation is to achieve its objectives then the means for debate 
must reflect the established method of relating, for example the ‘Pacific 
Way’ – a honest, consensual, inclusive and authoritative mechanism to 
make legitimate regional decisions;9 
                                            
7 Greg Fry, 2000, ‘A Coming Age of Regionalism’ in Greg Fry & Jacinta O’Hagan, Contending Images of 
World Politics, Macmillan Press, London & New York, p 119 
8 The concept of a logic of action is described in chapter two – 2.5 
9 The ‘Pacific Way’ is described in chapter three – 3.6 
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• If the concept of security is to remain relevant, then it needs to be re-
defined to cover the characteristics of the environment;10 
 
In chapter six, the above propositions are re-constructed into an argument 
which asserts that in order for the Forum Regional Security Committee 
(FRSC) to be effective it needs to be: 
• A mechanism that has the authority to define the region’s security 
environment, with good regional governance structures that mirror a 
matured ‘Pacific Way’ of consensus decision-making, which includes 
the transformation of political will into political responsibility. 
 
Chapter seven will conclude the status quo is likely to increase the region’s 
vulnerability as insecurities will only continue to weaken the security 
environment.  Conversely, a strengthened and invigorated FRSC will assist 
towards more effective security cooperation that will fortify the region’s 
security environment against the impact of insecurity. 
 
1.3 Defining the Region  
“Mostly when we speak of regions we actually mean regions in the making. 
There are no “natural” or “given” regions, but these are created and recreated 
in the process of global transformation.” 11
Bjorn Hettne & Fredrik Soderbaum 
 
This study focuses on security within the regional level of analysis and it is 
therefore, important to clearly define what is meant by the ‘Pacific region’. 
                                            
10 In chapter four, ‘Security Redefined’ discusses this assertion. 
11 Bjorn Hettne & Fredrik Soderbaum, 2002, ‘Theorising the rise of Regionness’ in New Regionalisms in 
the Global Political Economy, Routledge, London, p 39 
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Defining a region is problematic.12 Geography is a common tool but implies 
that a judgement can be made as to where boundaries begin and end.  It 
assumes that territory, proximity or some other distinction can be made to 
separate off an area and call it a ‘region’. This raises many questions. 
 
Pacific Map: 13
 
Is the Pacific region defined by ocean boundaries, and if so where do they 
begin and end? Should the introduction of another ‘sea” such as the Bering 
Sea, Tasman Sea or Coral Sea become a natural boundary? Should 
countries on the periphery of the oceans be included? Should countries with 
                                            
12 For a discussion on the problems of what boundaries define a region see Ron Crocombe, 2001, The 
South Pacific, University of the South Pacific, Suva, p 592 
13 Map from John Henderson & Greg Watson, 2005, Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Canterbury University 
Press, Christchurch 
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similar physical features categorise a region? Defining a region using only 
geographic criteria alone can be unhelpful and therefore other variables must 
be taken into account, for example: history, identity, commonalities or the 
degree of mutual relationship by the members within the region. 
  
1.4 Regionness Theory 14
Bjorn Hettne’s notion of “regionness” is a useful theory when considering how 
to define a group of states as a region.15 His levels of ‘regionness’ are simple 
descriptions based on the degree of relationship between the groups or 
members within a space. The five levels of ‘regionness’ comprise: 
• Regional Space 
• Regional Complex 
• Regional Society 
• Regional Community  
• Regional State. 
 
A Regional Space16 is a geographical unit, inhabited by human beings 
maintaining some kind of relationship. This is known as a pre-regional zone.   
 
A Regional Complex17 where there is increased social interaction but national 
states are predominant. Regional identity is low and suspicion is more 
common than cooperation. Economic cooperation is based on self-interest 
                                            
14 Hettne & Soderbaum, 2002, pp 39 – 45; Bjorn Hettne, 1996, ‘Globalisation, the New Regionalism and 
East Asia,’ Selected papers Delivered at the United Nations University, September 1996, Japan, 
http:www.unu.edu/unipress/globalism.html, p 3 – 17   
15 Ibid 1996, p 3  
16 Hettne & Soderbaum, 2002, p 39 
17 Ibid, p 40 
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and tends to be exploitative rather than cooperative and mutually reinforcing. 
Relations may include a security complex where security is dependent on 
each other as well as the overall stability of the region. This system is 
considered a rather primitive security mechanism. 
  
Regional Society18 embraces a form of cultural, economic, political or military 
organised cooperation. The “increasing and widening” of “mutually reinforcing” 
relationships fosters greater levels of institutionalism with a “gradual 
deepening of mutual trust and responsiveness.”19 This is a formal organised 
region. 
 
A Regional Community20 is associated with the development of a distinct 
identity, informal actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making. 
Violent conflict between members is inconceivable. Regional civil society 
emerges but is dependent upon the institutions and regimes that facilitate 
social welfare, social communication and convergence of compatible culture 
and values throughout the region. There is a multi-dimensional and voluntary 
quality of regional cooperation.  
 
Finally, a Regional State21 is a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly 
sovereign national political units into a supranational security community, 
where sovereignty is pooled for the good of all. States retain compatible but 
not identical policies as authority and decision-making is decentralised.  
                                            
18 Ibid, p 41 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid, p 43 
21 Ibid, p 44 
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1.5 Pacific Regionness 
What then defines the Pacific as a region and at what level of ‘regionness’ 
should it be categorised? Oceania is immense. The North Pacific Ocean and 
the South Pacific Ocean touch numerous rim countries and they contain a 
wide variety of islands within. Frequently the Pacific area is described as only 
a group of islands but this is inadequate in a region with great geographical 
and demographical diversity as shown in table one. 
Table 1 Geographical and Demographic Characteristics of the Pacific 
Region22
 Geography Land Area sq km Population (2004-5 est) 
Australia Continent 7,617,930 19,000,000 
Cook Islands 7 Atolls, 8 Islands 240 21,200 
French Polynesia 118 Islands and Atolls 4167 270,485 
Fiji 332 Islands 18,000 880,000 
Kiribati 33 Islands 811 100,700 
Marshall Is 30 Atolls, 1152 
Islands 
181.3 57,000 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
607 Islands 702 108,000 
Nauru 1 Island 21 12,000 
New Caledonia 1 main Island, 5 
islands and atolls plus 
archipelagos 
18, 575 216,494 
New Zealand 2 large, 7 smaller 
Islands 
268,000 4,000,000 
Niue 1 Island 260 2,100 
Palau 300 Islands 458 20,000 
Samoa 6 Islands  2,944 177,700 
Papua New Guinea Eastern half of 
Papua,  
600 Islands 
462,000 5,420,00 
Solomon Is 6 Major Islands, 992 
Smaller Islands 
28,450 523,600 
Tokelau 3 Atolls 10 1,405 
Tonga 169 Islands 748 110,200 
Tuvalu 9 Atolls 26 11,468 
Vanuatu 84 Islands 12,200 202,600 
 
                                            
22 The countries in this table have some form of membership with the Forum.  
Sources: CIA 2004 World Fact Book; Papua New Guinea Government 
http://www.nso.gov.pg/about/aboutpng.htm; Solomon Islands Government 
http://www.solomons.com/glocgeog.htm
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Nauru, Tokelau and Tuvalu have less than 30 sq kms of land, whereas 
Australia is a very large island/continent of 7.6 million sq kms, whose 
coastline touches the Indian, Southern and Pacific Oceans. 
 
The divided island of West Papua and Papua New Guinea is slighter larger 
than New Zealand, which comprises two distinct large islands. Australia, New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea have populations in the millions, while 
Tokelau and Niue have less than 1500. Environmental characteristics also 
vary around the region. Some states are abundant in natural resources while 
atolls have no arable land. Others have abundant marine resources with large 
Economic Exclusion Zones.  
 
Australia and New Zealand are highly developed countries, whereas some 
island states still struggle for basic amenities such as fresh water and a 
consistent power supply. Government structures are also diverse and include: 
a constitutional monarchy and/or federal state systems; parliamentary 
democracies; republics and states in free association.23
 
Defining a region by identity is also difficult. Is West Papua part of the Pacific 
region? Predominantly of Melanesian descent, West Papuans struggle to 
assert their identify separate from their Indonesian rulers. New Zealand is 
situated in the South Pacific Ocean, therefore do New Zealanders identify 
                                            
23 For a comprehensive table of the political status of countries in the region see, Steve Hoadley, 1992, 
The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p 21; For an overview of the 
concept of Free Association see, John Henderson, 2002, ‘Pacific Freely Associated States: seeking the 
best of both worlds,’ New Zealand International Review,  May/June Vol XXVII, No 3, pp 7 – 10  
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themselves as Pacific Islanders?24 How do Australians’ view themselves? 
Timor Leste is also an example of definitional difficulty as some identify it as 
being part of the Pacific region but geographically it is closer to Indonesia and 
South East Asia. Also islands within Micronesia in the north have only recently 
been considered to be part of the Pacific region. Its inclusion was reflected in 
the Forum’s name change from the South Pacific Forum to the Pacific Islands 
Forum in 2000. 
 
While many Pacific countries share a colonial history, their experience of 
decolonisation is diverse. Some states moved into self-government easily 
while others fought long and hard for their independence. Some territories are 
still ruled by colonial powers. However, the legacy of colonialism and a desire 
for cooperation has created a sense of regionness for its members. 
Regionalism grew when the South Pacific Commission (SPC) was established 
in 1947.25 The creation of other regional organisations, particularly the Pacific 
Islands Forum, has furthered a distinctive regional identity.  
 
Geography, identity and history clearly play their roles in defining a region. It 
is argued here that it is the ‘degree of relationship’ that defines an actual 
region through the voluntary membership of states to be in and part of 
institutions that promote regionalism. This membership may expand or 
decrease over time as relationships change. The Pacific group of independent 
and self-governing states coalesce through the Forum and the criterion for 
                                            
24 Witi Ihimera said, ‘While Pakeha New Zealanders now accept, sometimes reluctantly, that ours is a 
Pacific Country – how long must we wait for you to claim as freely as we do that you are Pacific 
Islanders.’ quoted in John Henderson, 1991, ‘New Zealand and Other Pacific Islands’ in Richard 
Kennaway and John Henderson, Beyond New Zealand, Longman Paul, Auckland, p 18 – 19  
25 Tom Smith, 1977, ‘South Pacific Regional Cooperation’, New Zealand International Review, No 4, 
July/August, p 29 
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membership was amended at the 2005 Forum summit to provide for associate 
membership status for Pacific territories.26 Oceania or the Pacific region, in 
this thesis, is therefore defined by the membership of the Forum. The Pacific 
Rim states, which have come together under APEC are not – with the 
exception of Australia and New Zealand – included.   
 
Using Hettne’s notion of regionness, the Pacific region can be described as a 
“Regional Community” where cooperation is expected method of interaction. It 
is a place where violent conflict between states is considered inconceivable 
and a sense of family has crept into the region. Smith described how at SPC 
meetings, “the delegates from islands hundreds of miles apart quickly became 
friendly and by the time they met for the third [South Pacific] conference in 
1956 they often used the expression “our Pacific brothers.”27 Fifty years later, 
the idea of ‘family’ was further entrenched into regional language with the 
2000 Biketawa Declaration, which stated: 
“Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response to 
members” request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of 
all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended 
family. (emphasis mine)”28  
This document enables the Forum members to seek assistance or 
intervention in a time of a crisis and signals a significant degree of mutual 
trust. This does not mean, however, that relationships are always harmonious. 
As in any family, squabbles break out from time to time.  
 
                                            
26 Forum Communiqué, 2005 
27 Smith, 1977, p 29 
28 Forum Communiqué, 2000 
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1.6 Oceania’s Security Environment Described 
National security is traditionally seen as the maintenance of territorial integrity 
and defence of political autonomy and this is achieved principally through the 
use of military power.29 In attempting to explain the nature of inter-state 
relationships, realist international relations (IR) theory asserts that the 
international system is anarchic. International security has therefore been 
traditionally viewed through a realist lens as described by Barry Buzan: a build 
up of military force that leads to a security dilemma.30 Suspicion and 
competition characterise the nature of inter-state relations so conflict (war) is 
considered inevitable. Regional security has been compared with traditional 
perspectives of international security with the focus on a particular region. 
 
Unlike other regions, the genesis of security cooperation in Oceania is not 
based on these traditional theories. Historically, cooperation and amity as 
opposed to competition and enmity have been the main characteristic of inter-
state relationships in the Pacific.31  Other powers have used the region as a 
theatre for war, but Pacific militaries have not been deployed against each 
other.32 Therefore these traditional or conventional interpretations and 
theories are unhelpful as they confine security to the complexities of negative 
interstate relations based on militarist conflict. They do not explain other forms 
of insecurity in an environment where amity and cooperation is the norm.  
                                            
29 Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, Ted Greenwood, 1993, Security Studies for the 1990’s, Brassey’s, 
Washington, p 2 
30 Barry Buzan, 1987, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International 
Relations, Macmillan Press, London. Buzan explains that, ‘it is a dilemma because states cannot easily 
take measures to strengthen their own security without making others feel less secure,’ p 78 
31 The term amity is used throughout this thesis to describe the state of friendship between countries. It 
infers that countries view each other as friends not enemies but it does not mean that tension or 
disagreement are absent. 
32 During the Bougainville conflict, PNG soldiers did enter Solomon Islands in pursuit of rebel militia 
however; the governments of the Solomon Islands and PNG did not declare war against each other.  
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 Insecurity in the region comes from diverse sources. The global terrorism 
agenda impacts on Pacific security indirectly. For example, the imposition of 
complex international legal standards to counter terrorism is beyond the 
capacity of some small Pacific legislatures and low enforcement levels 
weaken the legal environment. Also, the need to implement strict and 
expensive border controls threatens to further marginalise small Pacific 
economies. The consequences of these weaknesses are becoming more 
significant as trans-national criminals exploit lax border controls and use weak 
institutions to further their activities. One instance is the revelation that 
Chinese triad-mafia intimidate senior officials of the Papua New Guinea Police 
forces.33  
 
Internal insecurities have the most impact on Pacific states. The transfer from 
colonialism to independence for some has not been smooth. Constitutional 
structures considered incompatible with local culture have undermined 
indigenous methods of social control. Inept governance and under-
development has weakened Pacific countries. In some island countries, 
disciplined forces are politicised, corrupt and unprofessional. Instead of 
upholding law and order they become the source of violence and social 
instability. Political violence, coups, secessions, riots and intractable tribal or 
clan warfare have taken lives and further damaged fragile economies.  
 
                                            
33 Pacific Islands Report, 2005, ‘Chinese Gangs in Pacific Real Regional Threat’ 
http://wwwarchives.pireport.org/archive/2005/february/02%2D21%2D12.htm 
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Natural disasters destroy already meagre infrastructures. The slower impact 
of climate change resulting in rising sea levels spoils the quality of water and 
soil, which affects subsistence farming, making some small atolls reliant on 
expensive food imports. Under-development has caused a poverty of 
opportunity across many sectors, such as education and health. United 
Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan said, “… sub-Saharan Africa and 
Oceania are lagging in almost all areas …”34  
 
More developed countries, such as Australia and New Zealand feel obligated 
to provide assistance and/or intervention to alleviate the stresses to maintain 
regional stability in order to preserve their own security interests. This has 
caused resentment and tension in some Pacific island states because of the 
perception that this interference threatens their sovereignty. Donors also 
debate whether assistance should be premised by security needs. While this 
contention is likely to persist, it is suggested that for those who believe 
security should not be linked with development assistance, their view of 
security requires redefining (this is discussed further in chapter four). The 
Pacific Strategy of the New Zealand Agency for International Development 
(NZAID) states, “Without security, defined in its broadest sense, development 
cannot occur in a sustainable way.”35
 
Emeritus Professor and regional specialist, Ron Crocombe and his team 
completed a series of national and regional security studies in 2000 – 2004 for 
                                            
34 Kofi Annan, 2005, ‘Progress on the Millennium Development Goals’, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All,  United Nations, New York, p 15 
35 New Zealand Aid and Development Agency’s (NZAID), 2002, ‘Towards a Strategy for the Pacific 
Islands Region, A Consultation Draft, p 15 
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the Forum.36 A distinction was made between security and conflict. Security is 
threatened by crime, smuggling, false documentation, international terrorism 
and international financial crime.37  He identified the principal causes of 
conflict in the over the past 20 years as, 
… ethnic differences, land disputes; economic disparities; a lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to resolve differences fairly or 
satisfactorily, and usually a belief that those with the power to act are 
either biased, corrupt or inefficient.38  
These problems he said were at the “core” and that the failure to address 
them was the “basic causes of deteriorating national security.”39
 
In this environment, can a regional organisation facilitate closer security 
cooperation? What has been the experience in Oceania over the past three 
and a half decades? Leaders from the newly independent Pacific island 
countries initiated the first South Pacific Forum (the Forum) in 1971. 40 They 
discussed a “wide range of issues of common concern,” including the security 
issue of the day – French nuclear testing.41 New Zealand Prime Minister 
Norman Kirk hosted the meeting and Australian officials attended. It was 
agreed that the meeting “significantly advanced the spirit of regional 
                                            
36 Ron Crocombe, 2000, ‘Enhancing Pacific Security,’ a report prepared for the Forum Secretariat, 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj; Ray Anere, Ron Crocombe, Rex Horoi, Elise Huffer, Morgan 
Tuimeleali’ifano, Howard Van Trease, Nikenike Vurobaravu, 2001 ‘Security in Melanesia’ a report 
prepared for the Forum Secretariat, http://www.forumsec.org.fj; Ron Crocombe, Siliga Kofe, 2003, 
‘security for Small Polynesian States,’ a report prepared for the Forum Secretariat; Pacific Institute of 
Advanced Studies in Development and Governance, University of the South Pacific, 2004, ‘A Security 
Assessment of three Micronesian States. 
37 Crocombe, 2000, p 7-8 
38 Ibid, p 6 
39 Ibid, p 8 
40 Name changed to Pacific Islands Forum in 2000 
41 Forum Communiqué, 1971 – see annex one. 
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cooperation and mutual confidence.”42 Pacific leaders have met annually ever 
since. The Forum and its institutions have become the Pacific region’s pre-
eminent political association. 43   
 
1.7 Sources and Fieldwork 
Material for this thesis was gathered from a wide range of sources including: 
personal interviews, media, government policies, speeches and academic 
articles. Forum documents such as communiqués, declarations and annual 
reports are easily accessible. Information on the Forum, however has not 
been collected in one publication. Analyses are sparse and confined to works 
covering wider topics.  
 
Attending the 2004 Forum Annual Heads of Government meeting in Apia, as 
part of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
delegation, provided invaluable insight into the workings of the Forum. Access 
to all meetings, ceremonies and receptions provided the opportunity to 
observe the interaction between the region’s leaders, ministers and officials. 
This experience will be discussed further in chapter two. 
 
Visiting the Forum’s impressive and up-to-date library in Suva, Fiji, afforded 
the chance to research archival documents. This provided an overview of the 
Forum’s structure and helped to clarify the complex Forum network. Attending 
the Pacific Plan national consultation meetings in Auckland, March 2005 and 
                                            
42 Ibid 
43 The Pacific Islands Forum membership includes: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
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in Christchurch, October 2005 also provided the opportunity to hear and 
experience the concerns people felt towards the region and its transition 
towards closer regionalism. 
 
During 2004-2005, I managed and coordinated the Securing a Peaceful 
Pacific project. It consisted of an international conference with over 230 
attendees, the publication of the multi-authored (60) book derived from the 
conference and its launch coincided with a series of roundtable discussions 
held in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. This provided special 
opportunities to meet many Pacific specialists.44 The conference brought 
together from the region a diverse group of people including politicians, policy 
makers, practitioners, NGOs, academics and other post-graduate students. 
Attending and presenting papers at two other major conferences in Brisbane 
and Hawaii also afforded the chance to exchange views and debate the many 
issues of Pacific security as well as to receive comments and criticisms that 
have helped immensely in the development of this thesis.45  
 
1.8 Limitations and Rationale  
The main issue that arose from these sources and fieldwork was that a full 
analytical approach to understanding Pacific security was a serious gap in the 
current literature. A ‘big-picture’ view was missing. Works on Pacific 
regionalism and the Forum are sparse in comparison with the volumes of 
                                            
44 Material from this thesis was used in, Sheryl Boxall, 2005, ‘The Pacific Islands Forum and Regional 
Security’ chapter in John Henderson & Greg Watson, 2005, Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Canterbury 
University Press, Christchurch, p166.   
45 Conference paper: Pacific Regional Security Cooperation: the effectiveness of Forum Security 
Institutions at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Conference held 19-21 July 2005 in Honolulu, 
Hawaii: ‘The Impact of the Global War on Terrorism:  Navigating Instabilities’; Conference paper: Pacific 
Islands Forum: an Analysis of its Logic of Action at the University of Queensland Conference: ‘Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Region’ held March 31-3 April 2005. 
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work devoted to other regions and their institutions. Also theories and 
frameworks from other regions were not appropriate because they simply did 
not fit the Pacific environment.  
 
Globally since 1945, regionalism, which included the creation of security 
mechanisms, was premised on a history of interstate conflict. Conversely, the 
Pacific has had a history of interstate cooperation.46 While there is general 
agreement about the threats facing the region, many works on Pacific security 
still only describe them and recommend certain actions to be taken. There is 
no model for actual analysis based on cooperation. 
  
This was exemplified at the Brisbane conference, mentioned above, where 
one stream of presentations was to focus on Pacific regional institutions, 
namely the Forum. I had hoped to learn from other academics but found my 
paper was the only one that directly addressed the Forum. The presentations 
on European models of regionalism were interesting but did not provide 
insight into Pacific regionalism and security. 
 
The main rationale for this thesis is to develop a model that has the ability to 
complete a comprehensive explanation, breakdown and analysis of Pacific 
security cooperation. Such a model must have the ability to systematically 
examine the security environment and regional mechanisms. Its purpose is to 
expose any institutional weakness and recommend strengthening existing 
security mechanisms through the Pacific Islands Forum. 
                                            
46 See Chapter three for a history of Pacific cooperation. 
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Chapter 2: Pacific Islands Forum  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter profiles the Forum as it is now and describes the nature of its 
annual summit meetings. The idea of a logic of action for an organisation is 
established.47 While this term is borrowed, its substance is derived from a 
variety of theories and ideas to create a framework that considers the logic of 
purpose and structural logic and practical logic. An effectiveness test is 
applied by comparing this objective logic of action with the provisions for the 
various Forum institutions under the new Agreement. The purpose is to 
assess whether the Forum has the capacity to facilitate the next step of 
Pacific regionalism – closer cooperation and deeper integration. 
 
2.2 Forum Profile 
The South Pacific Forum was founded in 1971 and to reflect its expanding 
membership changed its name to Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. Its 
membership currently comprises 16 independent or self-governing states with 
three observers, one special observer and 13 dialogue partners – see table 
two.48 Territories in the region may apply to be admitted as associate 
members.49 Heads of government meet annually but special meetings may be 
convened. Leaders meet privately in retreat where it is claimed honest and 
robust discussion takes place.  
 
                                            
47 Samuel Bacharach, 1996, ‘The organisational transformation process: the micropolitics of dissonance 
reduction and the alignment of logics of action,’ in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 41, No 3, pp. 
477-506
48 These membership categories are explained in greater detail below.  
49 This is new status was agreed to at the 2005 Forum summit and is provided for in Article I(3) of the 
new Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum. This Agreement can be found at 
http://www.forumsec.org and also annex three. 
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Table 2 Pacific Islands Forum Membership  
Members 
Australia; Cook Islands; Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji; Kiribati; 
Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Zealand; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; 
Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu 
Associate Membership (this new status was created in October 2005) 
 
Observers 
French Polynesia (2004); New Caledonia (1999); Tokelau (2005) 
Special Observer 
Timor Leste (2002) 
Dialogue Partners 
Canada; PRC; EU; France; Indonesia; India; Malaysia; Japan; Philippines; 
Korea; Thailand; UK; USA 
 
There are no formal rules of procedure, however a number of traditions or 
conventions exist. Decisions are usually made by consensus. At all meetings 
countries sit in alphabetical order and this also normally guides the choice of 
next host country and therefore the Forum Chair until the following meeting.50 
The summit agenda is set by the Forum Secretariat with input from members 
and regional organisations. A communiqué announces the decisions made 
during the meetings and regional policies are also set through Forum 
Declarations. 
 
Australia and New Zealand pay one third each of the annual core budget and 
Pacific Island members collectively make up the other third. Contributions are 
                                            
50 The alphabet procedure is flexible to allow for countries to bid as Forum host especially if the 
prospective host country is celebrating a significant event. For example, to celebrate 30 years 
independence, Papua New Guinea bid for 2005 summit when the next in line was Tonga - now host of 
the 2006 summit. 
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also received from other donors, for example the European Union, France 
and Japan. China and Taiwan also contribute generously. 
 
The Secretariat’s main functions are to serve its members’ by providing policy 
advice and implementing initiatives as tasked by the leaders. It also acts as a 
coordinating body for various regional agencies and promotes the Forum’s 
interests internationally. It operates offices in Auckland, Beijing, Sydney and 
Tokyo.51
 
The Secretary General acts as secretary to the various Forum meetings 
including the leaders’ special retreat. Greg Urwin, a former Australian 
diplomat, is the current Secretary General. He manages the Secretariat and is 
permanent Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific 
(CROP).52 The Forum Officials Committee (the Committee), comprises senior 
officials from member governments and acts as Executive to the 
Secretariat.53 There are numerous Forum Ministers’ and officials meetings 
held throughout the year and in 2004 Ministers’ were given greater authority 
to make decisions. 
 
 
 
                                            
51 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s), 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/faqs.html 
52 CROP agencies are: Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM); South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA); 
Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP); Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC); South 
Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC); South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment 
(SPBEA); Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP); South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO); University of the South Pacific (USP)  
53 Also known as the FOC meetings, however this thesis follows the format of the new Agreement to 
describe Forum institutions. 
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2.3 Forum Update 
A number of events led to the convening of an Eminent Person’s Group 
(EPG) to review the Forum in 2003-04.  
1. Recommendations of the 2002-2003 Australian Senate review, A 
Pacific engaged, called for an investigation into the idea of a Pacific 
Economic and Political community. 
2. The deterioration of security in Solomon Islands and subsequent 
intervention in 2003 of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI).  
3. More significantly however, was the role of the New Zealand Prime 
Minister as 2003 Forum Chair.54  
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and seniors officials sought to 
maximise this opportunity and at the 2003 annual summit received a 
“wholesale sign-up to reforms,” for the New Zealand-led EPG review to, “put 
far more grunt into the Forum … [by] reconditioning its motor and adding more 
horsepower.”55  
 
The controversial appointment of former Australian diplomat Greg Urwin in 
2003 as Secretary General, was considered by some as another means by 
which Australia could dominate the Forum and further the “unabashed trend 
where the Pacific is being created in Australia’s image.”56 Others, given the 
diplomatic credentials of Urwin, did not “bridle, baulk and speak of neo-
                                            
54 Michael Field, 2003, ‘Persuasion Among Equals, Foreign Minister Goff talks about NZ’s regional role,’ 
Pacific Magazine, October 2003 
http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm102003/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=0010  
55 John Armstrong, 2003, ‘PM’s quiet diplomacy puts substance ahead of show,’ New Zealand Herald, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectID=3518587 
56 Stan Simpson, 2003, ‘Who controls the Pacific Islands Forum?’ Asia-Pacific Network, 
http://www.asiapac.org.fj/cafepacific/resources/aspac/200803simpson.html 
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colonialist attitudes,” but, “reached for the positives in Australia’s renewed 
interest in the region … [and] came to recognise that Mr Urwin was, quite 
simply, the ideal man to lead the Forum’s Suva based Secretariat.”57 In late 
2005, Robbie Robertson, Professor of Development Studies at the University 
of the South Pacific, argued that, “The EPG was certainly no mouthpiece for 
Australia and New Zealand, and its goals were very different from the security 
concerns of the Australian Government.”58
 
At a special leader’s summit in Auckland early 2004 the EPG submitted a 
report: Pacific Cooperation: Voices of the Region, where it recommended the 
adoption of a ‘Pacific Vision.’ 
Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of 
peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its 
people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the diversity of 
the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and 
religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a 
Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the 
sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of 
democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights. 
We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to develop our 
knowledge, to improve our communications and to ensure a 
sustainable economic existence for all. 59
                                            
57 New Zealand Herald, 2003, ‘Pacific group showing new maturity’ 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectiID=3518862 
58 Robbie Robertson, The Pacific Plan as a Development Strategy, Speech 29 September 2005, 
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-view_forum_thread.php? 
comments_parentId=49&top... 
59 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation: Voices in the Region, p 8, 
http://www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/pifreviewdocs/reviewindex.html,  
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At this summit, leaders also agreed to the development of a ’Pacific Plan’ (the 
Plan) to create stronger and deeper links between the sovereign countries of 
the region.”60
 
The 2004 Auckland Declaration also stated that security was one of four “key 
goals” for the Forum’s focus.61 In March 2005, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Helen Clark warned that “a regional approach” was needed to prevent “the 
region from becoming a permanent backwater.”62 She said, “the biggest 
challenge was to get traction” on the development of the ‘Pacific Plan’, “as 
development internationally was proceeding at a fast pace”.63 This call for 
forward traction is premised on what, Fred Bergsten called the, “bicycle 
theory”, which says, “you either move forward or you fall over.”64 The 
Secretariat was tasked with the responsibility to develop and implement the 
Plan and it has been described as: 
… the most widespread and intensive consultation process ever 
undertaken to prioritise Pacific solutions by Pacific people and is more 
extensive than any previously undertaken by the Governments of the 
region. It is not complete and is a process which must be further 
developed as the Pacific Plan itself develops. As a living document, the 
Pacific Plan will continue to draw inspiration from Leaders and from the 
people whom they serve.65
                                            
60 Ibid, p 21 
61 Auckland Declaration, Forum Communiqué, 2004 
62 New Zealand Press Association, 2005, ‘Regional approach to Pacific Issues Needed - Clark’, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/print/0,1478,3226990a11,00.html  
63 Ibid 
64 C. Fred Bergsten, 2000, ‘The Backlash Against Globalisation,’  
http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/trlgtxts/t54/ber.htm 
65 An Ongoing Strategy for the Future – Developed for Pacific People by Pacific People, 
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=issues+papers 
&PHPSESSID=fdf920e064133a85063a89accf4c426b 
 24
 Nevertheless, the process has not been smooth. The composition of the EPG 
was criticised for giving a “false impression that only men of the older 
generation are capable of becoming members,” and found, “it ironic that in 
this new millennium, gender equity is not an obligation in the Pacific when 
forming any local, national, regional and international working committees, 
institution or in this case the EPG.”66 It should be noted however that the EPG 
review process was chaired by New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark 
and the Reflection Group set up to offer expertise and advice to the EPG 
consisted of many outstanding female participants (see annex two for the 
membership of the Pacific review project). The Pacific Plan Taskforce has 
also ensured women were well represented.67
 
The major contention in the development of the Plan has been the depth of 
consultation. Journalist Michael Field said Urwin had “consulted the region to 
death,” and that leaders instead “want a plan of action.”68 As a result, during 
the national consultations held in New Zealand March 2005, Field alleged 
Urwin was given, “the deep dark hurry up and the message from Pacific 
leaders that they are deeply disappointed with his lack of performance.”69  
 
Conversely, civil society groups and NGO’s called for leaders at the 2005 
leader’s summit in Papua New Guinea to reject the Plan demanding, “more 
                                            
66Motarilavoa Hilda Lini, PCRC Director, 2003, ‘Concerns over Eminent Persons Group composition,’ 
Media Release, 3 November 2003, The Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, 
http://www.pcrc.org.fj/Media%20Releases%202/EPG_concern.html.doc 
67 HelloPacific, 2004, ‘Women Represented on Pacific Plan taskforce,’ 3 September 2004 
http://www.hellopacific.com/news/general/show/news/2004/09/03/03reg02.html 
68 Michael Field, 2005, ‘Pacific Report,’ Nine-to-Noon Show, Radio New Zealand, 1 April 2005, 
http://www.michaelfield.org/rnz.htm 
69 Ibid 
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time, at least two more years for further consultation….”70 Crocombe 
countered these criticisms by claiming, “these groups are spreading their own 
opinions, which are not representative of the wider Pacific community.”71 At 
the summit, the Plan was accepted by leaders in its entirety. In December 
2005 however Urwin reminded the region that the Plan “is not a blueprint for 
the Pacific Islands,” and while it was endorsed by the leaders, “it would be 
further developed”72
 
Another criticism, which also affected this research as it has been completed 
in real time, was the intermittent and infrequent flow of information about the 
Forum, the Plan and its development. The monthly Forum news e-bulletins 
were released inconsistently as the Forum’s webpage was not updated 
regularly. Late 2005 however saw a new comprehensive Pacific Plan and 
Forum website appear.73 They contain a significant quantity of high quality 
work and analysis. This proved that behind the scenes in various 
organisations as well as the Forum, much research, analysis and reporting 
had been taking place.74  It could be argued that a more consistent flow of this 
information may have increased confidence in the Plan’s development.  
 
                                            
70 Radio Australia, Pacific Beat, 2005, ‘Calls for leaders to reject Pacific Plan,’ Presenter: Jemima 
Garret, Speaker: Rex Horoi, Executive Director, Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific 
International (FSPI) 
71 Pacific Magazine, 2005, ‘NGO’s Criticized for Selfish Views,’ Interview with Ron Crocombe, 23 
September 2005, http://www.pacificislands.cc/pina/pinadefault2.php?urlinaid=17024 
72 Fiji Times, 2005, ‘Forum secretariat details Pacific Plan’ 17 December 2005, 
http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=33781 
73http://www.pacificplan.org; http://www.forumsec.org (note: the old website at time of writing is still 
running and is found at http://www.forumsec.org.fj; the subtle difference in the URL, in my opinion could 
produce confusion and misunderstanding.) 
74 For further details of the work completed by the Secretariat in 2005 see: Greg Urwin’s opening 
address at the Forum Officials Committee pre-Forum and Budget and Work Programme session, 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj, (note: old Forum website), under Forum Speeches.    
 26
A more aggressive marketing of the Forum and its programmes would dispel 
many negative assumptions and myths and this was also noted in the EPG 
report. They said, “we were disappointed to find that many aspects of the 
work of the Forum were poorly understood outside central government and 
core ministries ...”75 It is acknowledged however, the Forum, its library and 
staff are extremely professional and have patiently assisted and encouraged 
this study. The new websites are very user-friendly which once word gets out, 
is likely to encourage more study and research. 
 
The next step in regionalism is the implementation of the Plan especially 
those programmes identified as “low hanging fruits” or “early practical 
benefits.”76 The ‘Kalibobo Roadmap,’ named after the village in Papua New 
Guinea where the leaders’ retreat was held, guides the implementation of the 
Plan by the Secretariat with political oversight provided by the newly 
established Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC).  
 
2.4 Pacific Islands Forum Annual Meetings 
The next part of this chapter will describe the annual Forum summits. Much of 
this will be derived from attending the 2004 meetings in Apia Samoa. 77 Due 
to the subjective nature of this type of research, events will be re-told as 
                                            
75 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 36 
76 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005, ‘The Pacific Plan For Strengthening Regional Cooperation 
And Integration,’ p 5 
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=The+Pacific+Plan 
77 A major limitation of this type of narrative is that I have only attended one Forum summit, which 
prevents comparison. It is likely that the Auckland summit had its own atmosphere compared with the 
Papua New Guinea meeting. It was suggested however that despite this limitation, the experience was 
too valuable not to record. 
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experienced therefore the descriptions are personal views. In the same 
setting, it is acknowledged that others may view situations differently. 78
 
2.4.1 Leaders’ Summit and Forum Officials Committee (the Committee) 
The annual series of meetings comprise the Forum Officials Committee (the 
Committee), the Official Leaders’ Welcome, the Leaders’ Special Retreat, the 
Leaders’ Formal session and the post-Forum Dialogue. Taking advantage of 
the opportunity, bi-lateral meetings between leaders’ are also frantically 
arranged as officials are lobbied for the best time slots. Officials also take time 
to confer with their counterparts and informal get-togethers, especially those 
involving rugby, are arranged. 
 
As with most Forum summits, the Apia meetings were characterised by their 
informality. It is suggested that this comes from the expectation that relations 
will be conducted in an amicable atmosphere and sometimes humorous 
fashion. Laughing and joking is common. All the meetings in Apia, except the 
leaders’ special retreat, were held in an open fale where the hotel’s cats 
wandered between tables and on rafters 
 
During the leaders’ so-called formal session, jokes were made about the 
mode of transport that had been generously provided (a number of large black 
Buicks by the Chinese government) and how some leaders had been 
mistaken for film stars, creating hoots of laughter for quite some time. Most 
surprising was the atmosphere during the evening receptions, most of the 
                                            
78 For ease of discussion, here the first person tense will be used – sparingly.  
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leaders moved among the guests, danced and sung to island music and 
appeared to enjoy each others’ company. The absence of the Australian 
Prime Minister was noticed at these open events.   
 
After the Official welcome ceremony, leaders and the Secretary General 
participate in a special retreat. They use this time to thrash out issues in 
privacy. Officials do not usually attend. I was informed however they sit 
outside with arm-loads of information waiting just in case they are required. 
Normally there is no set agenda, but the agreed record of the Committee 
meeting is forwarded to leaders including a summary of the discussion that 
took place.  
 
Some major issues may go straight to leaders’ without ‘pre-cooking’ by 
officials. The Pacific Plan update at the 2004 Apia meeting is an example. 
However, the numerous issues facing the leaders’ are complex and frequently 
require technical advice. To ease the burden during the retreat meetings, the 
Auckland Leaders’ Decisions recommended a series of reforms including 
procedural suggestions such as the Secretary General developing a short 
Retreat agenda and greater authority for Forum Ministers to make decisions 
at their respective meetings.79  
 
In spite of the informality, professionalism during meetings is maintained. 
Procedures and agendas are followed and their content is taken very 
seriously. The Committee meetings take place over several days and are 
                                            
79 Forum Communiqué 2004, Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, Auckland Leaders Decisions, paragraph 
15, 22 
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attended by senior government officials and they proceed through an agenda 
supplied by the Forum. Officials discuss their respective government’s 
position on various issues and identify key decisions and recommendations 
for the leaders to consider. The Forum budget and work programme is 
presented by the Secretary General. Decisions concerning the Secretariat are 
made and operational and administrative issues handled. These meetings 
were held just prior to the leaders’ meetings however the Secretariat hosted 
the 2005 Committee meeting in Suva, three weeks before the leaders’ 
meeting in Papua New Guinea.80   
 
Flexibility during these meetings is possible because the processes are not 
bound by legalism. One example of this in Apia was when the Ulu-o-Tokelau, 
Pio Tuia, addressed the leaders’ session at the suggestion of the New 
Zealand Prime Minister. It was thought that this was the first time a leader 
from a non-member state had spoken at the Formal session.81 Another 
example was when the President of New Caledonia, an observer country, 
without prior warning gave her welcoming speech in French.  
 
One particular event that showed an aspect of political relations, which other 
regions could learn from, was the ability of leaders to move past or forgive a 
particular event. As an aside to the major meetings, island leaders met to 
choose the Forum’s representative for the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group 
(ACP) negotiations. The final two contenders were from Papua New Guinea 
                                            
80 The EPG recommended the Committee meet a few weeks before the summit, while there was not 
enough time to implement the suggestion at the 2004 Apia meeting, in 2005, the Committee met in Suva 
the first week of October and the summit was held 25-27 October 2005. 
81 Tokelau became an observer at the 2005 Forum. 
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and Samoa and this turned into a political tussle. It was rumoured that it could 
become a very difficult and tense issue.  
 
I was observing from the distance the leaders huddled in a circle with heads 
bent inwards. Waiting for some expression of tension to erupt, surprisingly 
nothing occurred and I was left wondering about the result, imagining they 
were at an impasse. Keeping in mind, it is expected that consensus is the 
usual mode for Pacific decision-making, again I was surprised to learn, they 
actually voted and that the Papua New Guinea candidate won. Given that 
Samoa was the Forum chair and host, I expected the Samoan Prime Minister 
to be aggrieved. That night at a reception, however the Prime Ministers’ of 
Samoa and Papua New Guinea were laughing together, patting each other on 
the back and even stood together while I took a very jovial photo of them. 
 
2.4.2 Post-Forum Dialogue 
Post-Forum dialogue meetings with Forum partners began in Kiribati in 1989. 
The purpose was to provide an opportunity for parties interested in the region 
to participate in discussions with Forum members. The criteria for admission 
as a dialogue partner are: 
• Long-established historical links with the region including security links; 
• Significant trade and investment links; 
• Long term commitment to the region through participation in regional 
organisations and diplomatic missions; 
• Cultural and social identification with communities in the region; 
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• Development assistance to the region…82 
Following several requests from potential new Dialogue Partners, a 
moratorium on new additions was placed by leaders at the 2005 summit and 
the Secretariat tasked to review the criteria. 83
 
In Apia, the Dialogue meetings ranged from extremely formal such as the 
meeting with the Chinese delegates to a very informal meeting with the 
Canadian delegates. There are two panels made up of normally three or four 
Forum Foreign Ministers who meet with the respective partners to discuss 
issues of concern from both parties. It appeared to be an exhausting process 
for the Forum panels that sat through two hour long sessions, which were 
comparable to an interview process with one delegation following the next. 
Some country briefs were long and the Forum panels listened to tedious 
renditions of the well-known foreign policies of the respective partners. 
Conversely, the Forum panel repetitively stated their collective view on certain 
positions to each delegation. While it is a valuable opportunity, the procedure 
requires reform. A review of this process was also agreed to at the 2005 
Forum and a report is due for the 2006 Forum.84
 
It is suggested that as part of the post-dialogue review, mention of the ‘Pacific 
Way’ and lessons in cultural sensitivity could be introduced. I noticed a clash 
of cultures between the Forum panel and some partner delegations. 
Demanding tones and aggressive hand gestures by some partner delegates 
                                            
82 Pacific Plan Website, ‘Post-Forum Dialogue’, http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-
page.php?pageName=POST-FORUM+DIALOGUE& 
83 Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005, ‘Pacific Islands Forum’, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/spf.html 
84 Ibid 
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are unlikely to be received well in the friendly atmosphere of the Forum 
meetings. Berating Forum countries is also unlikely to achieve any objectives 
whereas understanding and consideration for cultural sensitivities is more 
appropriate and may encourage better relations.  
 
When summing up the characteristics of the Forum annual meetings, the 
EPG’s suggestion that the “ ‘Pacific Way’ must evolve and be reasserted if it 
is remain relevant,” must be kept in mind. 85 It is the combination of 
informality, professionalism, flexibility and the ability to forgive a difficult 
political situation, which has matured the original idea of the ‘Pacific Way’. It is 
suggested that this is the reason cooperation has become normative and that 
there is a consistent expectation that future relations will remain friendly. It is 
this that creates a firm foundation for more intensive regionalism to progress.  
 
2.5 Logic of Action 
Regional integration described by Walter Mattli is, 
…motivated by the belief that there is a general logic to regional 
integration … That there is a way of looking at or interpreting or 
organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and 
diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and 
relatively simple structure …86 (sic) 
Pacific regionalism evolved ad hoc until the advent of the 2003-4 EPG report 
and the development of the Plan. Since the beginning of this study in early 
2004, the Forum has undergone immense change and is in a period of 
                                            
85 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 20 
86 Walter Mattli, 1999, The Logic of Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge,  p 3 
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transformation. The 2003-4 EPG report and the development of the Plan has 
revealed the Forum’s strengths and flaws. It is argued that outcomes have not 
always satisfied regional expectations. Has the Forum failed to meet its 
objectives or have regional expectations been unrealistic? One answer is that 
until recently, the logic of integration and action has been implicit and 
obscured by myths, incorrect assumptions and ignorance.  
 
During this time of regional transition, clarification is important. In all 
relationships, even friendly and cooperative ones, there comes a time when 
the expectations of all parties’ needs to be made explicit and roles clearly 
defined. If a party feels threatened or misunderstands motives and intentions, 
the desire to cooperate will lessen as tension or resentment builds. This 
scenario would undermine the basic objective of the Pacific Plan. On the other 
hand, for the Forum institutions to remain effective, its logic of action must be 
relevant and useful if it is to help fulfil the goals of the ‘Pacific Vision,’ through 
the implementation of the Plan. 
 
As discussed above, one purpose of this chapter is to challenge the myths 
concerning the Forum’s responsibilities and the region’s expectations. This 
examination will assess whether the Forum has the authority and ability 
required to fulfil its obligations because the main problem is; now the 
Secretariat is tasked with the responsibility of the Plan, to whom the blame will 
be attributed, should the Plan’s programmes fade into obscurity. Is it valid to 
assume that the responsibility for the success of the Plan lies only with the 
institutions of the Forum? 
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 Secretary General Greg Urwin cautions, “The Forum will not be able to do this 
on its own, and shouldn’t try to, for it is not a Forum Plan, but one that should 
belong to the nations and peoples of the Pacific.”87 It must be remembered 
that the Secretariat is not the sum of the Forum as it is the region’s 
governments that comprise its membership. Samoan Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance, Hon Misa Telefoni Retzlaff spoke to the Asian 
Development Bank in Manila early 2005 and stated, “Any Pacific Plan can 
only work with total commitment, good will participation and resolute 
compliance ….”88 Robertson also reminded that,  
The Pacific Plan needs popular support. Undoubtedly this will grow as 
the package of confidence-building initiatives, labour mobility and 
development assistance delivers benefits at the grassroots. But in the 
long term, deeper regionalism requires accountable and transparent 
institutions. 
 
The consensus surrounding the Plan has created a moral imperative for its 
execution and this degree of political-will needs to transform into political 
responsibility. So while overall responsibility for the success of the Plan is 
region-wide, it is up to the leaders to clearly define the Forum’s ‘logic of 
action’ and then by accepting their degree of political responsibility, cooperate 
with the Secretariat by supporting its programmes and implementing its 
                                            
87 Makereta Komai, 2005, ‘PNG Prime calls for special attention on the needs of small island states in 
the Pacific Plan’ PACNEWS, Oct 26, 2005, http://www.pinanius.com/news/publish/printer_1025.shtml 
88 Hon Misa Telefoni Retzlaff, 2005, ‘The Pacific Plan: how to make it work,’ p 6, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2005/speech-hon-misa-telefoni-retzlaff.pdf 
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initiatives. The Plan may be the first tangible mechanism to ensure the 
region’s governments cooperate with the Forum Secretariat.  
 
2.5.1 What is the Logic of Action for a Regional Organisation? 
The idea that a ‘logic of action’ exists is often taken for granted. During the 
process of organisational transformation, revealing the logic of action helps to 
prevent misunderstanding as the “means-ends relationships” can be clearly 
defined.89 It can be argued therefore that for a useful logic to emerge, it must 
consider the purpose of action and the structure for that action, which can 
then be tested by the effectiveness of the practical mechanisms to implement 
the action. Combined this logic of action will create an objective but common 
sense concept to help understand the ‘why and how’ processes of 
regionalism. 
 
2.5.2 Logic of purpose 
Classic authors of regionalism believed the purpose of organisation is to 
achieve an agreed goal or end by some form of cooperative endeavour. 
Amitai Etzioni, for example said organisations are, “… social units which are 
predominantly orientated to the attainment of specific goals.“90 Michael Smith 
described an organisation’s purpose as,  
A mechanism through which states and other groupings attempt to 
manage their involvement in the international arena … a means by 
which authority is transferred away from states and other groupings to 
                                            
89 Bacharach, 1996 
90 Amitai Etzioni 1961, Complex Organisations, A Sociological Reader, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New 
York, pvii 
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regional bodies better able to manage the problems that confront 
them91  
Importantly, he asserted that, ‘the test for effectiveness is the extent to which 
security and prosperity can be achieved through collective action at the 
regional level.”92  
 
Greg Fry has contended that “the region and its institutions are increasingly a 
place where business gets done.” 93 He extracted the “political roles” of 
regionalism and regional institutions, 
• The region often has the capacity to confer legitimacy on practices 
(such as intervention) and on important concepts (such as security or 
development); 
• It distributes resources, legitimates procedural norms and adjudicates 
on the legitimacy of states and governments by policing the right to 
membership; 
• It is also the site of the generation of international law. 
• It is used to protect local cultural mores; 
• Is seen as an anti-hegemonic strategy to control great power and 
particularly American or Western dominance.94 
 
Fry’s last feature is explained as a “counter-hegemonic strategy.”95 This 
process provides the ability for “enhancing state power and maintaining state 
                                            
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Fry, 2000, p 123, 124, 130 
94 Ibid 
95 Ibid, p 126; A comparison of this strategy with Bernard K Gordon’s view of the ANZAC pact would 
make interesting research.  
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sovereignty and the non-intervention principle in the face of global 
encroachment.”96 The affect of this, he concluded was that “even in the most 
marginalized case of the South Pacific, a region of micro-states, it can be 
shown that island state opinion has prevailed in the face of an attempt to 
impose a hegemonic order throughout the Cold War.”97 From here, the logic 
of purpose for a regional organisation can be described as the management 
of the region’s political roles through cooperative mechanisms with the 
purpose of attaining specific goals.  
 
2.5.3 Structural logic 
The structural composition of an organisation is an important feature to 
ensure the purposes of regional organisation are achieved. Philip Selnick 
reviewed the structure of an organisation by quoting John M Gaus, he said,  
Organisation, we are told, is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating 
the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of 
functions and responsibilities. Cooperative systems are constituted of 
individuals interacting as wholes in relation to a formal system of 
coordination ... Furthermore this structure is itself a totality, an adaptive 
organism reacting to influences upon it from an external environment.” 98  
 
He added that the “maintenance of the system” and its structure required the 
need for: 
• Security of the organisation as a whole; 
                                            
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid, p 131 
98 Philip Selnick 1961, ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organisation’ in Amitai Etzioni 1961, Complex 
Organisations, A Sociological Reader, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, p 17 - 24 
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• The stability of the lines of authority and communication; 
• The stability of informal relations within the organisation; 
• The continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination; 
• Homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the 
organisation.99 
Structural logic therefore consists of the arrangement of personnel in an 
institutional environment that is adaptive and maintains stability and 
consistency with agreement of its roles and functions.  
 
2.5.4 Practical logic  
Institutions that promote cooperative endeavours are the practical 
mechanisms that have been called the “motors of integration” or “the driver of 
regionalism.”100 The “Monnet Method” also known as “neo-functionalist 
incrementalism” is described by Myrto Tsakatika; “Concerted action was to be 
a ‘concrete achievement’, insofar as there was continuity and 
institutionalisation of a variety of partial projects of cooperation on economic 
and social issues [and] the common projects that would result from it.”101 He 
argued that,  
These projects would habituate European states and their citizens in 
cooperation. Gradually cooperation would be needed on other projects 
and whole sectors of common activity, due to the inter-dependence that 
would emerge from initial cooperation. Given time, Europe would become 
                                            
99 Ibid, p 26 
100 Myrto Tsakatika, 2002, ‘Why Political Responsibility is Lacking in the EU: the Legacy of the Monnet 
Method,’ paper presented at the PSA Conference, University of Aberdeen.  
101 Jean Monnet is considered to be the Father of European integration or the architect of the EU. For 
further reading - Myrto Tsakatika, 2005, ‘Claims to Legitimacy: The European Commission between 
Continuity and Change,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 43, Number 1, pp 193 – 220; 
2004, ‘The Open Method of Co-ordination in the European Convention: An Opportunity Lost?’ 
http://www.aueb.gr/deos/Seminars/Tsakatika28.4.04.pdf 
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united without realising it, as common projects would lead European states 
to pool their sovereignties.102
This method relied on a “body of experts and administrators” not politicians.103 
These ”technocratic elite” would be independent and loyal to the idea of 
regionalism and would provide “advice upon which governments and men of 
politics would act.”104  
 
Tsakatika argued that Monnet’s slow and concealed process of regionalism 
has produced “deeply rooted structural reasons for the lack of openness 
accountability, efficiency, coherence and participation,” so that “democratic 
legitimacy” is threatened and the development of good regional governance 
undermined.105 On the other hand, he acclaimed “there are many practical 
considerations to be taken into account,” as from this method the EU has 
become the, “motor of integration … is the centre of information and 
expertise; [a] policy entrepreneur; point of reference; [and a] reliable mediator 
between the contrasting interests of the Member states.” 106   
 
It is argued that the habit of cooperation has been the foundation for Pacific 
regionalism due to a lack of interstate enmity, but that ‘concerted action’ 
producing consistent ‘concrete achievement’ has limped along in ad hoc 
fashion comparable to Monnet’s method. As the ‘motor for integration’ or 
‘driver of Pacific regionalism’, the incremental development of the Forum has 
obscured some of its structures and institutions. Myths of inefficiency are 
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perceived because its implementation of initiatives or ‘concrete action’ has 
lacked momentum. While this maybe a time-sensitive flaw in the sense that 
Pacific regionalism is still evolving. The time to increase impetus is evidenced 
by the development of the Plan, which has been a firm and positive step 
towards a greater depth of regionalism. 
 
Ad hoc incremental regionalism has therefore been be superseded by 
deliberate political decision-making. The Forum, therefore as the driver of the 
Plan must take a more direct approach towards regionalism. Its logic of action 
is summarised as: 
… having the authority to manage the region’s political roles with the 
purpose of attaining specific goals through mechanisms with stable but 
adaptive structures that can implement good governance processes.  
 
2.6 Pacific Islands Forum Agreement 
This part of the chapter will compare the logic of action described above with 
the structural reform provided by the new ‘Agreement Establishing the Pacific 
Islands Forum’ (the Agreement) adopted by the Leaders at the 2005 leader’s 
summit – see annex three. The purpose is to test the effectiveness of these 
adjustments and make suggestions towards increasing the Forum’s potential. 
 
The political decision to legally establish the Forum through this Agreement, 
once in force, will change the constitutional and legal status of the region 
forever. At the 2005 summit, this regionally historical moment nevertheless 
occurred and passed without much media or academic fanfare. Previously the 
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Forum institutions were not confined to one formal document or treaty.107 It 
was believed this allowed for greater institutional flexibility however the 
communiqués, agreements and declarations have created an institutional 
complexity that was problematic when trying to clarify rules, roles and 
boundaries. The EPG review said, “The existing Agreement establishing the 
Forum Secretariat … is out of date and does not recognise the current nature 
of Secretariat work.”108
 
The Agreement re-affirms the goals of the Pacific Vision. Its purpose is, 
“formally to establish the Pacific Islands Forum as an international 
organisation in its own right and better to provide for its purpose and 
operation…” (sic). Nevertheless, relative to other international agreements 
this explanation is sparse.109 It does not explain how the Forum will achieve 
its goals and purposes.  Despite this, the implication is that, once in force, the 
Forum will have official actor status to enter and sign contractual agreements. 
It can participate as an entity, independent in law and of its constituents, with 
a legal platform to establish further binding agreements.110  
 
Ron Crocombe strongly agreed with the view of Dr Kurleigh King, Secretary 
General of CARICOM to, “Keep the lawyers out.”111 In 1980 Crocombe spent 
time “looking at regionalism in the Caribbean,” and said that, “CARICOM is 
bogged down by a detailed constitution and agreements that makes creative 
                                            
107 Forum institutions include the Pacific Leader’s and the outcomes from the annual summit meetings, 
the Secretariat, Forum Chair, and the various Forum ministers and officials meetings. 
108 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 51 
109 See annex three, page one, last paragraph 
110 Personal interview with Neil Boister, International Criminal Lawyer, School of Law , University of 
Canterbury – 3rd November 2005 
111 Ron Crocombe, 2005, ‘Regionalism and the Reduction of Conflict’ in Securing a Peaceful Pacific, 
Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, p 154 
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action difficult.”112 Is it likely therefore that the Forum’s new Agreement will 
hinder creative action? The Agreement now formally and legally sets out a 
structure that defines the roles, functions and boundaries of the Forum. It has 
outlined a logic of action for the Forum but the next question is how effective it 
this? 
  
Boister, an international lawyer, described this Agreement as ‘an empty – cut 
down version of a constitutional treaty.’113 He noted it lacked a formal dispute 
resolution process and required all Forum members to sign and ratify before it 
enters into force.114 This, he said makes it a ‘difficult’ treaty as it does not 
have a timetable for action.115 Therefore, until ratification, it has no official 
legal standing.  
 
The spirit of the Agreement, however clearly enunciates the structure and 
purposes, authority and functions of the Forum and its various institutions. 
Despite being deliberately vague with open-ended provisions, its main 
contribution is to clarify the status quo and provide for further development. 
With the Forum in a period of transition and the development of the Pacific 
Plan, this is a timely and sensible definition of the Forum’s logic of action and 
as another move towards a greater depth of regionalism – it is a small but 
appropriate step.  
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113 Boister, 2005, Interview, 
114 New Zealand, Tonga and Tuvalu did not sign the Agreement in Papua New Guinea at the 2005 
Annual Leaders Summit.  
115 Ibid 
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2.6.1 Article I: The Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum) 
The Forum is established as an international organisation. It comprises 
Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Samoa, Tonga as the 
founding members; and the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Niue 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon 
Island, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Associate membership of the territories must be 
approved by the Forum leaders. The criteria for associated membership and 
the nature and extent of the rights and obligations are to be determined by the 
Leaders from time to time. Leaders may also invite other territories and inter-
governmental organisations to be Forum observers.  
 
This defines the Forum, not as the group of leaders’ or their annual meeting 
(which is outlined in Article III), but as the membership of 16 governments. 
One interesting omission is a description of the nature and extent of the rights 
and obligations of members towards each other and the Forum. So, what 
action is available to the Forum institutions to ensure members cooperate with 
its strategies and initiatives? Cooperation implies a reciprocal interaction 
where all parties take responsibility to achieve a collective goal.  
 
The Forum can only move with or alongside national governments, who 
ultimately must accept the consequences if they hinder the cooperation 
process. As former Forum Secretary General Noel Levi said when,  
…trying to achieve the Secretariat’s vision of, a sustainable prosperous 
and secure Pacific…, the pursuit of these goals has been much like a 
canoe race. Unless the team paddles on both sides, with a degree of 
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coordination and harmony, the canoe cannot move forward very 
well.116  
 
2.6.2 Article II: Purpose 
The purpose of the Forum is to strengthen regional cooperation and 
integration including through the pooling of regional resources of 
governance and the alignment of policies, in order to further Forum 
members’ shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, 
good governance and security. 
Admirable and reflective of the Pacific Vision, this description of the Forum’s 
purpose implies a degree of responsibility for the Forum to achieve its goals. 
Yet as discussed above, cooperation is a two way process and here no 
mention is made of the consequences should a member hinder the 
cooperative process. Ideas of sanctions and the use of sticks to coerce 
compliance are unlikely to be effective. As a result members must exert 
greater political responsibility to ensure the purposes of the Agreement are 
achieved. This would be evidence of mature regionalism.  
 
Reliance on historical relationships of amity and cooperation based on the 
‘Pacific Way’ will therefore become a more significant mechanism that will 
require careful maintenance. Most Pacific leaders and officials will not find this 
difficult, but some who are used to formal structures and strict deadlines, will 
need to lower their expectations. While this is not easy, it is achievable. It will 
ensure legitimacy is achieved as collectively-made decisions are more likely 
                                            
116 Noel Levi, 2003, ‘Opening Remarks, 2003 Pre-Forum Summit Forum Officials Committee Meeting, in 
Auckland,’ 12 August 2003 
http://www.hellopacific.com/news/general/2003/08/12/12regdmeeting3.html 
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to achieve their objectives. This will be a significant role model for other 
developing regions to emulate. 
 
2.6.3 Article III: The Forum Leaders’ Meeting 
The Leaders’ annual meeting is the pre-eminent decision-making body of the 
Forum. The meeting procedures are not described but left to their 
determination. They appoint the Forum Chair who will hold the position until 
the next annual meeting. In the 2004 Auckland Decisions, and traditionally, 
this was the leader of the host country however this Agreement leaves the 
provision open.  
 
The 2004 ‘Auckland Decisions,’ gave the Forum Chair greater power and 
authority to provide leadership.117 The Decisions state that the Forum Chair is 
to ‘play a proactive role in taking a strong regional leadership role … including 
on the international stage.’118 This raises the profile of the position. It can act 
as an incentive to encourage a greater level of good and skilful regional 
leadership to emerge.  
 
The 2004 Forum Chair, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi 
was described as ‘a great pragmatist’ and chaired the region through the 
development of the Pacific Plan with courage and realism. He commented 
that, 
…our commitment to regionalism has been patchy. There are complex 
reasons for this, among them the pursuit of inward-looking policies, as 
                                            
117 2004 Communiqué, Note, the Auckland Decisions are separate to that of the ‘Auckland Declaration.’ 
118 2004 Communiqué, para 18 
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well as the fact, put frankly, that our members can still benefit from 
regionalism without making a serious commitment to it.119
The Hon Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
the 2005 Forum Chair said, ‘we have decided that the Pacific Plan is an 
appropriate vehicle … [and] let me state that it would be a mistake – an 
opportunity lost – if we do not approve the draft Pacific Plan.’120 As regional 
representatives, both these men are long term experienced politicians, from 
two very different Pacific island countries. 
 
Malielegaoi is from a homogenous society with stable government that 
enabled him the freedom to fulfil the duties of Chair. Somare is from a 
fractured state with a list of complex security issues all of which have the 
ability to seriously threaten its stability. As Forum Chair with the mandate to 
represent and promote the region on the global stage, Somare may be 
compromised by his domestic problems. Tonga has agreed to host the 2006 
Forum annual summit and will then become Forum Chair. It too may become 
preoccupied by domestic concerns as its citizens assert their desire for a 
more democratic form of governance.  
 
How these domestic issues impact the role of the Forum Chair is unknown at 
this point. It is stressed however, that these are problems common in varying 
degrees in most countries and should not inhibit regional leadership. The 
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stress here is put on the Agreement which does not contain explicit provisions 
for dealing with difficult political situations. 
 
Another major issue of promoting the position and authority of the Forum 
Chair is found in the Biketawa Declaration, which asserts,  
Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response  to 
members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of 
all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended 
family. The Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive 
issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnic 
tension, socio-economic disparities, and lack of good  governance, 
land disputes and erosion of cultural values). To this end, the Secretary 
General in the future after consulting the Forum Chairman should 
urgently initiate the following process … (emphasis mine)121
 
This problem here is if the Forum Chair is unable or unsuitable to function in 
this role, there is no formal solution. How can the list of ‘difficult and sensitive 
issues’ in the Declaration be ‘constructively addressed’ if the Forum Chair is 
the leader of the country suffering from these problems? Should a crisis arise 
in the country of the Forum Chair, how can the Secretary General consult 
when the position of Forum Chair is comprised by a conflict of interest?122
 
This then also draws into question the position of Secretary General and 
especially in light of the call by leaders for his role to become more pro-active. 
                                            
121 Pacific Islands Forum, Communiqué 2000 
122 As a note of interest, as hosts of the previous 17th Forum in 1986, Fiji was officially Forum Chair at 
the time of the 1987 Fiji Coup. 
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Helen Clark, New Zealand Prime Minister, in 2003 explicitly asserted the 
Forum Secretary General was “to act in trouble spots” as like that of 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon.123 She said, “…let’s make 
it absolutely clear that the Secretary General is expected to be proactive. If we 
mandate a new direction, we expect proactive management of that…” and “as 
Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr McKinnon not only has the ability to 
send in special missions and call for special attention to a trouble spot, but he 
is expected to do so.” 124   
 
As an alternative, one Forum institution not mentioned in the Agreement is the 
troika comprising the outgoing, current and incoming Forum Chairs – 
sometimes known as the Core Group of Leaders. The diversity of the group is 
transformed each time the Forum Chair circulates through the membership. If 
the Biketawa Declaration was updated to provide for the Secretary General to 
consult with this group – its diversity would reduce the possibility of conflict of 
interest and add towards greater regional legitimacy. In the course of their 
normal international leadership duties, all three could also promote and 
advance the interests of the region as they are able. 
 
2.6.4 Article IV: Establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat & 
Article VIII: Functions of the Secretariat 
Article IV establishes the Secretariat based in Suva and article VIII clearly 
describes its functions. Article VIII (2) states:  
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 The primary roles of the Secretariat are to provide policy advice, 
 coordination and assistance in implementing the decisions of the 
 Forum Leaders. 
Paragraph 3(a) states the Secretariat, “subject to the direction of Forum 
leaders and the Committee,” shall also: 
 Build upon the important basis for regional cooperation 
 established by the Forum by working to further strengthen and 
 deepen links between the countries of the region in accordance 
 with the purpose of the Forum, including through the ongoing 
 development and implementation of the Pacific Plan. 
 
While these provisions clearly outline the functions of the Secretariat, the 
rights and obligations of the members to the Secretariat are still implicit. This 
could become contentious should a problem concerning resources or 
overloading arise. The EPG report acknowledged this problem, “There have 
been criticisms that it [the Secretariat] is struggling to produce concise, high-
quality policy papers on time.”125 They recommended the Secretary General 
re-develop a corporate plan, it is suggested this include the provision that 
Pacific leaders and their respective governments prioritise their governance 
policies towards a more cooperative relationship. While the Secretariat and 
Secretary General serves the Forum members, the members must also 
reciprocate with national policies that provide the information and resources 
required for the Secretariat to develop effective policies.  
 
                                            
125 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 51 
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2.6.5 Article V: Pacific Islands Forum Officials’ Committee (the Committee) 
Comprising one representative of each of the members, this is the 
Secretariat’s Executive body and its powers and functions are, “to give 
general policy directions to the Secretariat and to make reports and 
recommendations to the Forum leaders.” It also approves the work-plan and 
budget of the Secretariat and comments on the Secretariat’s Annual Report.  
 
The Committee also determines the remuneration and regulations of the 
Secretariat staff. It has been suggested that the turnover of staff is not 
frequent, thus political and technical expertise is not evolving throughout the 
region. The EPG report discouraged the “cult of regional career official,” and 
recommended, “executive/professional staff be hired for no more than two 
three year terms of employment.”126 Increased secondments from Forum 
member governments may augment the region’s talent pool of officials. 
 
The position of Secretary General is limited by the two three year terms in 
Article VI but it makes no mention of other senior staff positions. This does not 
prevent the Committee from drafting the rule as this Article re-states the 
Committee is to determine the ‘establishment’ of staff and the remuneration 
policy. 
 
Article V (7) states, 
All decisions of the Committee shall be taken by consensus, wherever 
possible, or if necessary by a majority of the representatives present 
                                            
126 Ibid, p 52, 53 
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and voting, except as provided for in Article IX(2) of this Agreement 
(this provides for the sharing of the Forum’s operating costs). 
Consensus is considered an important feature in all relationships. The EPG 
report acknowledged its importance, “The ‘Pacific Way’ is one of the region’s 
greatest assets, but the concept must evolve and be reasserted if it is to 
remain relevant.”127 Taking the time to talk through a problem is a common 
cultural theme in many countries and it has an important moral strength that 
compels implementation.  
 
However, a consistent debate over the legitimacy of consensus versus vote, 
does not in the meantime, solve the problems facing the region. The strength 
of the ‘Pacific Way’ is not undermined by accepting that in some situations, 
voting is appropriate. Article V retains the commitment to consensus decision-
making but provides room for a vote if needed. Legitimacy can be achieved 
either by consensus or a vote but mainly by ensuring that regional decisions 
are made by a style of ‘good regional governance’ that is inclusive, effective 
and free from corruption.128  
 
This step in the evolution of the ‘Pacific Way’ extends the idea of ‘political will’ 
or ‘buy-in’ towards a sense of greater ‘political responsibility’. The practice of 
agreeing formally to a decision without the intention of implementing has been 
described as ‘in but cheating’.129 In this context, regionalism is prevented from 
achieving its goals such as those set out in the Plan. One outcome from the 
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members accepting the need for a greater degree of responsibility is a mature 
regionalism that sees adherence to the decisions made. 
 
2.6.6. Article VII: Functions of the Secretary General 
The Secretary General shall act as secretary to the Forum leaders’ 
meeting. The Secretary General shall also act as secretary to 
Ministerial meetings, the Committee and such other councils, 
committees or working groups as may be established by the Forum.130
Before the new Agreement was made available, it was suggested that the 
Secretary General’s authority was obscure.131  In April 2004, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Helen Clark repeated her view that his “role is expected to 
allow for greater intervention in regional crises …” but that “ the Forum 
Secretary General, for whatever reason, has not felt empowered to act in the 
way, say, Don McKinnon would if he saw a crisis in the Commonwealth.”132 
ABC reporter Sean Dorney also said, “The leaders agreed in August [2003] 
that it was time to have another look at the Forum and give the Secretary 
General and the Secretariat greater powers to be proactive.”133 It was argued 
conversely, that the Biketawa Declaration, being at that stage the only 
document outlining the authority of the position, actually confined initiative by 
the requirement for consultation with the Forum Chair.134 It was stated 
therefore that if “the authority to act is derived … from the document, then the 
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logic of action must be defined cautiously, if from the rhetoric, then there is 
more room to move.”135  
 
Looking at the wider context, a consistent degree of uncertainty concerning 
leadership in intergovernmental organisations was discovered. The current 
United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan said, “There are times 
when I have to be a secretary and times when I have to be a general and 
show leadership. Knowing when to be one and when to be the other is what 
makes this job so challenging.”136 Despite the objectives in the Terms of 
Reference for the 2003 EPG Review to “assess the mandate of the Secretary 
General including option for broadening and making more explicit the role”137 
The new Agreement states explicitly the Forum Secretary General is the 
region’s ‘secretary’.  
 
Article VII (2) clearly outlines the Secretary General’s responsibilities and 
tasks, 
The Secretary General shall be responsible, in close consultation with 
the Forum Chair and within the limits set by the Forum leaders from 
time to time, for setting Forum Leaders’ meeting agendas and 
coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly 
crises. The Secretary General shall also perform other functions and 
duties as directed by Forum leaders. 
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While this has dispelled any myths concerning the Secretary General’s 
authority and it provides little room for initiative or for a more pro-active role. 
During the 2003 review, the EPG “encountered a general belief that the role of 
the Secretary General should be less constrained” and in their report they 
asserted that the “role of the Forum Secretary General is substantial and the 
incumbent is a key determinant to the success or failure of both the 
Secretariat and the wider Forum process.”138  
 
Keeping in mind the idea of structural logic as described above, “…is the 
arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed 
purpose…”139 Regional governance under this Article is to bear all the 
negative bureaucratic burdens of constraint. When lamenting the demise of 
“individual genius and initiative,” former Under-Secretary of the UN 
Giandomenico Picco said, “We need to encourage the role of commandos … 
in the civil realm … [and that] a new theory of institutions, which combines the 
strength of their structure with the genius of individuals ...”140 Despite the 
region’s call for ingenious and directive leadership from the Secretary 
General, under this new Agreement, the position is to remain constrained 
without risk. 
 
2.7 What the Agreement missed 
The Agreement does not provide for all the Forum bodies, namely the 
numerous Forum Ministers’ meetings. The annual Forum Communiqués list 
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the annual reports from the ministerial meetings for the year past. These have 
included the meetings of Foreign, Fisheries, Education, Trade, Economic, 
Aviation, Communication ministers and the Pacific ACP and the Forum 
Ministerial Committee on New Caledonia. Some ministerial groups meet 
annually and others as required. The 2004 Auckland Decisions has mandated 
“Forum Ministerial meetings with decision-making power,” and Secretary 
General Greg Urwin has also acknowledged this “effort to devolve more 
decision-making to Ministers …141  
 
It is noted that defence or security ministers have not met in an official 
capacity. Security officials meet annually through various meetings such as 
the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC), Pacific Chiefs of Police, 
Oceania Customs Organisation, Pacific Immigration Directors Conference, 
and the Pacific Law Officers Meeting. In March 2005, police, defence and 
security officials from 15 countries and Pacific regional organisations, 
including the Forum Secretariat, attended a South Pacific Defence and 
Security Seminar at the Military Studies Institute, Trentham Military Camp, 
hosted by the New Zealand Defence Force.142 The status, function and 
potential of the FRSC will be detailed in chapter six but it is argued here that 
as security is one of the four pillars of the Plan and with Forum leaders 
devolving more authority to Ministers, it would be appropriate for defence or 
security ministers’ to meet with the purpose to make collective decisions 
concerning the Pacific security environment. 
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 2.8. Forum Appraised 
The test for effectiveness of the Forum is whether it, as described above, ‘has 
the authority to manage the region’s political roles with the purpose of 
attaining specific goals through mechanisms with stable but adaptive 
structures that can implement good governance processes.’ Being tasked with 
the implementation of the Plan, the Forum has been clearly been accepted as 
the driver or motor for greater regionalism. The new Agreement provides a 
simple logic of action that gives the Forum the formal and legal authority to 
manage the region’s political roles. Its structures are stable and have been 
clarified under the new Agreement. The adaptability of them to adjust towards 
their respective goals, despite the new legal structures, is likely to occur due 
to the informality and flexibility of regional relations.  
 
The success of the Plan and ultimately the Pacific Vision however may suffer 
due to the lack of good regional governance processes in the security sector. 
This will be discussed in chapter six when one regional institution, the Forum 
Regional Security committee is detailed and its processes analysed.   
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Chapter 3: Pacific Cooperation Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This review considers the literature on regional cooperation in the Pacific 
region. The emphasis on cooperation is important because it challenges the 
applicability of traditional security theory that relies on realism, when studying 
security in the Pacific.143 The characteristics of Pacific cooperation will be 
described with a focus on the evolution of the ‘Pacific Way’ – the region’s 
established means for consensual, inclusive and authoritative decision-
making process. Pacific cooperation depends on this principle especially 
when the members have disproportionate resources and power.   
 
3.2 Historical Cooperation 
The desire for closer relations and greater regional cooperation has been a 
historically consistent feature of Pacific relations. In 1930, Caroline Mabel 
West-Watson from the Canterbury University College presented her MA 
thesis on International Rivalries and Cooperation in the Pacific Area.144 While 
her definition of the Pacific region is different to this study by focusing on the 
rim countries, she included Pacific island countries as the territories of colonial 
powers. Her work is considered relevant as two principles of cooperation she 
espoused characterise the beginning of cooperative relationships in the 
Forum countries. One feature she argued was that:  
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… the growth of a spirit of cooperation … [evolves from] a system of 
cooperation [where] the various nations will be neither in subjection to 
the will of the strongest nor in competition with each other …”145  
In a region, like the Pacific, where there is a large diversity in resources and 
power, successful cooperation depends on a system that can prevent 
domination as well as providing the means for more vulnerable members to 
participate and contribute appropriately.  
 
Secondly, West-Watson asserted that cooperation was, “developed among 
them primarily to enable them to pursue their own aims more effectively.”146 
This idea that self-interest can be satisfied through cooperative action is 
obvious, but reminding the parties that it is a natural reward and inherent 
motivation for parties to work together, encourages effective regionalism. 
There exists however in Pacific literature that will be discussed below, a 
tautological argument that if parties seek to satisfy national interests at the 
expense of cooperation then regionalism is ineffective. The flaw here is that 
the means has become the goal. If cooperation is the goal instead of a 
specific outcome, then any disagreement about the method of cooperation will 
threaten the relationship. If however the goal is specific, such as the 
prevention of trans-national criminals violating border regulations, then debate 
over the means acceptable.  
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A Chatham House Study Group (the Group) in 1946 on The Pattern of Pacific 
Security presented a similar theme of cooperation. 147 Their view of the region 
also differs from this study but their main argument is still useful. They said 
that, “… a genuine working order of collective security is the best condition of 
peace and progress.”148 They also identified a geographical characteristic of 
the region that gives insight into the cooperative nature of Pacific relations.  
  
The Group examined the character of the whole region, which included the 
four main powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and 
China. They identified the lack of a “land-mass which provides the political 
centre of gravity” and that, “the Pacific Ocean presented one strong contrast 
with all the other regions of the world” because the major powers had 
substantial security interests elsewhere.”149 They illustrated this lack of 
‘centre’ by asserting that the two countries, New Zealand and Australia, while 
“more manifestly Pacific in geographical situation … look beyond the Pacific 
to the Mother Country.” 150  
 
One outcome of this lack of a dominating centre power was that the Pacific 
Island countries were not drawn deeply into the security complexities of Cold 
War dilemmas during their respective periods of decolonisation. In 
comparison with other developing regions and with the exception of Vanuatu, 
they did not experience the manipulations of the east/west power struggle for 
influence.  While this assertion needs further investigation, for the purposes 
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here, this is a useful explanation of why traditional theories of security based 
on realism are not applicable to the region. 
 
The Group believed that, “the most fundamental threat to Pacific security is 
the possibility of the system itself breaking down through the principal parties 
failing to cooperate on a basis of mutual trust and of agreement on basic 
principles.”151 They recommended that “…the good that is in sovereignty can 
be combined with the good that is in partnership…”152 Concluding with a bold 
and comprehensive proposal to establish a “New Pacific Order,” they 
recommended: 153   
• A political organ for conference and decision, with appropriate 
machinery for conciliation;  
• A Pacific Court of International Justice, related to the Permanent 
Court and a quasi-judicial organ for arbitration;  
• An economic organ for the conception, supervision and 
coordination of development and welfare programmes;  
• A defence organ capable of instant action to hold in check any 
threat to the general security and an organ of intellectual 
cooperation as a cultural clearing house.154 
Asserting that, “the Pacific needs, not the illusory promise of an ideally 
complete blue print, but a firm foundation of united action…”, while beyond the 
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scope of this thesis, a comparison of this Oxford study with the 2004 EPG 
Report, conducted 58 years later, would make interesting research.”155
 
3.3 Decolonisation – The Beginnings of Regionalism 
Narrowing the focus to the Pacific region as defined in chapter one, Davidson 
writing in 1971, described The Decolonisation of Oceania:156 He stated that,  
In the Pacific Islands, decolonisation and its immediate aftermath have 
also been unusually peaceful and orderly. The islands have 
experienced no revolutions (like those, before and after independence 
in Indonesia) [and] no civil wars (like those in the Congo and 
Nigeria).157
At that time, this was the major feature that distinguished the Pacific area from 
other regions.158 As the confidence and political authority of Pacific Island 
leaders grew during the 1970s, as explained by Davidson, “cooperation on a 
regional basis” become one of their political objectives.159  
 
The early 1970s, with 1971 being the ‘South Pacific Year,” were a busy time 
for New Zealand’s foreign affairs officials and academics.160 Seminars and 
conferences were organised and many books and pamphlets tracing Pacific 
regionalism were published. In Bruce Brown’s, New Zealand in the Pacific, TR 
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Smith (former Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission) stated that 
challenges to security came from outside the region.161 He said:  
The spread of Europe’s lethal quarrels to the Pacific in 1942 made it 
clear to Australians and New Zealanders at least, that association with 
the outer world involved Pacific islanders in perils against which they 
had no real defence. [There] was a firm determination to build a better 
world in the future for the Pacific peoples … It was in this spirit that the 
Australian and New Zealand Agreement was signed at Canberra on 21 
January 1944. 162
 
This Agreement, referred to as the ANZAC163 pact, clearly outlined the depth 
of responsibility taken by Australia and New Zealand for the Pacific region. 
The two governments agreed to establish a “zone of defence” in the region 
and declared their intention to the “community of Nations” to “assume full 
responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such areas in the South West 
and South Pacific.”164 Bernard K. Gordon asserted the intention of Australian 
and New Zealand was to ensure their influence in post-war “Allied 
discussions” was noted by Britain and America.165  The Agreement stated the 
purpose of this, was for the “the welfare of the native peoples and their social, 
economic and political development.”166 The pact also agreed to “promote the 
establishment” of a South Sea Regional Commission that could  
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‘secure a common policy on social, economic and political 
development directed towards the advancement and well-being of the 
native peoples themselves … with a view to promoting the ultimate 
attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the 
circumstances of the native peoples concerned.”167  
Smith, however, was quick to point out that,  
the original inhabitants of the islands of the South Pacific had, before 
the arrival of Europeans, lived in their islands for centuries, and even 
millennia, in full political independence … [but] the new factor in the 
situation which had made them unable to stand alone in the modern 
world was the presence of Europeans.168
Smith described how the proposal for the Commission was taken to a 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in London in 1946 and later to the 
governments of France, the Netherlands and the United States. In 1947, 
representatives of these countries came together in Canberra and drew up 
the agreement to set up the South Pacific Commission (SPC). He explained, 
however, that the “political development” component of the original objectives 
of the Commission in 1944 was not included in the 1947 agreement.169  
Smith can be seen to imply a reason for this omission when he described how 
the French outlook contrasted with that of the other members.  While the 
principle concern of the agreement was the welfare and development of 
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colonial peoples, strengthening “international cooperation” became an 
imperative and caused this objective to be “redefine[d].”170  
Smith highlighted the contrasting opinion held by Mr Robert Butler from the 
American delegation that,  
The island peoples must be brought into the programme and made to 
feel part of it. They must find in it a means of expressing their wishes 
and aspirations. They must have confidence that it is operating in their 
best interests.171  
However, reflecting the approach by other members, Smith goes on to say, 
the South Pacific Commission (SPC) was planned for the peoples of 
the South Pacific but not by those peoples … Any development of 
common political aims among Pacific islanders would have been 
unwelcome to at least some of the administering powers in 1947. The 
provision for consultation between islanders was, therefore, limited and 
cautious.172
 
At the sixth South Pacific Conference at Lae in 1965, Smith described how 
“the increasing dissatisfaction of island leaders with an organisation in which 
important decisions affecting them were made by a body on which they had 
no vote came to head.”173 Ratu Kamisese Mara (later Sir) asserted the view 
“that Fiji would have little use for the Commission in the future if it did not 
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regard the territories as equal partners,” and this opinion, said Smith, was 
held by most Pacific Island leaders at this time.174
 
Norman Kirk, in 1971, as Leader of the Opposition in New Zealand (Labour 
Party), commented on “the need for independent thinking of a new and 
vigorous nature” concerning the South Pacific. 175 He said, “for the present 
there is no satisfactory regional organisation where the Island States and the 
Australian and New Zealand Parliaments can meet to discuss political 
issues.176 He felt a government to government forum was not enough and 
recommended the establishment of a “Pacific Council representative of the 
parliaments of the region.”177 He called for a venue, “drawing people from 
every party represented in those [Pacific] parliaments … [where] further 
cooperation and coordination on development can be discussed.”178
 
In Bruce Brown’s Asia and the Pacific in the 1970’s, Mary Boyd provided a 
broad overview of many issues in the ‘Southwest Pacific’ on the eve of 
decolonization. 179 Her aim was to “make some general observations about 
the main problems and trends discernible.”180 In an overview of larger Pacific 
island countries, she included their experiences of independence, evolution of 
political authority and identified potential security problems. For example, in 
the case of Fiji she asserted, “A multi-racial rather than a Fijian military force 
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would be a better insurance for internal security.”181 In Papua New Guinea, 
she contended that the aim of the Pacific Islands Regiment is to become a 
national army, but that “in the event of civil politics becoming ineffective, 
unstable or corrupt, the possibility of a military takeover clearly exists.”182  
 
Boyd acknowledged the, “south Pacific [was] entering a period of political 
change.”183 She asserted, “for small emergent, economically non-viable 
territories who cannot afford to become United Nations members and have 
many problems and interests in common, regional associations are 
particularly valuable.”184  Boyd did not explicitly promote recommendations for 
closer cooperation, but encouraged, “building on machinery already in 
existence.”185 She asserted that “the growing aspirations of islanders to 
determine their own course in economic and social development,” was 
evident by Pacific leaders initiating the development of the Pacific Islanders 
Producers’ Association (PIPA) to facilitate inter-territorial trade cooperation. 
She cautioned that “it is hard to believe that a revitalized South Pacific 
Commission can remain non-political.”186
 
In agreement with Boyd, LV Castle, argued that the Pacific Island leaders 
“desire for regional cooperation is probably more clearly apparent in the 
formation of the Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA) which embraces 
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Fiji, Western Samoa, Cook Is, Niue and Tonga.”187  He said the aim of PIPA 
was to “achieve closer regional economic cooperation,” and that it was not 
“concerned with problems of a political nature, nor is it likely to develop in that 
way.”188 He described it as “an organisation of indigenous origin,” but that, 
“what is now needed also is some means whereby the indigenous peoples 
can meet for the discussion of common political problems.”189 The focus of his 
paper was the role and responsibility of New Zealand in the Pacific and 
keeping in mind the practical ideas of cooperation espoused by West-Watson, 
Castle concluded,  
Whatever we do let us do it with grace and understanding; let us 
conceive our self interest as being served by the greater welfare of our 
Pacific neighbours. As Adam Smith, that gentle spirit, was at pains to 
establish, the pursuit of true self-interest is the key to a natural 
harmony in the affairs of men.190
 
The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, held its annual conference 
in August/September 1971, where Pacific regionalism and its implications 
were robustly discussed. Mary Boyd edited the conference papers into a book 
entitled Pacific Horizons.191 Boyd’s introduction outlined the evolution of SPC 
and described how the “growing political aspirations of island leaders” were 
frustrated by the prohibition of political debates, but how it “… encouraged 
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them to spawn new sub-regional organisations.”192 She contended that Kirk’s 
idea of a Pacific Council had “an air of unreality about” it.193 She asserted 
that, “flexible, home-grown regional arrangements were more likely to satisfy 
felt needs. The South Pacific Commission, the Pacific Islands Producers’ 
Association and the South Pacific Forum were useful tools well worth 
sharpening.”194  
 
RQ Quentin-Baxter in his chapter, A New Zealand view, noted the 
significance of the meeting where a group of Pacific leaders met in Wellington 
for private and informal talks “about various matters of common concern.”195 
He wrote, “We should try to realise what a landmark this meeting 
represents.”196 He took a brief look into the evolution of regional cooperation 
but quickly moved on to the nature of the first Pacific forum.197 Of the meeting, 
he described how, the Pacific leaders were, “free to confer without restriction 
as to subject matter. They invite Australian and New Zealand participation, but 
they have no duty to tailor their attitudes to fit in with our expectations.”198 
However, he countered this freedom with responsibility when he stated,  
The new countries, coming to the Forum on a basis of equality, do not 
feel entitled to judge only the behaviour of the metropolitan countries. 
Theirs is no longer the irresponsible relationship of the child to the 
adult, making endless demands but not stopping to reflect on its own 
conduct. At this meeting it was, I think, notable that each participant 
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was conscious of the need for self-scrutiny. More often than not, the 
mirror of self-examination leads to the discovery of common interests 
and deepened sympathies.199  
 
This mature, but partly patronising, assessment led into further debate on the 
practicalities of closer relations. Quentin-Baxter highlighted the merits and 
problems of a more open migration policy and how greater cooperation in the 
development of education services could impact on the cultural inheritance 
and social cohesion of Pacific communities.  
 
Keith Jackson argued the merits of Kirk’s idea of a Pacific Council modelled 
on the Nordic Council.200 He described its structure and functions comparably 
with the Pacific region and became concerned about the potential problems of 
arousing, “premature and exaggerated expectations of the possibilities of 
cooperation,” arguing that this would, “ultimately lead to greater frustration for 
some Island leaders.201 Nevertheless, he soundly criticised the then New 
Zealand Prime Minister’s view of Kirk’s proposal when Holyoake said, “for my 
part, I am confident that we in New Zealand should keep in step with our 
island friends rather than get out ahead of them.”202 Jackson asserted that, 
“Not getting out ahead of the islanders’ sounds too much like a euphemism for 
not doing more than we have to.”203 He advocated the continuing of 
“essentially informal forums” which “do not raise hopes too high, yet they 
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provide a valuable safety valve for the islanders as well as a place where 
ideas can be tossed around.”204
 
3.4 The Monnet Philosophy  
What therefore is the logic of cooperation implied at this point in the evolution 
of Pacific regionalism? Jean Monnet, the architect of the European 
Commission/Union described, “when men are put in a certain situation they 
see that they have common interests and they are led towards agreement.”205 
He articulated a universal principle of cooperation that, “it is essential that they 
should be talking about the same problem, with the desire and even the duty 
to reach a solution acceptable to all.”206
 
Monnet continued to expand his logic of cooperation. He said,  
 Cooperation between nations will grow from their getting to know 
 each other better and from interpenetration between their 
 constituent elements and those of their neighbours. It is therefore 
 important to make both Governments and peoples know each 
 other better, so that they come to see the problems that face 
 them …207
 
3.5 Monnet’s Philosophy Pacific Style 
In the Pacific context, Monnet’s philosophy on cooperation is comparable to 
the belief of Pacific leaders that it is in the interests of all to solve problems of 
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common concern. In August 1971, these issues were ‘tossed around’ by 
leaders at the first Forum of the South Pacific held in Wellington New 
Zealand. They discussed the practical problems they faced governing their 
newly independent countries. The communiqué stated that the talks, 
“concentrated on matters directly affecting the daily lives of the people of the 
Islands of the South Pacific, devoting particular attention to trade, shipping, 
tourism, and education.”208 Pacific Leaders agreed cooperation through 
collective action and pooling resources was a means to solve their own 
problems and satisfy their interests.  
 
At this particular point in Pacific history, however, where are the resources for 
collective action coming from? Paula Kunabuli argued,  
The small states of the Pacific need to develop specialized agencies to 
act as pressure groups for their needs and demands in the 
international community because a united front is more effective than 
an individual effort in international trade and diplomacy … thus 
regionalism is essential to their well-being.”209
While, the Forum provided the venue for Pacific Leaders to discuss ways to 
find greater resources to reduce their vulnerabilities, Jackson asserted, “the 
only really common factor throughout the whole area [the Pacific Islands] is 
dependence.”210  
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Ron Crocombe edited the 1975 compilation, The ‘Pacific Way’, in which a 
group of authors discussed the impact of “The Tyranny of Freedom: Political 
Independence and Economic Dependence.”211 Political scientist, Sione 
Tupouniua called for more research into development and trade theories 
relevant to the region.212 Journalist, Isakala Paeniu warned, 
Independence regained from our colonial masters will be eroded slowly 
but surely. Islanders will live the kind of life dictated to them by 
foreigners, definitely not one of their choice. Beggars don’t choose.213  
 
Pacific Island leaders needed significant economic assistance to run their 
newly independent governments so they could provide services and function 
within the international community. Without a functioning economy, insecurity 
grows. Conversely, political sovereignty does not always translate to 
economic autonomy. Had the responsibility that came with political freedom, 
been fully accepted by the newly independent Island countries? Tupouniua 
stated, “Pacific Islanders are searching for a new way of life: a life in which we 
fully accept the responsibility for creating the social, political, economic and 
cultural institutions,” and he also recognized that, “political independence is 
robbed of much of its true meaning if excessive dependence of other kinds 
still overwhelms the new nation.”214  
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It can be argued that political responsibility had been eroded by paternalism. 
In a robust lecture given in 1962, New Zealand geographer, Kenneth 
Cumberland tackled the failures of New Zealand’s administrative 
responsibilities to many Pacific territories. He described how the previously 
“strong, socially tight-knitted and politically sophisticated Polynesian 
community” clashed with “almost twenty years of costly ill-advised 
paternalistic welfare projects,” which had a “costly policy of misguided 
humanitarianism and an official attitude of passive indifference to economic 
development.”215 He berated the “the largely flabby and ineffectual South 
Pacific Commission,” which he described as, 
… pottering along collecting film strips, devising improved techniques 
for repairing fish nets, organising South Pacific games or formulating 
safe and innocuous agenda topics for discussion by islanders at South 
Pacific Conferences – and studiously avoiding the basic political and 
economic questions of the region.216  
 
More strongly, however, he urged that, “Polynesia must be prepared to stand 
on its own feet and accept responsibility for its own political, economic and 
social future knowing it can turn elsewhere and to New Zealand more 
especially, for technical assistance, administrative know-how, expert 
personnel and financial aid.”217 In response to the “changing political 
situation,” he called for an urgent “overhaul of the form and functions of the 
South Pacific Commission.”218
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 Sitting in the audience of this winter lecture was Fijian, 42 year-old Ratu 
Kamisese Mara. Five years later, Mara became Fiji’s Chief Minister. It can be 
argued that the influence from this lecture was pronounced, as Mara in 1974, 
recited lengthy excerpts from it to an audience in the newly independent 
Papua New Guinea.219  
 
Mara was convinced that “there must be another organisation to fill the gaps 
left in the Commission’s framework” and said,  
We who were not satisfied with the exclusion of politics from the 
conference, especially the leaders of newly independent countries or 
those moving to independence, took advantage of the South Pacific 
Conference to hold political discussions outside the conference 
meetings.220  
He described putting “out feelers to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 
suggesting that New Zealand might like to take the initiative in inviting Pacific 
Island Leaders to a meeting to discuss matters of general interest.”221 He 
explained that it was “the flowering of a spirit of cooperation … [and] a 
yearning for dialogue between the peoples of the South Pacific,” that 
developed the concept of the South Pacific Forum. 222
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Mara outlined in this speech the reasons for inviting Australia and New 
Zealand to become members of the Forum.223  He said, “the aspirations of the 
small nations have much in common with the way of life in Australia and New 
Zealand and there are trade relations between all these countries.”224 More 
importantly he asserted, “that without the inclusion of Australia and New 
Zealand, the forum might tend to develop along the lines of the Organisation 
of the African States … where racial friction between Africans and Europeans 
developed with such tragic results,”225  
 
3.6 Diversity and the ‘Pacific Way’ 
During this address, Mara also addressed the great diversity between the 
members of the Forum. He stated that, “there is no doubt in my mind that the 
forum will lead the way to infinitely better understand[ing] and much more 
effective cooperation between the nations of this area, large and small.”226 He 
described the “‘Pacific Way’,” as, “a lively, vocal, frank but friendly,” method of 
discussing the “opinions and ideas on subjects of vital importance to all our 
people,” and that regional organisations, “open the way to full dialogue 
between us and provide permanent channels of peaceful communication 
through which we can foster good-will and understanding to the lasting benefit 
of all our people.”227 He then concluded in an ideological tenor,  
Cooperation in the region will only be attained by tolerance, harmony 
and goodwill. Yes and by hard work too, for nothing in this life is worth 
having if we did not have to work for it. When we use the phrase, the 
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‘Pacific Way’ we are not thinking of the way of the loafer or the idler. It 
is the way that energetic and vibrant nations find to resolve their 
differences and harmonise their efforts. It is this very energy which 
produces the need for the ‘Pacific Way’.228
 
Mara laid the foundation of regionalism and cemented a Way for the newly 
independent states to interact. In 1977, TR Smith re-asserted the purpose of 
cooperation. He said, “there is much scope yet for inhabitants of the South 
Pacific to cooperate in protecting and promoting their interest in the best use 
of economic resources.”229 The Forum was to facilitate dialogue and to 
provide the opportunity for leaders to find a collective solution to common 
problems. Mara acknowledged the difficulties of cooperation but in his 
biography The Pacific Way, he said, “I have found regionalism one of the 
most rewarding experiences of my political life in the Pacific.”230
 
3.7 Pacific Cooperation Actualised 
The next step towards greater Pacific regionalism was decided by leaders in 
Canberra at the second Forum meeting in February 1972. They stated,  
This second meeting advanced the process of mutual consultation and 
represented a further stage in the sympathetic understanding of each 
other’s problems and in willing collaboration in practical measures 
directed to their solution. The advantages of co-operation and the 
opportunity of easy and informal exchanges were found to reinforce a 
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sense of regional identity and common purpose, directed to the 
advancement of all the peoples of the region.231
 
The Leaders agreed to establish the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation (SPEC). Article III of the formal and legal Agreement establishing 
SPEC stated the “purpose of the Bureau is to facilitate continuing co-
operation and consultation between members on trade, economic 
development, transport, tourism and other related matters.”232 A long list of 
functions outlined the services SPEC was expected to provide and the 
objectives it was to meet.  
 
Ken Piddington, newly appointed Deputy Director of SPEC, in November 
1972 described the establishment, functions and structure of the Bureau.233 
He said, “the new Bureau has been launched with high hopes and I will speak 
with the enthusiasm of one who believes that its role could be unique.”234 He 
covered many topics worthy of mention and analysis, the focus here however, 
is to assess his ideas on cooperation. He stated,  
“the South Pacific is in transition … [t]he Islands must now adapt to a 
far more complicated matrix of economic activity and it is in this 
situation of rapid change that it is essential to develop effective 
cooperation. SPEC’s message is a simple one; we recognise the need 
for accelerated economic development in the region; we are convinced 
that the key to this lies in a collective effort; but it must be pursued in 
                                            
231 Forum Communiqué, 1972 
232 See annex six. 
233 Ken Piddington, 1973, The South Pacific Bureau: A new venture in Economic Cooperation, New 
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington 
234 Ibid, p 3 
 78
harmony with local values and local attitudes – in brief, economic 
progress through regional cooperation “in the ‘Pacific Way’.”235
 
Piddington was commenting on something he was a part of and 
acknowledged the difficulties of describing a newly established organization. 
However, comparable with West-Watson’s earlier comments, he realistically 
noted the need for cooperation to “start from a hard-headed assessment of 
long-term national interests.”236 Satisfying the interests of the parties 
collaborating was inherent for cooperation to be successful. However, the 
logic of cooperation must be questioned when the national interests of the 
parties are not consistent and the potential for free riding is more than likely, 
yet the parties still desire collaboration because they take a long-term view of 
the costs of not cooperating.  
 
Piddington acknowledged that the Forum was, “an exercise in partnership 
among nations of wide disparity.”237 That Australia was, “after all the 
superpower of our region.”238 Yet, he believed that, 
Australia and New Zealand sit at the table as equals and are not 
dominant partners (in a non-political sense, they bring obvious 
advantages through their wealth of administrative and other skilled 
resources) … [but] that the total wisdom of the Forum on any given 
issue will rest on the contribution of some of its smaller members. And 
that it is tacitly understood that Australia and New Zealand will defer 
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when it comes to deciding the direction which the Forum as a whole 
should take in asserting its role in the region.239
 
Despite this, the logic does become obscure when the parties are unequal 
and a history of colonialism exists with all its complexities. For a more 
developed country to defer to a group of lesser-developed countries may 
compromise its interests, particularly so when the needs of the lesser-
developed countries are obviously greater and a higher level of vulnerability 
exists. Is cooperation, therefore still able to satisfy the interests of all the 
parties involved when relationships are complex?  
 
3.8 Inequalities and Cooperation 
At this point in Pacific history, a question, expressed in the form of a 
proposition is that, cooperation can still be effective when the parties involved 
are unequal in power and resources, as institutional structures can play a key 
role in helping to overcome the problems created by such disparities. 
Piddington asserted that for New Zealand it is a, 
…wholesome and constructive relationship with the Islands of the 
South Pacific” that must be its long-term interest and, “what SPEC 
must consciously seek are techniques whereby New Zealand and 
Australia can contribute to this sort of relationship. Unless these 
techniques take account of the Pacific Way, we will be guilty of another 
chapter of economic imperialism.240  
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Australia’s account of the Forum’s inception was published in 2004 and it has 
a very different emphasis.241 Instead of relating an understanding of the 
‘Pacific Way’ or describing the positives of Pacific regionalism to address the 
needs of the region, it exposed Australia’s numerous suspicions about New 
Zealand’s motives, intentions and level of influence. In reference to the first 
Wellington meeting, Doran wrote, “There continued to be suspicion over prior 
New Zealand involvement in the Island initiative.”242  
 
Reporting after the second Forum held at Canberra, Doran described a 
competitive atmosphere between the Australian and New Zealand meetings, 
…the officials were confident that Australia had performed markedly 
better than New Zealand …. Consequently it was thought that while the 
Australian delegation advanced its standing in the Forum, New 
Zealand stocks slipped.243  
In future relations it was asserted that,  
Australia should seek to work in close relationship with the New 
Zealanders and to accept philosophically that they will, from time to 
time, try to do a certain amount of ‘grandstanding’ with the Islanders.244  
So instead of championing the benefits of cooperation, it defensively 
concluded,  
…the independent and self-governing nations of the region sought 
greater political interaction during 1970. This impulse resulted in both a 
rapid growth of cooperative activity and the emergence of low-level 
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tensions – a two-pronged dynamic rooted in the pursuit of national 
interests. For Australia, these diverging forces bore a desire to 
collaborate and to influence.245
 
3.9 Stresses of Regionalism  
In the 1980’s the honeymoon of Pacific regionalism has begun to wane. The 
competition and assertion of national interest versus common interest had 
begun. Cooperation became the goal and superseded specific outcomes. 
Richard Herr briefly outlined his view of the evolution of Pacific regionalism in 
Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism.246  
 
Herr introduced this paper with, “the belief that regional cooperation is 
imperative for the survival of the South Pacific, it has become so widely 
accepted as to virtually enjoy the status of a political axiom.”247  He argued, 
however that, “the implementation of a regional approach has involved 
numerous difficult decisions particularly in recent years,” and “at the heart of 
many of these problems has been the felt need to reconcile the national 
aspirations of the constituent states and a general but less concrete desire for 
regional cooperation.”248  
 
Obviously deviating from West-Watson and Piddington’s logic of cooperation, 
Herr further stated, “as with any regional organisation, national interests 
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prevent a complete harmony of purpose within the Forum.”249 It appeared in 
his argument that purpose has been superseded by process. Herr’s argument 
has distorted the nature of Pacific cooperation as it was based on realist 
views of cooperation, which were used as a political norm to prevent conflict. 
The goal therefore is the act of cooperation. The logic of cooperation as 
described in chapter two is to achieve a specific goal and cooperation is the 
means of attaining the goal.250
 
In a broader context to help explain Herr’s opinions, international theorist 
Robert Keohane summarised the prevailing views of cooperation from both a 
realist and institutionalist perspective.251 He re-asserted neo-realist Kenneth 
Waltz’s argument, that world politics is in a “state of war” and self-reliance is 
the means by which states must relate, resulting in conflict and war.252 
Keohane then outlined the institutionalist view of Mitrany, et al, who, “see 
cooperation as essential in a world of economic interdependence and who 
argue that shared economic interests create a demand for international 
institutions and rules.”253 Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Cooperation 
examined the mechanisms of cooperation.254 Similar to Herr’s argument, 
Axelrod analyses the problems of cooperation when the pursuit of self-interest 
frustrates the process. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is used to represent, 
“the vast array of specific situations,” but it must be kept in mind that these 
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games are premised on suspicion and competition were the “pursuit of self-
interest … leads to a poor outcome for all.”255  
 
3.10 Costs and Benefits of Regionalism – where is the equity? 
In 1986, Ueantabo Neemia-Mackenzie also questioned the merits of 
cooperation in his work titled, Cooperation and Conflict, Costs, Benefits and 
National Interests in Pacific Regional Cooperation.256 In this cost-benefit 
analysis of regionalism, he said, 
Cooperative efforts may frustrate or fail, if costs and benefits are 
allocated and distributed inequitably or if one or several countries 
selfishly and inconsiderately pursues its own interests without due 
consideration for the others” concerns.257  
He concluded that, “the key to the success of regional cooperation is 
equity.”258  
 
Unfortunately, equity is in limited supply in the Pacific region. In his 2001 
book, The South Pacific, Ron Crocombe acknowledged a long list of “costs, 
benefits, alternatives and limits in regional integration.”259 One generalisation 
he made in agreement with Neemia-Mackenzie was that “equitable 
distribution of benefits among members is crucial. To the extent equity is not 
achieved, effectiveness is reduced.”260 It is argued here that while the 
distribution of benefits is not spread equitably between all members of the 
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Forum, the enormous cost to facilitate cooperation is also not shared between 
the members of the region. In 2005, Crocombe calculated that “Pacific Island 
governments contribute generally below 1% of their budgets to regional 
activity.”261 Therefore taking a realistic view of the disparities in the region, 
equilibrium is unlikely to occur for quite some time, so can cooperation 
proceed effectively when the interests of all parties involved are diverse and 
unlikely to be equally satisfied? 
 
3.11 The ‘Pacific Way’ 
Hawaiian Professor Michael Haas’ observations of regional cooperation 
based on a means of relating are described in his work entitled The ‘Pacific 
Way’. 262 He said,  
The ‘Pacific Way’ is a new form of international interaction – a 
refreshing contribution to theories of regional integration. The power of 
the ‘Pacific Way’ is decidedly spiritual. The world would indeed be a 
better place if all countries were to adopt the ‘Pacific Way’ as a basis 
for international diplomacy.263  
He identified six features of the ‘Pacific Way’:  
• Pacific solutions to Pacific problems; 
• Equality of cultures; 
• Unanimous compromise; 
• Primacy of political goals; 
• Pan Pacific spirit ; 
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• Optimistic incrementalism.264  
 
As a “style of negotiation,” Haas said that it was, “the most promising form of 
discussion between countries seeking to improve relations that begins with 
areas of agreement and moves to areas of ambiguity, but scrupulously avoids 
unfruitful areas for cooperation.”265 He described the ‘Pacific Way’ as a 
“politically motivated … norm of diplomacy.”266 Pacific diplomacy, Ratu Mara 
said depended on “tolerance, harmony and goodwill.”267  
 
Herr, however worried that the ‘Pacific Way’ and future of regionalism 
depended on the “vision, statesmanship and personality of Ratu Mara,” 
because he believed “the Forum owe[d] its existence to his energies.”268 Greg 
Fry, a prominent regionalist specialist however argued, that while Ratu Mara 
“was an impressive paramount chief who had already established his regional 
leadership credentials …,” other Pacific leaders from newly independent 
countries were equally talented and advocated regionalism.269 He cited, 
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, Prime Minister of Western Samoa; Albert Henry, 
Premier of the Cook Islands and Prince Tu’ipelehake of the Kingdom of 
Tonga. Together with Mara, this group were the drivers of regionalism during 
the period of decolonisation. More recently, however,  other actors such as Sir 
Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea; New Zealand Prime 
Minister Helen Clark and Samoan Prime Minister, Hon Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele 
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Malielegaoi have also been promoting the virtues and future of Pacific 
regionalism.270
 
3.12 The Forum and a Mature ‘Pacific Way’  
Forum members are well acquainted with the inequalities of the region and 
the processes of cooperation may not always be harmonious because 
‘energetic, vocal,’ and ‘frank’ debate is likely to produce disagreement. The 
regional consensus however to develop and implement the Pacific Plan and 
the maturing of the ‘Pacific Way’ through the Forum institutions is evidence of 
the member’s ongoing commitment to regionalism. 
 
The works of Fry have been a significant contribution towards advancing the 
literature on regionalism. 271 He said that, 
The Forum network is the site of what we might call the main game of 
regional cooperation. It is through the Forum network that the principal 
integrative schemes have been attempted, that joint political stances 
have been worked out, and that a number of regional legal regimes 
have been negotiated … It is the only South Pacific organisation which 
represents the collective opinion of the independent states of the 
region.272
 
In contrast to Herr’s argument, but comparable with West-Watson and others, 
Fry in addressing the sovereignty issues, said,  
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…there gradually grew a commitment to regional schemes that did not 
involve a sacrifice of sovereignty, that would in fact promote national 
interests rather than subsume them in a regional interest …273
He continued by acknowledging that Pacific regionalism,  
Far from subsuming state sovereignty, the regional process, embodied 
in the Forum became for many communities a significant potential or 
actual source of their claim to sovereignty. It was Forum membership 
which accorded recognition of state sovereignty to the otherwise 
questionable status of the associated states …274
During the early years of Pacific regionalism, Fry said that, 
The South Pacific states were fortunate that they did not venture far on 
the path of comprehensive integration common in other areas of the 
Third World and were encouraged by the prevailing development 
theories of the time. Had they done so, the experience would have 
likely poisoned any chance of moving to a more workable form of 
cooperation.275
Fry emphasised the realities of cooperation when stating that there were, 
…two specific interests in promoting cooperation. One was to assist in 
the economic development of the newly independent states; the other 
was to maximize the diplomatic influence of the small countries on 
political issues such as nuclear testing.276  
He concluded that, 
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The quest for regional sovereignty, a foundation idea of the Forum, 
permeated all subsequent cooperation efforts by the Islands states. As 
they have sought to strengthen their hand and expand their diplomatic 
resources to control or at least influence their relationship with the 
outside world, they have had to rely on the outside world to finance 
such efforts. But the history of South Pacific regionalism has shown 
that although important, this financial dependency has not been 
determinative.277
 
Therefore, resource inequality does not have to determine the failure or 
success of cooperation. Other factors are important and Axlerod asserted 
that, “for cooperation to thrive … [it must] be based on reciprocity.”278 He also 
stated that, “friendship is not necessary for cooperation to evolve … The 
requirement for the relationship is not friendship but durability …”279 History of 
Pacific cooperation is, however based on friendship and durability.  
 
This durability has been maintained by the Forum but also because, as 
argued by John Henderson, “the concept of regionalism would appear to have 
a compelling logic in a part of the world where a number of the island 
countries lack the resources to contemplate a future of their own.”280 After the 
1990 New Zealand-led review, he too acknowledged the practical logic of 
                                            
277 Ibid, p 173 
278 Axelrod, 1984, p 173, 188 
279 Ibid 
280 John Henderson, 1991, ‘New Zealand and the Other Pacific Islands’ (Note the inclusiveness of the 
title) in ed Kennaway Richard and John Henderson, 1991, Beyond New Zealand II, Longman Paul 
Limited, Auckland p 19 
 89
cooperation, “if regionalism is to grow it must demonstrate tangible benefits to 
those taking part.”281  
 
More recently in another surging wave of Pacific regionalism, the idea of 
“pooled regional governance,” has been promoted.282 Fry asks more, than 
answers the problems of this concept. He questions the, “depth, breadth, form 
and purpose of future regional governance and the shape of institutional 
arrangements.283 When reviewing past lessons of Pacific regionalism, he 
divided it into five episodes:  
• Comprehensive economic integration (1971 – 1974);  
• Sectoral integration (1971 – 1978);  
• Collective diplomacy (1979 – 1990);  
• Regional security community (1984 – 1989)  
• Harmonisation of national policies (1994 – 2003).  
 
The main lesson he focused on again was the inequality of influence, the 
Australian and New Zealand dominance in setting regional security and their 
economic agendas. He asserted that, in the past, this has resulted in the 
failure, “to gain legitimacy among Pacific Islanders because they [Australia 
and New Zealand] fail to take account of their [Pacific} security concerns, 
forms of governance or ethics.”284 He warned that this “form of regional 
governance may also have the problems of legitimacy it experienced in the 
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1990’s unless Australia and New Zealand engage more fundamentally with 
Pacific perspectives on the governance and security issues they seek to 
influence.”285 Good regional governance in the Pacific, it is argued is founded 
on the qualities of the ‘Pacific Way’ as described above. The necessity of this 
type of governance for effective security cooperation will be discussed further 
in chapter six when the Forum Regional Security Committtee is analysed.  
 
Steve Hoadley reminds his readers that the original purpose of the Forum was 
to establish a means for leaders’ “to discuss political issues that could not be 
aired in the South Pacific Commission.”286 It is a fact that the leaders of 
Pacific countries, including Australia, despite the disparities of wealth and 
influence and inequality of benefits and contributions, have volunteered 
membership to the Pacific Islands Forum. Simplistically, Pacific cooperation is 
premised on the most basic reality; that the Pacific neighbourhood is where 
we all live and leaders’ have agreed to achieve the goals of Pacific Vision by 
implementing the Pacific Plan.  
 
In summarising the above, the ‘Pacific Way’ has evolved and matured. The 
desire and need for a new level of regionalism has been identified by Pacific 
leaders’ therefore, Pacific ad hoc regionalism has been superseded by 
deliberate decision-making that has been based on serious and detailed 
regional analyses. One background paper describes the “Basic Concepts,” of 
the Plan and sets out a number of tests, “The Market Test, The Subsidiarity 
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Test, The Sovereignty Test,” to determine the costs and benefits of 
regionalism within the various sectors. 287  
 
There are numerous works of detailed data and creative ideas on the Pacific 
Plan website. It is argued that it is this new depth of knowledge that has the 
potential to enable effective implementation of the Plan. Tension however is 
bound to ebb and flow, nevertheless this only furthers the argument for robust 
institutional structures to ensure these problems are moderated. This 
cooperation can move Pacific regionalism towards to the goals of the Pacific 
Vision – a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, 
[where] all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. 
 
This literature review has shown that cooperation has been the historically 
consistent form of interaction between Pacific countries and is likely to 
continue. Realist concepts of security cooperation based on enmity, if applied 
to the Pacific, would not sit easily with the history and nature of Pacific 
cooperation. Consequently any analysis of the region’s security environment 
must be premised on this cooperative type of regional interaction.  
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Chapter 4: Security Theory Re-defined 
4.1 Introduction 
The realist view of international relationships is based on power and 
competition, whereas the nature of regional relationships in the Pacific has 
traditionally been one of friendship and cooperation as described in the 
previous chapter. Insecurities come from diverse sources and not from conflict 
between Pacific militaries. What then, is the base for security studies in the 
Pacific region?  
 
This chapter considers that if the concept of security is to be relevant, then it 
must consider the historical relationships and current characteristics of the 
security environment. An overview of three prevailing International Relations 
(IR) theories is used to explain the concepts of security. Buzan’s regional 
security complex theory and ideas of new security are described and the 
realism/security debate analysed. It concludes that despite the usefulness of 
these theories, a re-definition of security to help understand an appropriate 
theory of Pacific security relations is required. 
 
4.2 Theories of International Relations and Security  
International relations theories explain state behaviour. The three major 
variants include realism, liberalism and more recently constructivism. Ideas of 
security stem from these assumptions. 
4.2.1 Realism 
“Realism is based on the view of the individual as primarily selfish 
and power seeking. Individuals are organised in states, each of 
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which acts in a unitary way in pursuit of its own national interest, 
defined in terms of power.”288  
Realism asserts the state is sovereign. No global mechanism exists above the 
state. To ensure survival, the amassing of power (whether military, political or 
economic) is the state’s main objective. The growth in power of one state 
however threatens other states, who in turn amass power to counter each 
other. This competition to balance power is meant to protect autonomy. States 
are wary of cooperation or collective action and alliances are viewed with 
suspicion.  
4.2.2 Liberalism 
“Many Liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of 
democratic processes make it easier to sustain international 
cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in 
multilateral institutions.”289
Liberalism asserts the human is essentially good and that conflict is not innate 
but is a consequence of poor social institutions. Cooperation and collective 
action can eliminate war and conflict. The individual is supreme and 
government must protect the rights and freedoms of the individual. 
Democracy is an important concept as it is contended that democracies do 
not go to war against each other. While this may be accepted as true so far, 
some assert that democracies may “launch messianic struggles against 
warlike authoritarian regimes,” in a crusader-like mission.290 This may suggest 
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that democracies still display aggressive tendencies, despite not engaging in 
conflict with one another.  
 
Other elements are also important. Reason – the belief that the world is 
rational, that debate and dialogue can solve problems; equality – all are equal; 
consent – social interaction is consensual, and that for government to be 
legitimate it should be based on popular representation; constitutionalism – 
government ensures that society remains stable but that checks and balances 
keep tyranny at bay.291 These principles are the foundation of most western 
democracies and the model for organisations.  
 
4.2.3 Constructivism or Idealism 
Constructivism asserts that ideas, values, identities and social interactions 
shape and change the world structure. It challenges the realist view that 
anarchy is a given and that states are unable to change their suspicious and 
competitive behaviour. Constructivists believe that ideas and norms have the 
power to change behaviour. States can change their worldview by adapting 
socially constructed standards of behaviour. An example of the power of ideas 
is the acceptance of the concept of human rights. Over time, states have 
accepted the obligation to establish mechanisms to ensure these rights are 
protected. Constructivism provides an explanation of this type of process, 
where other theories have been unable to account for such intangible 
phenomena.    
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Actors in the world structure are not confined to states, but include many 
players such as international institutions, non-government organisations, 
multi-national corporations, individuals and social movements. Frequent social 
interaction by these actors creates norms and institutions that have power to 
influence state behaviour. A group of individuals, for example heads of 
governments, will agree to accept an idea and thereby establishing a set of 
standards or rules to which their states are expected to cooperate with and 
adhere to. Regional cooperation or collective security administered by an 
institution is an example of constructivist behaviour.  
 
4.3 The Realism and Security Debate 
Traditional security theorist Stephen Walt asserted that, “the main focus of 
security studies is easy to identify … it is the phenomenon of war.”292 He 
contended that security studies are defined as “the study of the threat, use 
and control of military force.”293 New security theorists Barry Buzan et al, 
however questioned “the primacy of the military element and the state in the 
conceptualization of security.”294 They attempted to widen the security agenda 
by “claiming security status for issues and referent objects” in the 
environmental, societal, economic, as well as the political and military 
sectors.295
 
This broad view of new security is more relevant to the challenges facing the 
Pacific region because war between Pacific states and the deployment of 
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Pacific disciplined forces296 in combat against each other is inconceivable.297 
Nevertheless, the academic debates between the “wideners” and the 
“traditionalists” are ongoing. Terry Terriff, et al, acknowledges however that 
“the central problem in the study of security in the post-Cold War era is simply 
that there is no agreement on what constitutes security.”298  
 
Traditional security analysis was viewed through a state-centric lens and 
protection of the state was considered to be of the utmost value. However, the 
role of the state has evolved and the concept of security must take account of 
these changes. The degree of security a state or government wants, or is able 
to provide, will determine the safety of its citizens. If the state lowers its 
maintenance of security to the point where it is unable to protect its citizens, 
and permits – or becomes the source of – instability, then the concept of 
security must be re-assessed. Richard Ullman warned of the dangers on 
limiting security to the traditional view; “defining national security … in military 
terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality … it causes states to 
concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps more harmful 
dangers.”299
 
Re-stating an original concept of security, the maintenance of a condition 
where peace and freedom, safety and survival are guaranteed, is more 
relevant to the Pacific security environment. Insecurity arises when the 
guarantee or maintenance of protection is weakened or under threat. With this 
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wider definition of security, a more comprehensive analysis is needed, since 
the range of threats has expanded and taken on new dimensions.  
 
When considering the object of security – that which is valued – all levels of 
analysis within all sectors must be considered. For example, if an individual – 
a human being – is the valued object, security can mean feeling safe, as well 
as free from danger. In the social sector, the welfare of the individual – social 
security – can be described as the expectation that a certain standard of living 
will be maintained.  
 
Communities or ethnic groups value the core principles that hold them 
together. For them, the preservation of their collective identity is what they 
most value. For many groups, protection of the natural environment is 
paramount, as the land or sea is invested with spiritual value.  
 
At the state level, security means the protection and maintenance of territorial 
boundaries – sovereignty. In the political sector, ideas such as democracy or 
the rule of law are highly valued and therefore require protection. The concept 
of Pacific regional security implies a sense of neighbourhood, where co-
operation, stability and equality are valued to the point where institutions are 
established to protect these relationships. 
 
It is the composition of vulnerabilities compared with the threats that 
determine the degree of insecurity. Buzan discusses this balance, “as threats 
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rise, vulnerabilities must be reduced if security is to be maintained.”300 
Obviously weak states are more vulnerable than strong states but this does 
not necessarily correspond to degrees of insecurity. Strong states may have a 
high degree of threat, whereas a weak state may experience a low degree of 
threat.  
 
Vulnerabilities however, can only be identified and then reduced after a 
comprehensive analysis of the whole security environment. This not only 
includes looking at the sources and the effect of insecurity, but a deep 
investigation into the linkages and interaction of wider security phenomena 
such as security policies, actors, institutions and systems for response. 
 
This broader analysis of security must include a “big picture” view of the 
regional environment. An open-minded and inclusive analytical approach will 
consider each element of a security environment, to make sure no potential 
risk is missed. One example, concerning the threat of terrorism, is the 
attention now given at airports to items such as backpacks and shoes and 
other mundane items that have been used to harm civilian targets.  
 
An analytical model or map that has the capacity to consider all the 
characteristics of Pacific security will provide a thorough account to help 
explain and understand the environment. Existing analytical tools available for 
a comprehensive examination of security are based on theories of realism – 
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power and competition, whereas the nature of Pacific relations is premised on 
friendship and cooperation.  
 
4.4 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 
Before discussing an appropriate theory of Pacific security relations, the 
applicability of Barry Buzan’s RSCT, which analyses security interactions of 
states within a region, will be examined. A regional security complex (RSC) is 
defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be 
considered apart from one another.301 It is based on the “pattern of amity and 
enmity among states.”302 Amity can range from “genuine friendship to 
expectations of protection and supports,” whereas enmity is a “relationship set 
by suspicion and fear.”303 The middle of these poles “is a broad band of 
indifference and/or neutrality,” where a lack of interaction results in either a 
weak or unstructured complex.304  
 
A judgement of the degree and intensity of security interaction and 
interdependence is required to identify the existence of a security complex.305 
High or low intensity and positive or negative interaction determines whether 
the complex is weak or strong, high or low-level.306 The existence or not, of 
inter-state war is also an indicator of a complex. A major feature of identifying 
the existence of a complex is the degree of “mutually” felt perception, 
threat/fear or friendship/trust, between states. At this point, it is evident that 
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RSCT is state-centric but Buzan has since revised this to include the widened 
security agenda, by opening the framework “to catch security in its increasing 
variation.”307  
 
 In 1991, Buzan said the ‘small Pacific Ocean states, where very weak powers 
are separated by vast insulating distances of water,” would have little impact 
on the structure of a regional security complex but that the “Pacific Islands 
Forum binds Australia, New Zealand and many of the small island states into 
a loose security community.”308 Later, in 2003 he said the Pacific region is 
“probably the closest model” of a “pristine unstructured region containing 
largely inward-looking units [where], the units are too weak as powers to 
generate security interdependence.”309
 
4.5. What is the Theory of Pacific Security Relations? 
As previously discussed, Pacific relationships are based on a desire to 
cooperate and solve common problems by pooling resources. The 
involvement of military personnel from Papua New Guinea and Australian 
logistical support in quelling the Santos rebellion in Vanuatu is an example. 
The 2000 Biketawa Declaration formally established the expectation that in a 
time of trouble other members will assist as required. The intervention in 
Solomon Islands in 2003 under RAMSI, was considered by some to be 
mobilised rather too late, given that requests from the Solomon Islands’ Prime 
Minister for the assistance of Australia and New Zealand, were declined in 
2000.  
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 In the post 9/11 security environment, the features of transnational threats 
bind countries into a global security complex as the reliance on security 
cooperation has become more salient. The Pacific region is not exempt from 
this expectation and security cooperation, relative to the insecurities faced, 
thereby increases security interdependence. Internal threats also expand 
regionally as what affects one Forum member will ultimately involve the 
others.  
 
A regional response to insecurity must reflect the breadth and depth of these 
threats and in a cooperative environment, dialogue and decisions need to be 
made through good regional governance structures so that the parties 
involved will accept their responsibility to act as required. Part of the decision-
making process includes a need for thorough analyses of the security 
environment. A framework to analyse insecurity in a cooperative environment 
must take into account the full security environment. 
4.6. New Security Agenda (NSA) Framework 
The “New Security Agenda” re-analyses the framework of security studies. It 
was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and others from the English and 
Copenhagen Schools to question the status of the military and state in 
traditional strategic studies.310 It distinguishes itself from strategic studies, 
which focuses on military strategy and the use of force within or between 
states. 311The NSA theory seeks to widen the security agenda by including 
issues from the economic, environmental, and societal sectors, as the military 
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and political sectors are no longer considered privileged but become part of a 
larger area of enquiry.  
 
Dividing security issues into sectors is an analytical means to understanding 
the nature of real-world challenges. The types of interaction or relationships 
identify the sector. For example, Buzan asserts the military sector is about 
forceful coercion; the political sector about authority and governance; the 
economic sector about trade, production and finance; the societal sector 
about collective identity and the environmental sector is about human activity 
and the planetary biosphere.312 Other sub-sectors could also include health 
and legal environment. 
 
 
 
 
4.6.1 Military Sector 
In the military sector, the state is the unit of analysis.313 The machinery of 
government includes the defence forces, whose main function is to have the 
ability to take action to secure the state against external threats and protect its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also protects the government and its 
right to govern.314 In democratic states, the defence forces are meant to be 
under the control of civilian authorities. 
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The military security sector is concerned with the “two level interplay of the 
armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states perceptions 
of each other’s intentions.”315 The military security agenda revolves around 
states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions – amity or enmity. Buzan said it 
is based on,  
the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and 
external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power 
to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their 
existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.316  
 
One function of government therefore is to maintain law and order. Buzan 
stated, “military security is primarily about the ability of the ruling elite to 
maintain civil peace.”317 If the machinery of government, however, fails to 
provide security for its citizens, the authority of the military can become 
obscured. In some instances, Pacific military forces have themselves been 
the cause of insecurity as they have become increasingly politicised.318 For 
example in Fiji, during the 2000 Coup, the Military Commander took it upon 
himself to intervene to restore order. While this act of necessity brought 
stability, the Commander’s intervention into political affairs has continued a 
legacy where he maintains his right to comment on the actions of the 
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government and has defiantly said he “will not be gagged if there is a need to 
speak out on issues of national importance.”319  
 
4.6.2. Political Sector 
The political security sector is concerned with “the organizational stability of 
states, systems of governments and the ideologies that give them 
legitimacy.”320 Challenges to these ideas can de-stabilise the reigning political 
order. These challenges include questioning the governmental structure, its 
right to autonomy and its ideological underpinnings. Challenges to legitimacy 
or the denial of recognition also impact the governing order. If these 
ideologies are violated causing the state to feel threatened, responses 
typically come from the military sector. The violations frequently derive from a 
disaffected social group. 
  
4.6.3. Economic Sector 
The economic security sector is concerned with threats to the “resources, 
finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and 
state power.”321 The effects from problems arising from the economic sector 
spill over into other sectors making it difficult to identify pure economic 
security issues.322 The global market and national economies are the obvious 
sites of insecurity, as the collapse of the global market would threaten the 
survival of national economies.  
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The effects of globalisation may be considered as threats to developing 
states. Economic marginalisation affects all states in the region in varying 
degrees. Poverty has been recognised as one of the leading causes of violent 
conflict and many aid programmes consider the elimination of poverty as an 
important base for development and conflict prevention. The Pacific Plan 
seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the region by developing initiatives to 
increase regional prosperity and development. 
 
4.6.4. Societal Sector 
Challenges to security in the societal sector are concerned with identity.  
While this may include the identity of a nation-state, it also includes units from 
other levels such as the family, clan, village or region.323 The community 
vigorously protects the “ideas and practices that identify individuals as 
members of a social group.”324 When the survival of group identity and the 
development of community are threatened, the potential to incite violent 
reaction is increased. Inter-group conflict has been noted as “the world’s most 
costly and intractable social issue” and that “deep-seated cleavages between 
racial, religious, cultural or ethnic groups” can become entrenched and 
“resistant to resolution.”325  
 
When “we/they” loyalties are tested, they can produce insecurity.326 Migration 
of one group into a region of another frequently tests these loyalties. 
Perceptions of competition, undue influence and dilution or ignorance of 
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cultural norms can fester, and if left, can eventually trigger violent conflict.327 
Fiji’s social insecurity is an example where continued inter-group tension has 
spilled over into the political and economic sectors. 
  
Morton Deutsch said, “the most profound and enduring positive changes in 
inter-group relations occur when successful cooperation in the achievement of 
a joint or super-ordinate goal is promoted.328 As a conflict prevention 
mechanism, the Plan implemented through the Forum Secretariat can 
promote effective and closer cooperation at a community level through 
development projects. 
 
4.6.5. Environmental Sector 
The environmental security sector is concerned with the “maintenance of the 
local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all 
other human enterprises depend.”329 It is assumed that the “carrying capacity” 
of the earth’s population is threatened by misuse of its natural resources.330 
The maintenance of the environment is the responsibility of humanity. As 
consumers, participants and caretakers of the biosphere, it is argued, there 
exists an obligation to protect it for future users.  
 
The environment security sector has two competing agendas: the scientific 
agenda and the political agenda.331 At times, the two overlapping agendas 
complement or compete against each other. The scientific agenda deals with 
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the investigations of the environment by mainly scientists and research 
institutes. It presents potential environment threats based on scientific 
findings, as the demand and contest for scientific proof is an important part of 
securitising environmental threats. The political agenda involves the 
politicising and securitising of environmental threats by the media, non-
governmental organisations (NGO’s) and at times, governments. They may 
employ the scientific community to validate their claims and their main task is 
to alert the relevant audience to the “presumed urgency” of the threat.332  
 
Environmental security is survival of the planet. A closer inspection shows that 
the ‘ultimate’ threat is the “risk of losing achieved levels of civilisation – a 
return to forms of societal barbarism – while still apparently being able to 
prevent doing so.”333 Human structures and systems must respond and cope 
with environmental threats. Buzan divided these issues into three 
categories:334  
1. Threats to civilisation from the natural environment that are not caused 
by human activity; for example, natural disasters 
2. Threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the 
planet, when the changes seem to pose existential threats to 
civilisation; for example bioterrorism, disease transmission, disruption 
of ecosystems, food scarcity 
3. Threats from human activity to the natural system or structures of the 
planet when the changes do not pose an existential threat; energy and 
mineral depletion, loss of animal species 
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 The division of the security agenda into sectors is a useful tool to track issues 
through the sectors and identify how they spill over. The cause and effect 
flows can be clarified, and effective mechanisms for response implemented 
and targeted directly to achieve the greatest impact in order to minimise or 
prevent insecurity. A next step to consider is how an issue become a security 
threat. 
 
4.7 Securitisation 
The process of securitisation, is when ‘security actors” successfully convince 
an audience that a particular issue has become a real and imminent threat to 
security.335 This will result in agreement to mobilise an extra-ordinary 
response to prevent or minimise the threat. It permits using “emergency 
measures and justif[ies] action outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure.”336 It may include legitimately breaking rules, such as human 
rights, which under normal circumstances would not be permitted. The use of 
military force or other coercive means is also accepted as a necessary 
response. This act of selling insecurity will be discussed further in chapter six 
in the discussion of the Forum Regional Security Committee. 
 
4.8 Pacific Security – Theory Re-defined 
Since cooperation has been the historical nature of the relationship between 
Forum members, traditional security theory premised on a realist framework 
does not explain the insecurities suffered by Pacific countries. As discussed 
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previously, the creation of a theory for Pacific security is beyond this study but 
such a theory could start with Buzan’s theories to widen the security 
environment.  
 
In an environment where security is defined broadly, the maintenance of 
security requires re-consideration. As sources of insecurity come from a 
variety of sectors, security has become more than military defence. If this 
premise is extended further, the agencies that address security issues must 
also mirror this extension, whether regionally or nationally. 
 
This leads us to question the structure of security maintenance within Forum 
member countries. The division of labour of many government ministerial 
portfolios still reflects a realist cold-war framework. External defence, border 
control, environmental and internal security for example, are spread among a 
variety of separate agencies. The security infrastructure of national security 
service providers may then require some adjustment. 
 
As a consequence of widening the security agenda, a ‘whole of government’ 
approach to security maintenance has already begun. The New Zealand’s 
Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination 
(ODESC) co-ordinates New Zealand's external and internal security needs.337 
This includes intelligence, counterterrorism preparedness, and internal 
emergency/crisis management and defence operations. It comprises Chief 
Executives from Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Defence Force, the Ministry of 
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Defence and the NZSIS, the GCSB, the NZ Police, the Ministry of Civil 
Defence & Emergency Management, Treasury and other groups if necessary. 
It is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet and the Domestic & External Security Group acts as a support 
secretariat. It is suggested that this type of holistic structure needs to be 
mirrored regionally. This will be considered in the analysis of the FRSC in 
chapter six. 
 
An ability to explain a region’s full security environment is however still 
lacking. A framework to analyse the ‘whole of government’ or more fitting, 
‘whole of region’ approach to security has not yet been considered. Security 
actors, policies and security services must be compared with the issues they 
are faced with. In addition, the securitisation process requires greater 
understanding to ensure that all security issues are addressed and the means 
of response is effective. Therefore to fully understand regional security needs, 
a model or framework must have the ability to account for all the 
characteristics of the region’s security environment. 
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Chapter 5: Security Environment Equation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will create a framework to analyse a cooperative security 
environment. The ‘security environment equation’ includes all the variants 
present during the securitisation process. It is an objective model with 
universal applicability and when applied to a security environment it 
completes a full picture of what exists. The security equation comprises three 
factors or divisions: security agenda, security architecture and security 
infrastructure. The equation can be used to complete a number of 
investigations as described below. In this chapter however it is applied to the 
Pacific region and a full picture of the Pacific security environment is revealed.  
 
A secure environment is enjoyed by all. As discussed previously, the means, 
however frequently becomes a problem. Debate over issues, threats, 
responses and agendas is likely. It is important to measure the expense of 
obtaining a secure environment, but a cost/benefit analysis where tangible 
and intangible variables are a significant feature, is difficult. Notwithstanding 
this, the response must be comparable to the threat, as democratic 
accountability demands tax-payer dollars and human resources are spent 
wisely.  
 
A framework, appropriate to the situation, which has the ability to reveal and 
assess the security environment, is necessary. At the 2005 Forum Regional 
Security Committee meeting, Greg Urwin, Forum Secretary General 
acknowledged the importance of a full assessment;  
 112
Regional and national security initiatives need, then, to be grounded in 
an appreciation of the comprehensive nature of the things which 
threaten us and by extension, of the need for comprehensive 
responses. How we achieve that comprehensiveness is one of the 
major tasks confronting us in the region …338
 
Buzan’s theories, as discussed in the previous chapter, while a useful 
beginning to re-defining security, do not go far enough for a comprehensive 
explanation of the Pacific security environment. Application of his sectoral 
division to the issues does provide insight into their characteristics, especially 
as to how they evolve and spill through other sectors. The theory of 
securitisation also provides a good account of how an issue becomes a 
security threat and why action is or is not mobilised. A full account of the 
security environment is, however, still lacking a theoretical model.  
 
Only after a full assessment is made of the security environment, can 
evidence be produced to justify appropriate responses to the insecurities 
facing the region. Moreover, if the assessment is made collectively by the 
region’s stakeholders and this is made available to the relevant audience, 
these responses are more likely to be considered legitimate. Obtaining 
legitimacy encourages greater responsibility and participation to help secure 
the environment.  
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5.2 Security Environment Equation 
It is argued here that a security environment is the sum of three dynamic 
factors:  
Agenda + Architecture + Infrastructure = Security Environment 
 
 
Security 
Agenda 
Issues & 
Process of 
Securitisation
Security 
Architecture 
Actors  
& Policies 
Security 
Infrastructure 
Security Service 
Providers 
           Security Environment = 
+ +
Table 1: Security Environment Equation 
The security agenda identifies issues and sells them as security threats 
through the process of securitisation.339 Security actors try to convince the 
relevant audience that a particular threat is real and imminent. If successful, 
there will be an agreement to mobilise and use whatever means are 
necessary to prevent or minimise the threat.  
 
The security architecture is the plan or design for dealing with the security 
agenda. The architecture is made up of security actors and security policies. 
Official actors design security policies that set the agenda. They also attempt 
to securitise issues as threats. Conversely some actors may be perceived as 
a threat by one group, but by another, the liberators or freedom fighters. 
                                            
339 Buzan et al, 1998, p 23 
 114
Consequently, both security and insecurity actors plan strategies for response 
to perceived threats. Insecurity actors may act as militia and attempt to disrupt 
the plans of the official security actors. Security service providers comprise 
the security infrastructure – the operational side of security. They administer 
programmes and initiatives, and in some cases monitor the security 
environment. 
  
Analysing the interaction between the bodies or agencies that comprise the 
agenda, infrastructure and architecture provides a full explanation of the 
environment. For example: when a security service provider behaves as an 
actor and tries to set the agenda by attempting to securitise an issue, their 
status and purpose becomes confused. The politicisation of the Fiji military is 
a good example of this. As a security service provider it can “promote either 
security or insecurity.”340 The Commander Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama 
considers it well within his professional position to comment on political 
affairs.341 However, taking a wider approach and after asking why this is, 
underlying issues within other sectors can be identified. These threats (in Fiji’s 
case the need to uphold the rule of law), can then be addressed by more 
appropriate security actors or governmental systems. The military should then 
return to its appropriate constitutional functions.  
 
Analysing the interaction between the factors or divisions may also provide 
ideas for response. At the 2000 Forum Regional Security Committee, it was 
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agreed that “ethnicity, land disputes and other social issues were matters that 
required deeper understanding and action.”342 If the issues are tracked 
through the equation: agenda, architecture and infrastructure, it may be 
revealed that a group have become frustrated from a lack of justice in some 
form. As a response a government as an actor may create more functional 
policies, which strengthens the architecture. They may also construct an 
efficient institution to provide structured mediation and negotiation processes, 
building a stable infrastructure; thereby fortifying the security environment.  
 
This equation accounts for all the unique features of a security environment. It 
is universally applicable to other security environments: national, regional, 
even global. The unique characteristics of each environment are not sacrificed 
to the generalities of theory. The loose framework allows for specific security 
information or data to be complied or in other words, it requires ‘filling in the 
blanks’ – see table three.  
 
 
Agenda 
 
Issues 
Political 
Social 
Military 
Environmental 
Economic 
Internal/External  
 
Securitisation 
Process 
Architecture 
 
Actors 
Individuals 
Nations/States 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
Militia/rebel groups 
 
Policies 
Laws 
Treaties 
Conventions 
Infrastructure 
 
Security Service Providers 
Disciplined Forces 
Border Agencies 
Intelligence Agencies 
Aid Donors 
Judicial Systems 
Table 3: Universal Security Environment Equation 
=       Security Environment 
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5.3 The Pacific Security Environment – A full picture 
When introducing an original model for the first time, the critique needed to 
fine tune is lacking. One criticism or problem acknowledged is the need for 
first hand investigation of all the factors within the region. The short-comings 
of an open-sourced desk analysis become clear when information on the 
groups, their functions and their interactions is limited. In a region where 
relationships are informal and friendships cross professional and official 
boundaries, extensive field work would provide depth and a greater 
understanding of the cultural features of Pacific security relations. 
Nevertheless, table four below is an attempt to “fill in the blanks” with the 
information available to create a picture of the Pacific security environment. 
 
Despite the earlier judgement by Buzan discussed in chapter four, the Pacific 
security environment is a structured complex with networks comprising a 
matrix of security interaction and interdependence. In the Pacific security 
agenda, insecurity arises from a broad array of issues in a diverse range of 
sectors. The process of securitisation is contentious and some states within 
the region are suspicious of the motives of the security actors. The actors in 
the Pacific security architecture are diverse and the growing body of security 
policy and its legal complexities require more analysis. The security service 
providers in the Pacific security infrastructure are well organised and 
cooperate within their various groups but greater interaction between the 
groups would make more effective use of meagre resources.  
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 Security Issues and 
Securitisation 
 
Internal Issues 
Political  
Constitutional crisis, 
Inept and corrupt 
governance, 
Deterioration of law 
and order, 
Crime 
 
Military  
Poorly resourced, 
Lack professionalism & 
training 
Politicised or 
compromised 
 
Economic  
Marginalisation, 
Trade disputes, 
Poverty, 
Under-development 
 
Social  
Civil instability, 
Land disputes, 
Population disparities, 
Health problems, 
Crime 
 
Environment  
Disasters, 
Climate changes, 
Unsustainable 
resource exploitation, 
Disease transmission 
 
Legal 
Poor implementation of 
legal obligations, 
Low adherence to 
regional agreements 
Under-resourced and 
under-skilled judiciaries 
 
External Issues 
Terrorism, 
Drug and people 
smuggling,  
International financial 
crime,  
Dangerous goods 
transportation, 
Piracy, 
Illegal fishing, 
Border crime, 
Disease transmission 
 
Security Actors
 
State Governments 
Internal/External to 
the region 
 
National/Ethnic 
Groups 
 
Non-Government  
Organisations – 
Activists 
Greenpeace, 
Amnesty,  
Transparency 
International,  
Pacific Islands 
Association of Non-
Government 
Organizations 
(PIANGO) 
 
Inter-governmental 
Organisations 
Pacific Islands 
Forum, 
Asian Development 
Bank 
 
International 
Organisations 
World Bank, 
United Nations, 
Financial Action 
Task Force, 
International Civil 
Aviation 
Organisation, 
International 
Maritime 
Organisation 
 
Insecurity Actors 
Rebel groups, 
Militia, warlords, 
Undisciplined forces, 
Criminal gangs, 
Transnational 
criminals, 
External pressure 
groups, 
Terrorists, 
Conflict 
entrepreneurs, 
Mercenaries 
Security Policies
 
National Policies 
 
Regional Policies 
Forum Declarations 
1992 Honiara 
1997 Aitutaki 
2000 Biketawa 
2002 Nasonini 
 
Treaties/Conventions 
1985 Rarotonga 
1995 Waigani 
 
International Policies 
Financial Action Task 
Force, 40 Anti-Money 
Laundering 
Recommendations; 
International Civil 
Aviation Organisation 
Standards; 
Protocols for 
Trafficking in Human 
Beings; 
United Nations 
Convention against 
Trans-national 
Organised Crime; 
12 Conventions and 
Protocols against 
Terrorism; 
OECD - Taxation, 
Corruption and 
Banking Instruments; 
Maritime 
Transportation 
Security Act; 
International Ship and 
Port Facility Security 
Code 
 
 
Security Service Providers 
 
Regional Security Agencies 
CLAGS Combined Law 
Agency Groups; 
FIU Financial Intelligent Units; 
FFA Forum Fisheries Agency; 
OCO Oceania Customs 
Organisation; 
PASO Pacific Aviation 
Security Office; 
PICP Pacific Islands Chiefs of 
Police; 
PIDC Pacific Immigration 
Directors Conference; 
PILOM Pacific Islands Law 
Officers Meeting; 
PTCCC Pacific Transnational 
Crime Coordination Centre; 
SOPAC South Pacific Applied 
Geo-science Commission;  
SPC Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community; 
SPICIN South Pacific Islands 
Criminal Intelligence Network; 
SPREP South Pacific 
Regional Environment 
Programme 
 
National Disciplined Forces 
Military, paramilitary, police  
 
National Development 
Agencies  
 NZAID 
 AusAid 
  
Regional Development 
Agencies  
Asian Development Bank 
 
International Aid Agencies 
United Nations  
World Bank 
 
  =     Security Environment 
Table 4: The Pacific Security Environment 
   Agenda        +                 Architecture                    +    Infrastructure 
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 5.3.1 Pacific Security Agenda = Issues + Securitisation 
Issues 
The Forum Secretariat commissioned Ron Crocombe, et al, to complete a 
series of national and regional security studies in 2000 – 2004.343 The issues 
identified in these reviews comprise the security agenda and are listed in table 
four. Crocombe said many of these issues were at the “core of the actual 
conflicts in the region” and implied that the failure to address them were the 
“basic causes of deteriorating national security.”344  He said “sensitivity” was a 
reason for the “lack of acknowledgment” of the issues because one approach 
was “to hide, deny or avoid them until they deteriorate to the point of 
conflict.”345 “Habit,” he said was another reason issues were ignored.346 
Enhancing public awareness and encouraging open and constructive 
research and discussion of the issues combined with facilitating “widespread 
involvement in actions to overcome them,” was his recommendation to 
address, or in ‘new’ security terms, securitise the issues.347  
 
Threats to security impacts globally. A United Nations report of the Secretary 
General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identified 
that “a threat to one is a threat to all.”348 Security interdependence is 
pronounced and collective responses are expected. The origins of threat may 
come from one source yet the impact may be felt by another – global warming 
leading to rising sea levels is an example in the Pacific region. While in 
                                            
343 Crocombe, 2000; Ray Anere et al; Crocombe & Siliga Kofe, 2003 
344 Ibid, p 8 
345 Ibid 
346 Ibid 
347 Ibid 
348 United Nations report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, 2004, ‘A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,’ p 14, http://www.un.org/secureworld/ 
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 debate over the Kyoto Protocol and the consequences of climate change, 
former New Zealand Minister, Hon Taito Philip Field described how in 
February 2004 the small atoll island of Tuvalu, “… went underwater for over 
an hour …” and that if nothing is done to reduce fossil fuel emissions in 
industrial countries, “we could see low-lying islands in the Pacific totally 
disappear as a result of the effect of greenhouse gases.”349  
 
The debate over the origins and the cause/effect of risks and threats is likely 
to increase within an interdependent global system. Crocombe et al, for 
example, acknowledged that while there is “considerable agreement on 
security matters,” within the Pacific region, ‘security interests and perceptions 
of security differ widely.”350 For instance, tropical hurricanes are a real threat 
to the people of Niue, whereas New Zealand, sitting directly on the Alpine 
Fault line, is over-due for a massive earthquake. Trans-national crime, 
especially drug trafficking and airport security, is a major concern for 
Australia. HIV/Aids threaten the health security of the people of Papua New 
Guinea. In Tonga, democratic reform may cause civil instability if the 
management of this process of political change is poor.351
 
This diversity within the region also causes debate. How, for example, do land 
disputes produce insecurity in Fiji when compared with New Zealand? The 
responses necessary for an appropriate solution must fit the situation, a one-
size-fits-all approach does not address all the nuances, including cultural. 
                                            
349 Hon Taito Philip Field, 2004, Hansard, Wednesday, 25th February 2004 
http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Content/Hansard/Final/FINAL_2004_02_25.htm#_Toc66867243 
350 Ibid, p 3, 6 
351 Recent reports (July 2005) of the first nationwide strike of the public servants in Tonga have shown 
the growing discontent of its citizens. During the final editing of this thesis, the Tongan Government 
appointed Fred Sevele, a commoner (non-royal), for the first time as the acting Prime Minister.  
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 Similarly, the economic insecurity suffered from illegal fishing is much greater 
between Micronesia and Polynesia; again solutions must mirror the relative 
security environment. 
 
Any assessment of the complexity of the issues within the security agenda 
needs to be logical, systematic and thorough. Using security analysis and 
reviews to hype up or contest threats against other risks is self-defeating. It is 
essential that all parties in the security environment are involved in the 
process of securitisation.  
 
Securitisation 
Securitisation, as discussed in the previous chapter, describes the process 
whereby a particular threat is accepted as real and imminent,352 and a 
response is formulated. Emergency measures may be justified, including 
legitimately breaking rules and the use of military force or other coercive 
means judged necessary. The dispute of whether an issue is a threat and 
requires action is often a battle itself and consensus on securitisation in the 
Pacific region is inconsistent.  
 
How do issues – such as climate change, HIV-aids or transnational threat – 
become securitised? Commissioning and the acceptance of security reports is 
only an attempt to securitise as they do not always mobilise a response. In 
most instances, a “performative,” the act of saying, makes it so. For example, 
a declaration of war means the existence of war. The securitising act can be 
                                            
352 Buzan et al, 1998, p 24 
 121
 compared with a marketing campaign. It is the actor’s ability to sell the issue 
as a threat and persuade their audience that a response is required. If action 
occurs, securitisation can be considered successful. 
 
A relevant example in the Pacific region is the assertion that poverty or under-
development is a security risk. As a consequence, governments of wealthier 
states justify spending taxpayer dollars on the development of poorer states. 
Domestic constituencies from the wealthier countries are the relevant 
audiences and if they accept this as a necessity, poverty has become 
securitised. For example, the 2003 Australian Senate inquiry, A Pacific 
Engaged, strongly asserted that “there will be serious implications for 
Australia if economies in the region collapse”.353 The Australian Government, 
(in this case part of the audience), accepted this assertion. As a result, the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) stated that 
“Australia’s national interest [is] advanced by assistance to developing 
countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development.”354 Further 
that, “Australia is at the forefront of donors engaging with countries that face 
particularly stark poverty and development challenges and are vulnerable to 
further decline.”355 Consequently, Australian aid in response to the crisis in 
the Solomon Islands was increased by A$55.2 million in 2004-5 to A$92.6 
million.356
 
                                            
353 Parliament of Australia Senate (2003), A Pacific Engaged, 
http://aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/FADT_CTTE/completed_inquiries/2002-04/png/report/index.htm 
354 AusAID Annual Report 2004-2005, p 12, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/anrep05/default.cfm 
355 Ibid, p 27 
356 Aid Budget Summary 2003-04 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget03/summary.cfm 
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 Another reason for the increase in aid to Solomon Islands stems from the 
securitisation of the global terrorism agenda. The Australian Government 
asserted that,  
“establishment of terrorist bases, the laundering of money, the 
procurement of false documents and the trafficking of weapons are 
easier in a state whose legal, political and governance systems are 
weak or have failed to operate. What happens in the Pacific affects our 
strategic and security interests. Australia is playing a leading role in 
efforts to avert the prospects of state failure and institutional weakness 
in the Pacific islands.” 357  
An outcome of this act of securitisation was the invention of RAMSI – led by 
Australia in 2003 to “help deter international terrorist groups from exploiting 
the islands countries.”358  
 
While imagining the prospect of Osama Bin Laden residing in the Pacific is 
considered unlikely by most; Dell Higgie, New Zealand’s Ambassador for 
Counter Terrorism said, “the region is not exempt from threat – even though 
the threat is low…”359 Despite this low rating, the guard must be keep up as it 
was alleged by Solomon Islands Finance Minister, Peter Boyce, in July 2005 
that radical militant groups from Indonesia attempted to recruit teenage 
Solomon Islanders.360  
 
                                            
357 Australian Government, 2004, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, p 107 -109 
358 Ibid, p 110 
359 Dell Higgie, 2005 ‘Approaches to Terrorism’ in John Henderson & Greg Watson (eds), Securing a 
Peaceful Pacific, Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, p 105 
360 Pacific Islands Reports, 8 July 2005, ‘Indonesian Militants seek Recruits in Solomons’, 
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pirport/2005/July/07-08-10.htm 
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 Resources are required to market or sell the threat, and when these are in 
limited supply, as is the case for many Pacific island countries, securitisation 
may be very difficult. This may lead to threats such as climate change failing 
to become securitised, while wealthier actors succeed in having lesser 
security priorities attended to. Security actors may also mobilise a response 
without seeking agreement to securitise. This causes problems with 
legitimacy because in a regional setting, unilateral and frequently bilateral 
action often causes resentment. Other members of the regional 
neighbourhood may wish to be consulted in order to feel they have a degree 
of control and influence over their regional security environment.  
 
Disparities in power and resources, combined with cultural and ideological 
differences, will influence the security debate and disagreements are likely 
when the perception of what is valued differs. Methods of response also 
cause debate. Nevertheless, a regional institution is a suitable setting to 
facilitate equality, offer explanation and understanding, as well as provide 
technical assistance during securitisation.  
 
Members of the Forum meet as equals and can exercise this equality to 
accept or reject an attempt to securitise. ‘Buy in’ is thereby communal and the 
political will and responsibility to ensure compliance through pooling 
resources is more likely. This leads to closer security cooperation to ensure 
regional security is maintained and therefore, national security interests are 
also satisfied.  
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 5.3.2 Pacific security architecture = Actors + Policies 
Security Actors  
The current architecture comprises a diverse group of security and insecurity 
actors and a comprehensive set of regional security policies. The status of 
security actors, internal and external, requires clarification and strengthening. 
These actors include individuals, governments, ethnic and communal groups 
as well as non-governmental, inter-governmental and international 
organisations. While official security actors establish security policies, all 
actors identify problems and attempt to securitise. For example, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace alert the region to 
environmental threats, while individual activists such as Philip Alpers,361 
promote the dangers of a lack of gun control in Papua New Guinea. The role 
of the media as an actor and facilitator is also an important feature in the age 
of rapid telecasting.  
 
Actors may also cause insecurity because it is the perception of the audience, 
which determines the status of a freedom fighter, rebel group, an interfering 
NGO or politicised military. These actors also attempt to securitise their 
cause. As part of the any security analysis, it is necessary to take a deeper 
look before applying enemy-terminology to a particular actor. 
The focus of this thesis is the security institutions of the Pacific Islands Forum. 
Chapter six will assess the status and logic of action for the Forum Regional 
Security Committee as a security actor. Its ability to securitise will be 
                                            
361 Philip Alpers, 2005, ‘Gun-running: From Arrows to Assault Weapons’, in Securing a Peaceful Pacific, 
Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, pp 475-480 
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 examined resulting in suggestions to strengthen the Pacific security 
environment. 
 
Policies 
Pacific security policy consists of a number of treaties, conventions and 
declarations as listed in table five. Declarations are not binding unless this is 
explicitly stipulated. They are considered statements of intent, adopted by 
states or organisations,362 incorporating a moral imperative for parties to 
uphold certain principles or courses of action.  
 
Treaties, conventions and international obligations are legally binding 
contractual agreements that make up the body of international law, and 
violations can be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
However, the cost of bringing cases to the ICJ restricts many small states 
from using this system, making access to international justice beyond their 
capacity. Therefore, Forum members rely on the principle of “pacta sunt  
servanda”: the commitment by the parties to act in good faith, to maintain 
treaty compliance and co-operation.363
                                            
362 Carl Fleischhauer, 1992, in Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol 1, Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Amsterdam, New York. 
363 Malcolm Shaw, 2003, International Law, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 811. The 1974 
Nuclear cases of Australia v France, ICJ p. 253, paragraph 46; New Zealand v France IJC p. 457 
paragraph 49 declares ‘pacta sunt servanda’ as becoming ‘increasingly essential’ in an age of greater 
international co-operation. 
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Table 5 Pacific Security Policy 364
 YEAR PURPOSE 
Treaty of Rarotonga 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 
Honiara Declaration 1992 Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Waigani Convention 1995 Convention to Ban the Importation in to Forum 
Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive 
Wastes and to Control the Trans-boundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes Within the South Pacific Region 
Aitutaki Declaration 1997 Regional Security Cooperation 
Biketawa 
Declaration 
2000 Principles of Good Governance & Collective 
Crisis Response 
Nasonini 
Declaration 
2002 Regional Security: Implementation of 
Internationally Agreed Anti-terrorist Measures. 
Despite this principle, adherence to international and regional agreements by 
Forum members is considered “poor”.365 “High implementation costs, “poor 
co-ordination”, and “low law enforcement capacity” are cited as difficulties 
facing Forum members.366 From a legal point of view, it has been suggested 
that “relying on soft law . . . runs counter to orthodox modes of regional law 
making” and that a “hard law” or more formal approach through a “range of 
regional treaties” may be advantageous.367  
 
Declarations 
The 1992 Honiara Declaration was a response by the region’s leaders to the 
potential impact of trans-national crime.368 The Forum Secretariat developed 
model legislation for Pacific states to adopt, involving mutual assistance in 
                                            
364 The Declarations can be found in the Forum Communiqué of the respective year. 
365 Neil Boister, 2005, ‘New Directions in Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational 
Crime in the South Pacific,’ p. 3. To be published in G Leane and B Von Tigerstrom (eds), International 
Law in the South Pacific, Ashgate, London 
366 Ibid 
367 Ibid 
368 For a detailed analysis of the declaration see Neil Boister 2005 
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 criminal matters; the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime; a review of national 
extradition legislation and issues involving customs co-operation, illegal traffic 
of drugs and money laundering. The declarations also noted the security 
services provided by specialist agencies and tasked the FRSC to co-ordinate 
and disseminate information to increase contact between the agencies.369  
 
The main goal of the 1992 Honiara Declaration is the “need for a more 
comprehensive, integrated and collaborative approach to counter” the threats 
and impact of trans-national crime. This has become more significant in 
today’s security climate, yet establishing the means to achieve it requires 
more work. 
 
The 1997 Aitutaki Declaration built on the Honiara Declaration by widening 
the region’s security agenda to include threats from a range of sectors. 370 It 
also noted the vulnerabilities of Forum members in the face of external 
threats. It outlined a comprehensive set of “guiding principles governing 
security co-operation”, including various mechanisms for “preventive 
diplomacy”, including a regional response to “emergency situations”. 
 
In July 2000, just weeks after the coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands, at the 
annual FRSC meeting in Vanuatu, former Forum Secretary General Noel Levi 
said, “[T]he security of the region is under severe pressure and the 
expectations from around the region of the Committee producing a 
substantive recommendation to fully implement the principles of the Aitutaki 
                                            
369 Forum Communiqué 1992, Honiara Declaration paragraph 3 
370 Forum Communiqué 1997 
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 Declaration is never higher.”371 The options recommended by the FRSC were 
tabled later that year at the 31st Pacific Islands Forum in Biketawa, Kiribati. 
  
The 2000 Biketawa Declaration included the Forum Economic Action Plan 
Eight Principles of Good Governance, and the regional response mechanisms 
of the Aitutaki Declaration. It acknowledged “the principle of non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of another member state”, but asserted that in “the time 
of crisis or in response to members” request for assistance, for action to be 
taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific 
Islands extended family”.372 This declaration justified the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and the financial rescue plan for Nauru 
(PRAN) when it was threatened with bankruptcy.  
 
It can be argued that the provision for a regional response to a crisis has been 
available since 1997, with the response mechanisms of the Aitutaki 
Declaration. Furthermore, the informal and flexible nature of the Forum has 
always allowed for creative responses when needed, as was the case in the 
1987 Fiji coups. It would seem, then, that response to a crisis or security 
threat may be determined by other factors, such as the ability of the ‘security 
actors” to convince the regional audience that a threat is real and requires 
action.  
 
Why is the Biketawa Declaration used to securitise some circumstances and 
not others? It is held to embody a “proactive” approach, so that response to a 
                                            
371 Levi Noel, 2000, Welcome Remarks at the Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting, 13-15 July 
2000, Port Vila, Vanuatu, http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2000/jul05.htm 
372 Forum Communiqué 2000, Attachment 1 or annex seven 
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 crisis is not impeded by ‘slow and considerable diplomatic effort”.373 However, 
a regional response needs to be legitimate, and this can only be achieved in 
an environment free from politically dominating agendas, so decisions can be 
made by consensus. This improves the chances that, when implemented, the 
response will be effective. One way to achieve this is to ensure that decision-
makers – or security actors – are regionally representative and have the 
appropriate authority.   
 
The 2002 Nasonini Declaration built on the previous declarations and 
committed Forum members to the counter-terrorism measures agreed by the 
international community after 9/11.374 This included legislation to meet the 
standards of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 
Financial Action Task Force Special recommendations. The Nasonini 
Declaration also noted that implementation of the Honiara Declaration 
legislation had not been completed and urged Pacific states to recommit to 
“full implementation by the end of 2003”. An Expert Working Group met in 
2003 to develop a regional framework for model legislation. They also noted 
that in-country drafting assistance was available to Forum members.375  
Treaties and conventions 
All Forum members have signed (and most have ratified) the 1985 South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the 1995 Waigani Convention. Treaty 
protocols “commit nuclear powers not to use or test explosive nuclear devices 
                                            
373 Phil Goff (2003), ‘A Move to Succeed where Colonial Powers Failed’ 
http://www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/speeches/goffcomment.html 
374 Forum Communiqué, 2002  
375 Forum Press Statement, 2003, Expert Working Group to Coordinate the Development of a Regional 
Framework including Model Legislation to Address Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime, 51/03 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2003/May?may%2001.htm 
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 in the region”.376 At the 2004 Forum, leaders again “called upon the United 
States to ratify the Protocols to the Treaty as a means of enhancing global 
and regional peace and security”.377 However, the Pacilii treaty database 
contains comments that assert the US is unlikely to do so, as this would 
impede the passage of US nuclear-powered or -armed naval vessels through 
the region.378 These comments are comparable with the 2005 United States 
Defense policy which declares one of its objectives is to ensure free access 
around the world’s oceans.379
 
The 1995 Waigani Convention, which came into force in October 2001, bans 
the importation of hazardous and radioactive waste into Forum countries and 
controls the trans-boundary movement and management of hazardous 
wastes in the Pacific. The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP) acts as the Secretariat of this Convention.  
 
There appear to be a few problems concerning the enforcement and 
application of Waigani obligations. Notification by the exporter of trans-
boundary waste shipments was made mandatory by Article 6 of the 
convention. However, this does not occur as it was reported that some Pacific 
island countries were not officially informed of the route of the April 2005 
                                            
376 France completed 159 (44 atmospheric and 115 underground) nuclear tests in the Pacific since 
1966. In 1995, French President Chirac announced the resumption of underground testing and 
completed a series of six tests ending January 1996. France signed the treaty in March 1996.  
Pacific Islands Forum (1997), New Release, ‘UK Ratifies Rarotonga Treaty Protocols’, 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/1997/foc12.htm (2/07/05) 
377 Forum Communiqué 2004 
378 Pacific Islands Treaty Series, 2004, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 
http://www.paclii.org/pits/status_pages/Dismarmament%20 
&%20Security/treaty_rarotonga 
379 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005_sum.htm  
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 shipment of nuclear material by the Pacific Sandpiper.380 This was the tenth 
shipment made since 1995. Pacific island countries have repeatedly voiced 
their objections to the shipments to the three shipping states, Britain, Japan 
and France. Also, Forum Secretary General Greg Urwin is concerned that the 
“international arrangements for liability and compensation do not adequately 
address the risks posed by shipments through the region”.381 Should an 
incident occur, how would the region respond? What contingency plans exist? 
As mentioned previously, this is another area of Pacific security that needs 
further examination. 
 
The vulnerability of these ships to terrorism (including hijacking) was 
considered “a real threat” by the Regional Maritime Legal Adviser to the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community.382 A recent Oxford Research Group 
study reported that terrorists could obtain enough radioactive waste products 
from one shipment to manufacture a “dirty bomb”.383 Greenpeace estimated 
the nuclear waste aboard one ship enough to build 60 nuclear devices.384  
 
While the risk of an accident to a shipment in severe weather is worrisome, 
the idea that terrorists could use the shipments to hold the international 
community to ransom is a significant concern. This could come in the form of 
a threat to attack, or an actual attempt at boarding or hijacking. If such an 
                                            
380 Pacific Islands Reports, 4 April 2005,’Nuclear Shipment to Pass Through the Pacific’, 
http://archives.pireports.org/archive/2005/april/04%2D04%2D14.htm 
381 Pacific Islands Reports, 7 April 2005, ‘Pacific Forum Raises Concern Over Nuke Shipment,’, 
http://archives.pireports.org/archive/2005/april/04%2D07%2D02.htm  
382 Captain Peter Heathcote (2001), Terrorism at Sea - The Potential Threat, 
http://www.spc.org.nc/Maritime/documents/terrorism.pdf  
383 Frank Barnaby (2005), ‘Dirty Bombs and Primitive Nuclear Weapons’, Oxford Research Group, 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/books/dirtybombs.htm 
384 Asia Times, 1999, Nuclear Shipments Sail into South Pacific Anger, 
http://www.atimes.com/oceania/AH03Ah01.html  
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 incident occurred, the damage and destruction would be incalculable. In 2002 
the US Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) considered it “irresponsible” to ship 
nuclear waste in the post-9/11 security climate.385  
 
International standards and laws 
The cost of compliance, the consequences of non-implementation, and the 
lack of capacity to enforce the host of complex international legal 
requirements constitute a dilemma, particularly for small and economically 
poor Pacific states.  
 
Pacific Island countries rely on tourism and trade and cannot risk the prospect 
that international shipping companies and airlines will refuse to land. This is 
an ever-present threat. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
officials can arrive unannounced to inspect an airport – both Solomon Islands 
and Fiji airports are reportedly below ICAO standards. In mid-2005 Nadi 
airport was issued a three-month licence instead of the usual 12 months, and 
has since announced a $19 million upgrade to meet the required 
standards.386 The Solomon Islands airport “restoration project” is reliant on 
external funding from the Japanese government.387 The United States Coast 
Guard and Homeland Security included Nauru on their Port Security Advisory 
list because it had not reported its compliance with the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act and the International Ship and Port Facility 
                                            
385 BBC News Online, 2002, A Floating Target for al-Qaeda? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2038097.stm  
386 Pacific Islands Reports, 2 May 2005, ‘Fiji Nadi Airport Faces Compliance Deadline’, 
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireports/2005/May/05-03-09.htm  
387 Pacific Islands Magazine, 21 June 2005, ‘Solomon Islands: Airport Facilities below Standard’, 
http://www.pacificislands.cc/pina/pindefault.php?urlpinaid=15841  
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 Security Code of the International Maritime Organisation.388 Consequently, 
ships that have recently docked at Nauru could be refused access to US 
ports.  
 
Terrorism has been described by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a 
“global scourge with global effects”.389 One consequence of the global 
terrorism agenda is the threat of further marginalisation, should Pacific 
countries fail to adequately implement and enforce international security 
policies. Higgie asserted that,  
“the legal counter-terrorism framework drawn up by the international 
community is universal in its application. It applies to Pacific Island 
countries as to other members of the global community.”390  
The integrity of the region would be tested if it were perceived internationally 
to be falling behind international legal standards. In this case, when Pacific 
leaders voice their concerns on other issues, the international community is 
less likely to respond favourably.  
 
Conversely, if the international community is intent on imposing strict and 
expensive security standards on Pacific Island states, they must also accept 
responsibility for assisting these vulnerable states to achieve compliance. The 
Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy is one 
mechanism that will help Forum members and “donor countries and 
organisations work co-operatively in meeting regional and international 
                                            
388 US Homeland Security & US Coast Guard, 29 June 2005, Press Release, Testimony on 
Implementation of Maritime Transport Security Act, 
http://www.piersystem.com/external/index.cfm?cid=786&fuseaction=EXTERNAL  
389 Kofi Annan, 20 January 2003, Press Release Menace Of Terrorism Requires Global Response, 20 
January 2003, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sgsm8583.html
390 Higgie, 2005, p 103 
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 expectations for these countries”.391 The question must be, is this enough to 
ensure compliance before the implementation deadlines? If not, what would 
be the consequences, legal and otherwise, of a failure to comply? 
 
One way to mitigate the circumstances is for Pacific countries to pool judicial 
services. This would relieve the legislative burden from Pacific countries by 
providing regional jurisdiction for certain criminal or terrorist situations. This 
would strengthen the Pacific legal security environment and provide 
assurance to the international community that the region is serious about 
adhering to international legal standards. 
 
The 2002 Nasonini Declaration noted that implementation of the 1992 Honiara 
Declaration legislation has not been completed, and urged Pacific states to 
recommit to “full implementation by the end of 2003”, exemplifying the 
region’s problems with adherence to regional agreements. Furthermore, the 
2004 EPG Review identified the lack of an “efficient mechanism” as hindering 
regional co-operation on security and law enforcement issues. 
 
While the technical assistance offered by the PIRSTCS will help Pacific 
countries meet their international legal obligations, pooling judicial resources 
would provide greater regional legal protection. The idea of a regional court 
has been advocated for some time. Samoa, at the 1974 Pacific Islands Forum 
in Rarotonga, proposed a regional court of appeal. Forum Secretary General 
Greg Urwin proposed the idea of a regional “privy council” in late 2004. In 
                                            
391 This strategy is listed to be implemented as an ‘Early Practical Benefit’ in the draft Pacific Plan. 
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 early 2005, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi also 
suggested that greater co-operation could be achieved by pooling judicial 
resources. 
 
Boister describes a regional judicial system that could,  
Articulate national criminal processes and perhaps even remove the 
burden of suppressing serious trans-national and international crime 
from the member states by delegating jurisdiction to a regional court 
that deals with such offences, staffed by regional judges and procuracy 
processing offences investigated by a regional investigation bureau. 392  
 
Model legislation developed by the Forum Secretariat could provide the basis 
for a body of regional laws administered by a Forum regional court attended 
to by a group of legal officials from member states. A set of regional laws 
could interface between national and international laws and standards. The 
idea of shared jurisdiction could also be a step towards resolving some of the 
complexities facing the pooling of police forces in the region. Questions of 
sovereignty can be examined by introducing the idea of a shared “regional 
sovereignty”. This may appear to be an oxymoron if the concept of state 
sovereignty is strictly interpreted. Nonetheless, the idea should not be 
discarded, as solutions to problems often involve stretching concepts so they 
remain relevant. In the recent reviews of the region, sovereignty has been 
tested and re-evaluated in a Pacific context. Chapter seven compares the 
latest regional reviews and the sovereignty issues discussed. 
                                            
392 Boister, 2005, p. 11. 
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5.3.3 Pacific Security Infrastructure = Security Services Providers 
Until the flurry of activity in the development of the Pacific Plan, analysis of the 
Pacific security infrastructure has been limited. In the Terms of Reference for 
the Pacific Plan Taskforce, the Leaders tasked the Forum Secretariat to 
complete An Assessment of Regional Mechanisms and Processes in the 
Pacific.393 The resulting report in August 2005 by AV Hughes, Strengthening 
Regional Management: A Review of the Architecture for Regional 
Cooperation in the Pacific, proposed some bold reforms of five of the CROP 
agencies:394 Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS), South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the South Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP).395  
 
Examples of the CROP agencies that provide some form of security service 
are FFA – the Vessel Monitoring System (VSMi),396 SPC – the Regional 
Maritime Programme (RMP), 397 SPREP – protection and management of 
natural resources including monitoring climate change, and pollution 
                                            
393 Pacific Plan Task Force, 2004, ‘Terms of Reference,’ para 3 
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=Pacific+Plan+TERMSOFREFERENCE&
PHPSESSID=ACA4C4D5EAF72B0C17B4... 
394 Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) membership includes: Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA), Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM), Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP), South 
Pacific Board for Education Assessment (SPBEA), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), South 
Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the 
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO), 
and University of the South Pacific (USP).  
395 AV Hughes, 2005, Strengthening Regional Management: A Review of the Architecture for Regional 
Cooperation in the Pacific, Consultative Draft, Report to the Pacific Islands Forum 
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=HomePage 
396 Uses satellite technologies to monitor fisheries vessels and a policy programme to streamline and 
strengthen their laws and operations in surveillance and enforcement. 
397 The mission of RMP is safe and secure shipping, the Public Health Surveillance and Communicable 
Disease Control Section (PHS & CDC) and the Pacific Plant Protection Organisation (PPPO) Bio-
security. 
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 protection, and acting as Secretariat for the 1995 Waigani Convention. 
SOPAC monitors disaster management practices.  
 
CROP, however, does not include other security agencies such as Pacific 
Islands Law Officers Meeting (PILOM), Oceania Customs Organisation 
(OCO),398 Pacific Immigration Directors Conference (PIDC), Pacific Islands 
Chiefs of Police (PICP), South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network 
(SPICIN), Pacific Aviation Security Office (PASO), Pacific Financial 
Intelligence Unit (PFIU), and the Pacific Trans-national Crime Coordination 
Centre (PTCCC).  
 
Other service providers include national aid agencies, international donors 
and organisations and disciplined forces.399 Schemes such as the New 
Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) and the Australian/New 
Zealand funded Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI) will strengthen 
inter-operability and increase professionalism. Non-government organisations 
also provide services in a crisis situation, of which, Red Cross and Oxfam are 
examples. Security providers in the Pacific are well organised and while there 
is co-operation within each sector, there is room for improvement in 
communication between sectors. 
 
One possibility would be to structure a network to co-ordinate the security 
infrastructure as described in table four. Building on existing mechanisms, 
PICP could act as a coordinating unit of the security service providers with the 
                                            
398 Formerly known as Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meetings (CHARM) 
399 Disciplined forces include the military, paramilitary and police. 
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 Forum Secretariat providing administrative and technical support while 
incorporating the decision making capacity of the Forum Regional Security 
Committee. A representative of this structure could also become part of the 
CROP group. This would compliment the recently revised CROP charter 
which asserted that a, “Joint CROP response to crisis situations in the region 
[is] another coordinated function.”400   
 
5.4 Security Equation Applied 
This overview of the Pacific security environment briefly described the three 
factors or divisions in the security equation: security agenda, security 
architecture and security infrastructure. This equation can be applied for a 
variety reasons to produce a number of outcomes, which include: 
• A complete security environmental analysis revealing a 
comprehensive overview of the region’s security needs;401 
• An issue-driven analysis of the security agenda through the 
various sectors, delving into the securitisation process which 
would trace the threat through the security architecture and 
infrastructure and give greater understanding of its nature and 
the type of response required; 
• Collation of the security infrastructure revealing duplication and 
exposing areas that require modification; 
• An investigation into the security architecture revealing the 
status of the security actors and their effectiveness. 
                                            
400 The CROP Charter, http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=The+CROP+ 
Charter&PHPSESS.... 
401 An overview of the region’s security environment see – 5.3 
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 The next chapter will focus on this last outcome by concentrating on the 
Forum Regional Security Committee, one security mechanism of the Forum.  
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 Chapter 6: The Forum Regional Security Committee  
6.1 Introduction 
The insecurities facing the region are complex and becoming more sensitive. 
Sharp-end threats such as transnational crime can be more amenable to 
regional solutions compared to internal issues such as corrupt governance or 
resource and land disputes. This is because the threat is, by nature, 
transnational and it is self-evident that solutions to these threats require 
regional security cooperation. The Biketawa Declaration however called for 
Forum members to start the process of “constructively” addressing the 
“difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and 
conflict (ethnic tension, socio-economic disparities, and lack of good 
governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values).”402  
 
One security mechanism available to the region is the Forum Regional 
Security Committee (FRSC). As a regionally representative institution, it has 
the legitimacy to securitise issues and set the region’s security agenda. It has 
the potential to explore ways to address these difficult and sensitive issues 
that are common to all Forum members in varying degrees. Solutions to 
internal crises may be hard to find and, while not advocating a one size fits all 
solution, certain responses to problems are universal and lessons can be 
learnt from various situations. Therefore, with security as one of the four 
pillars for the Forum’s focus in the Plan’s development and implementation, it 
is timely to examine the FRSC which is danger of becoming moribund. 
 
                                            
402 Forum Communiqué, 2000, Biketawa Declaration – annex seven. 
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 The aim of this chapter is to discuss the flaws and potential of the FRSC. It 
describes its inception, and by using the security equation created in chapter 
five, it will update its current structure and status within the security 
environment. Its logic of action is defined by modifying the objective logic of 
action described in chapter two with the assertion introduced in chapter one. 
A comparison of the characteristics and functions as set out in the region’s 
security policies will help to explain its inability to securitise the issues causing 
insecurity. It is concluded that, without strengthening its authority to set the 
region’s security agenda, the Pacific security environment will be weakened 
and the goals of the Pacific Vision and Plan threatened. 
 
6.2 FRSC – Inception 
At the opening of the Forum Officials Committee meeting Apia 2004, the Hon 
Han J. Keil, the Samoan Minister of Commerce, Labour and Tourism recalled 
the last Forum summit held in Apia 1987, seventeen years prior. He said,  
It was a time of turbulence for our region then, with the first political 
crisis in Fiji occurring just a few weeks before the Apia Forum. The 
discussions at the 1987 Forum naturally were dominated by the events 
in Fiji and how the region should respond to the crisis. Fortunately for 
us then, there was and still is today the ‘Pacific Way’ of resolving 
difficult problems.403
 
The inception of the FRSC was at that 1987 Forum in Samoa. Forum leaders 
relayed their “deep concern and anguish” over the Fiji coup, and conveyed 
                                            
403 Hon Han J Keil, 2004, ‘Opening Address of the Forum Officials Committee meeting,’ Apia, Samoa, 5 
August 2004 
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 their “expression of willingness to provide whatever help they might be able 
to”.404 After “detailed informal discussion” with the Governor General of Fiji, 
leaders agreed to send a mission to Fiji. The purpose was to hold discussions 
with all parties and facilitate processes for resolution. The Prime Minister of 
Australia was to lead the mission, which included the Prime Minister of 
Solomon Islands and the director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation (SPEC).405 While the Forum’s offer of help was not taken up by 
Fiji’s Governor General, the fact that a regional response to an internal crisis 
was discussed and organised is significant. An Air New Zealand aircraft had 
been hijacked five days after the coup, and the leaders also agreed to 
“establish a working group to examine the issue and develop ways to 
enhance the capacity of the Forum states to counter terrorism and 
hijacking”.406 It was in this context that the Committee on Regional Security 
Information Exchange was established.  
 
The Committee held its inaugural meeting at the SPEC headquarters in Suva 
in February 1988. A wide-ranging list of security issues was submitted and, 
from the outset security was defined broadly. While a second meeting was 
held in June 1988, the committee did not meet again until November 1990, 
when it became known as the Forum Regional Security Committee.  
 
 
 
                                            
404 Forum Communiqué, 1987  
405 South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, currently known as the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat. 
406 Forum Communiqué, 1987 
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 6.3 FRSC in the Security Equation  
Using the security equation created in chapter five, the FRSC’s current 
structure and status within the security environment is analysed. Table six 
places the FRSC as a security actor within the security architecture. As a 
security actor it has the objective ability to securitise and set the region’s 
security agenda. It also has the potential to create regional security policies 
and set the tasks and build or strengthen the security infrastructure 
 
Agenda 
 
Issues 
 
Securitisation 
Architecture 
 
Actors 
FRSC 
 
Policies 
Infrastructure 
 
Security Service Providers 
Table 6 Security Environment Equation - FRSC
=       Security Environment
 
6.4 FRSC – Structure and Status 
The FRSC meets annually at officials’ level. The meetings are divided into two 
sessions over two days. Session one receives reports from prior meetings of 
the Regional Law Enforcement agencies comprising the Forum Secretariat, 
the Oceania Customs Organisation, the Pacific Immigration Directors 
Committee and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police. Other agencies, such as 
the Pacific Island Law Officers, also brief the FRSC on their strategies and 
programmes. Session two is a retreat meeting where representatives of each 
Forum member are expected to participate in frank discussions on sensitive 
issues. In 2005, papers from two Pacific academics were presented with the 
aim of encouraging provocative discussions.  
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The outcomes for session one are drafted by the Secretariat and adopted by 
members out of session. The recommendations are prepared for 
endorsement of the Forum Officials Committee, which then identifies the 
issues that are forwarded to leaders. To ensure the openness of the second 
session, no record is kept but major outcomes are summarised. 
 
The attendance and participation at the FRSC by some Forum member 
delegations has been criticised as absent, poorly prepared and uninformed.407 
Over-domination by the New Zealand and Australian delegations has been 
noted while Island delegations have been accused of apathy. The 
combination of assertiveness on one hand and passiveness on the other has 
produced confusion and resentment, resulting in a situation where the 
meeting process has become an expensive and time consuming activity.  
 
Comments were made that competing and overlapping mandates between 
the various agencies, particularly in the field of transnational threat, criminal 
intelligence and money laundering, have meant that Forum members can 
become confused about agenda.408 There is also a lack of clarity in the 
relationships between the Forum and the regional law enforcement agencies, 
such as OCO and PICP as the latter have wider memberships than just the 
Forum. The security-related activities of the Secretariat have also been 
criticised as not driven by clear consensus, but by the priorities of individual 
                                            
407 Comments made at three confidential interviews with officials from two separate countries and one 
intergovernmental organisation.  
408 Ibid 
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 staff members or more significantly, directed by the objectives of external 
donor funding.409  
 
The failure of the FRSC to deliver the expectations, (arguably implicit and 
unrealistic), of the region has meant that opportunities to strengthen the 
security environment have been missed. It is asserted, therefore, that its main 
problems are a result of a confused and obscure logic of action and that a 
lack of authority, logic of purpose and structural logic has prevented practical 
and effective implementation of otherwise creative and useful initiatives.  
 
Also hindering FRSC’s potential is the issue of political responsibility. Political 
will for consensus-style decision-making or securitisation in this sector, has 
been undermined by the dominance of the Forum’s larger members. Political 
responsibility amongst the majority of smaller Forum members for their own 
national and regional security is weakened. Conversely, because 
responsibility has been lacking, the well-resourced delegations have become 
even more dominant in order to fill the vacuum and take action to solve the 
pressing problems. This self-reinforcing system of pro-activeness and 
passivity breeds tension and resentment. This is especially significant when 
compared to one of the goals of the Pacific Vision: 
 We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its 
 governance …410
The quality of security governance in the region has therefore suffered and 
opportunities have been missed to encourage better security cooperation. 
                                            
409 Ibid 
410 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 8 
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 Solving the problems stemming from bureaucratic inertia are beyond this 
thesis, nevertheless after “strengthening” and “invigorating,” the FRSC has 
the potential to be a legitimate mechanism to effectively securitise the 
challenges facing the region.411 It liaises and coordinates well with the 
security service providers within the security infrastructure. Part of the solution 
therefore begins with identifying a logic of action, directed by an appropriate 
level of authority.   
 
The status of the FRSC arguably comes from the seniority of its level of 
attendance. At officials’ level, it reports directly to leaders as it has been 
suggested they are responsible for security. This logic seems weak. Leaders 
are ultimately responsible for the gamut of issues in all sectors and with full 
meeting agenda they are unable to give concentrated attention to the 
assorted insecurities facing the region. The EPG report recognised this 
problem and the 2004 Auckland Decisions mandated ministers with more 
decision-making authority. Ministers from many other sectors meet either 
annually or as required. To include ministers from the various security-related 
portfolios is one way to direct a strong degree of authority to the FRSC.412  
 
6.5 FRSC – Logic of Action 
By modifying the logic of action created in chapter two with the above 
assertion, the logic of action for the FRSC as a security actor is: ‘the authority 
                                            
411 Justin Fepulea’I, 2003, ‘Security Community or Neo-Colonialism? The ‘New’ Wave Intervention in 
Oceania: A New Zealand View’ paper given at a conference held at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, ‘Islands State Security 2003: Oceania at the Crossroads,’  Honolulu, 15-17 July 2003, p 10; 
New Zealand Ministry of Defence & New Zealand Defence Force, 2003, ‘New Zealand and the Pacific 
Islands: Security through Partnership,’ Review of New Zealand’s Pacific Defence and Security Policy 
412 The Security portfolios include defence, police, customs, development assistance and immigration 
for example.  
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 to manage the region’s security roles by good governance processes of 
securitisation that reflect the ‘Pacific Way’ with the aim of achieving specific 
security-related goals through mechanisms with stable but adaptive 
structures.’413  
 
The FRSC, it is argued here, lacks the appropriate authority to manage the 
region’s security roles. Its bureaucratic structures are adaptable but weak due 
to this lack of authority. Security governance lacks legitimacy because the 
structures do not mirror principles of good governance. This inhibits its ability 
to sell insecurity thereby securitisation is difficult. The ‘Pacific Way’ is 
undermined as the security goals are not agreed too by consensus. Specific 
security goals do not cover the broad array of issues in the security agenda 
but have been overtaken by the global transnational threat agenda.  
 
6.6 FRSC – Characteristics and Functions 
The characteristics of the FRSC and its functions, as set out in the region’s 
security policies will now be compared. This comparison will help to explain 
why it lacks the appropriate authority and ability to securitise the region’s 
security issues.  
 
6.6.1. Characteristics 
As a regional institution it is represented by the region’s members. This gives 
it a legitimacy to discuss and decide upon the issues affecting the region. As a 
Forum creation, it is expected to adopt the established method of relating – 
                                            
413 See chapter two – 2.5  
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 the ‘Pacific Way’. As a security institution it is clearly compelled to consider all 
issues that threaten the region’s security. Security, as discussed previously, 
has been defined broadly and reaches across a variety of sectors. The 
principles of the Biketawa Declaration assert that security issues are to be 
addressed. Its meetings are held annually which implies members agree that 
dialogue concerning security issues requires consistent attention. 
 
6.6.2. Functions 
The functions of the FRSC have grown ad hoc and are found in a collection of 
the Forum communiqués and the various regional leaders’ declarations – see 
table seven below. It is argued that these functions have been diverted and 
narrowed from the original purpose of the FRSC by the dominance of the 
global transnational threat agenda. This distraction has prevented the 
securitisation of other insecurities facing the region.  
 
Its inception was derived from the internal crisis of Fiji and the 1987 Forum 
Communiqué, which established the ‘Exchange of Information on International 
Developments Affecting the Security of the Region’ later to become the 
FRSC. The Exchange was to consider “matters affecting national security and 
defence, … [and] the economic security of the region was to be monitored.”414
The 1988 Communiqué re-iterated the Forum’s commitment to the Committee 
on Regional Security Information Exchange but “noted” the “unwelcome 
international phenomena of terrorism and the illegal trade in arms…”415  
 
                                            
414 Forum Communiqué, 1987, paragraph 17 
415 Forum Communiqué, 1988, paragraphs 18-19 
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 Table 7 Functions of FRSC 
1992 Honiara Declaration • Co-ordinate and disseminate information;  
• To establish a framework for increasing contacts amongst specialist 
agencies;  
• To provide advice to Forum Leaders on law enforcement issues; 
• To meet annually before the Forum Officials Committee  meeting; 
• To review and advise on programme priorities, institutional linkages, and 
resource needs in the area of law enforcement co-operation and 
information exchange on regional and international security issues; 
• Focus on: legal Issues, mutual assistance in criminal matters, forfeiture of 
the proceeds of crime, extradition, financial action task force; customs, 
police, drugs and environmental issues; terrorism, maritime surveillance, 
taxation issues and training. 
1996 Communiqué • Study ways to achieve the Honiara Objectives; 
• Study and report on a common approach to weapons control. 
1997 Communiqué  • Continued role in overseeing co-ordination of law enforcement amongst 
specialist agencies; 
• Role to be broadened and strengthened. 
1997 Aitutaki Declaration • Further develop mechanisms for preventive diplomacy including use of the 
Forum Regional Security Committee; 
• Be strengthened through the addition of a second session for consultations 
on broader security issues; 
• Give early consideration to the circumstances whereby the Committee 
would be convened in response to emergency situations. 
1998 Communiqué  • Action Plan to assist member achieve Honiara objectives; 
• Continued regional law enforcement co-ordination of specialist agencies; 
• Development of recommendations on policy approaches to broader 
security issues.  
2000 Biketawa Declaration • Convening of a special high level meeting in times of crisis. 
2002 Nasonini Declaration • Review regional implementation of UNSCR 1373, the FATF Special 
Recommendations and the Honiara Declaration and report back to the 
Forum.  
2003 Melanesian Spearhead Group • Look at the concept of a standing regional force. 
 
 
The next mention of the Committee was in 1990 and the diversion to narrow 
its focus was complete as the Forum agreed it was to “be revived to consider 
the needs and priorities of member countries in the area of law enforcement 
cooperation.”416 The characteristics of FRSC were obviously not considered 
during this evolution and thereby its potential to function as a security actor 
was hindered. Details of the political agenda for this, implicit or explicit, are 
                                            
416 Forum Communiqué, 1990, paragraph 24 
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 beyond this discussion however its neglect has meant that opportunities to 
strengthen the security environment have been missed.  
 
Ron Crocombe’s series of national security studies, mentioned above, detail 
the complexities of security issues that the Biketawa Declaration asserted 
needed to be addressed. The FRSC has the ‘characteristics’ to strengthen the 
security environment by securitising these issues. The processes of 
securitisation however require resources for the actors to sell a threat and 
then mobilise action to counter the threat. These resources include authority, 
legitimacy and political responsibility as well as financial commitment.  
 
6.7 FRSC with Teeth – the appropriate level of authority 
In an earlier paper presented at the conference held at the Asia-Pacific Center 
for Security Studies in Hawaii, I suggested that the FRSC should be attended 
at ministerial level. This idea received a polarised response; a Pacific Island 
delegate gave the idea a good back-slap while an official from Australia was 
completely against the idea. New Zealand officials acknowledged it may be 
timely to consider the idea.  
 
6.8 Ministers’ Meeting Agenda 
The main contention from the Australian official was that their ministerial 
agenda was too full to attend more meetings. This rebuttal lacks sense. If 
security ministers’ are too busy to meet to discuss issues of regional security, 
re-prioritisation is the solution. To ignore or neglect security issues and the 
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 securitisation process, the issues fester and the security environment 
becomes weaker and the eventual response can be more complex. 
 
As a response to this criticism in a chapter in Securing a Peaceful Pacific it 
was argued that “the ministers’ council [could] meet when necessary.”417 New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official, Susannah Gordon who 
organised the 2005 FRSC meetings also suggested security ministers’ could 
meet on the fringes of the United Nations General Assembly annual meeting 
as an alternative if required.418 After further research and keeping in line with 
the goals of the Pacific Plan for closer cooperation, it is contended here that 
regular meetings would add a greater depth of political commitment and 
responsibility towards solving the region’s security needs. This would make 
the FRSC a more authoritative security actor with the power needed to define 
the security environment through setting the security agenda and monitoring 
the security infrastructure.  
 
In addition, I previously suggested that a Forum Security Council of Ministers 
be established.419 Again after further research, the idea of a Council seems 
excessive. The FRSC format, as described earlier, mirrors the annual Forum 
summit meetings. Security officials could meet beforehand and set an agenda 
for the ministers’ who then meet in retreat format.420 The officials meetings 
would still receive reports from the security infrastructure agencies and this 
could be extended to include civil society groups. The main contention 
                                            
417 Sheryl Boxall, 2005, p 180 
418 Interview with Susannah Gordon, 11 February 2006. 
419 Ibid 
420 Chapter two 
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 regardless of the meeting details: is for the FRSC to successfully securitise 
insecurities greater decision-making authority is needed. 
 
6.9 Security Ministerial Portfolios Adjusted 
It is acknowledged however, one problem of raising the authority of FRSC to 
ministerial level is that there are a number of ministers from various security-
related portfolios who could attend. In chapter four the theory of security was 
re-defined and it was argued that where security is defined broadly, the 
maintenance of security by the agencies that address security issues must 
mirror this extension, whether regionally or nationally.421 Consequently some 
Forum governments may need to re-consider their national security 
structures.422 Ministerial portfolios often mirror cold-war frameworks where the 
maintenance of national security is spread among distinct agencies. While the 
full extent of this readjustment is far beyond the objectives of this thesis, it is 
suggested that the issue needs considering. Therefore, when deciding which 
minister should attend FRSC, practically at this stage, it needs to be left to the 
members’ discretion but keeping in mind the idea of the ‘whole of government’ 
approach to security maintenance should be mirrored regionally. 
 
6.10 FRSC with Democracy 
One benefit of strengthening FRSC to ministerial level would be that it makes 
securitisation more democratic. Ministers’ are elected whereas officials are 
appointed. The regional electorate then has more power by proxy to 
determine the security agenda.  
                                            
421 Chapter four 
422 Chapter four 
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The political responsibility of ministers is also greater than that of officials. The 
implementation of security decisions is likely to increase as ministers are 
responsible and accountable for the portfolios. This degree of political 
responsibility and accountability is also more likely to filter down to officials 
and security service providers. 
 
6.11 FRSC with Political Respect 
Another benefit of the attendance of Ministers at FRSC is the likely increase 
of political respect. The dynamic between ministers is different than officials. 
Ministers’ need to be made more responsible for security decision-making as 
they are used to an environment of debate and are more able to assert their 
government’s interests. They have the authority and status that comes with 
their portfolio and so meet with other ministers as equals. This level of respect 
also minimises the ‘political spin’ used by officials to protect themselves from 
difficult situations.  
 
6.12 FRSC with Legitimacy 
One ‘characteristic’ of the FRSC as a security actor, is that its membership is 
regionally representative therefore it has the legitimacy to set the region’s 
security agenda. This structural logic helps reduce the chances for 
resentment to build because this degree of representation should protect the 
less influential members from the dominance of those with greater power.  
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 One of the political roles of regionalism espoused by Greg Fry is the ‘counter-
hegemonic strategy’.423 This was explained in a global context in chapter two, 
but here it can be applied within the FRSC. Despite the disparities of the 
region discussed in the introduction, the Forum is a venue where domination 
by larger or wealthier Forum members over other Forum members’ is 
reduced. This is further reduced when ministers meet as equals because it is 
expected they will express their disagreements openly and maximise the 
opportunity to find ways to settle their differences.  
 
6.13 FRSC – Reduced Sensitivities  
As a Forum creation, the principles of the ‘Pacific Way’ are the expected 
method for regional decision-making. In this environment, sensitivities are 
reduced; therefore it is more likely that the problems facing the region, both 
external and internal will be addressed. One example of a set of 
circumstances that would benefit from a regional approach is the bi-lateral 
Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) between Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) and Australia. 424  
 
As an exercise in security cooperation, the ECP experience failed miserably. 
Commentators described it as muscular, hairy-chestedness, arrogant and that 
it smacked of Australian neo-colonialism.425 One point missed however, 
regardless of alleged heavy handedness of Australian diplomacy, is that PNG 
                                            
423 Chapter two 
424 For further details of the package and its process see - Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade – PNG, Enhanced Cooperation Programme, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/ecp2004.html 
425 Sydney Morning Herald, 2005, ‘Ties are Fraying with PNG,’  
http://www.smh.com/news/Editorial/Ties-are-fraying-with-PNG/2005/05/1711160; Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI), ‘ASPI dialogue on PNG – More Focussed aid and less hairy chestedness from 
the Australian Government,’ notes from the Brisbane meeting, 6 May 2005, 
http://www.aspi.org.au/pdf/ASPI_dialogue_Brisbane.pdf 
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 suffers a serious lack of professional law and order maintenance. A Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) report on the state of the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary titled, ‘Making their own rules: Police beatings, rape and torture 
of Children in Papua New Guinea,’ outlined the grim and fatal realities of the 
lack of law and order. 426 Michael Field reported that the Police Minister Bire 
Kimisopa freely admitted the report was correct but “something, you know, 
we’re not proud of.”427  In January 2006, however Kimisopa warned, “Any 
person who tries to sabotage or criticise the Enhanced Co-operation 
Programme (ECP Mark II) will be severely dealt with.”428
 
It appears then after two years of negotiations the programme is again 
underway. The Australia and PNG colonial relationship is complex and to 
accept that PNG is victim of Australian browbeating is a fallacy.429  However 
using the FRSC as the mechanism for the ECP negotiations, the colonial 
complexities would be minimised because the securitisation process would 
involve the wider Forum membership. The Biketawa Declaration also makes 
provisions for security involvement from other Forum members resulting in 
regional policies to guide the intervention processes. This may save time and 
money in future security projects. 
                                            
426 The Human Rights Watch Report states: Papua New Guinea is one of the more dangerous countries 
in the world not at war.  There is no question that the country, and its police force, face a serious violent 
crime problem, including gang crime, armed highway robbery, tribal fighting in the Highlands, conflicts 
related to resource development such as mining, and election-related conflict. White collar crime, fraud, 
and corruption among politicians are also serious problems. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/png0905/png0905text.pdf 
427 Michael Field, 2005, September, http://wwwmichaelfield.org/png2.htm 
428 Pacific Magazine, 2006, ‘PNG: Mp Warns Against Sabotaging ECP II, Monday 26th January 2006, 
http://www.pacificislands.cc/pina/pinadefault2.php?urlpinaid=19761 
429 In 2003, during the Australia – Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, the PNG delegation was led by 
an impressive group of politicians that included, the Rt. Hon. Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration, and included the Hon. Sir Moi Avei, Minister for Petroleum and Energy, the 
Hon. Bart Philemon, Minister for Finance and Treasury, the Hon. Bire Kimisopa, Minister for Internal 
Security, the Hon. Sir Peter Barter, Minister for Inter Government Relations, the Hon. Kappa Yarka, 
Minister for Defence, the Hon. Sinai Brown, Minister for National Planning and Monitoring, the Hon. 
Peter O’Neill, Minister for Public Service and the Hon. Mark Maipakai, Minister for Justice.  
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6.14 FRSC - Strengthened 
It is concluded that the FRSC as the region’s security actor needs ministerial 
authority to set the region’s security agenda. Its status quo however does not 
meet the security needs of the region so without attention, insecurity in the 
region is likely to increase resulting in a weak security environment. This 
scenario contradicts the goals of the Pacific Vision and intentions of the 
Pacific Plan. 
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 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The concluding assertion of this thesis is that the status quo security 
arrangements in the region are likely to further weaken the pacific security 
environment. This would result in many of the objectives of the pacific plan 
being threatened and consequently the goals of the pacific vision frustrated. 
The security mechanism of the Pacific Islands Forum, the Forum Regional 
Security Committee (FRSC) has the potential to minimise this vulnerability by 
facilitating closer and more effective security cooperation. But a key 
requirement identified in this thesis is that greater authority should be 
mandated to the forum ministers’ by raising attendance at FRSC meetings 
from officials to ministerial level. Decisions would be more likely to be 
implemented effectively if political responsibility for the security environment is 
increased. 
 
The rationale of this thesis is to introduce ideas which help explain the 
region’s security environment. Traditional views of security theory were not 
applicable in an environment where cooperation as opposed to competition or 
enmity, has been and remains the norm. A redefinition of security was 
therefore required, but before this could explain the security interaction taking 
place, a full picture of the security environment was needed.  An equation that 
had the ability to complete such a picture was presented and proved to be 
universally applicable because it included all aspects and variables of the 
security environment. The ‘security environment equation’ was applied to the 
specific characteristics of the pacific region’s security environment. It 
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 produced a comprehensive picture that provides a greater depth of knowledge 
to guide more accurate analysis. 
 
The Pacific Islands Forum is identified by this study as the region’s driver of 
regionalism and the FRSC as the region’s main ‘security actor’ in the ‘security 
architecture’. The analysis of the FRSC revealed that it does have the 
potential to effectively address the security issues facing the region. It is 
hindered however because its ‘logic of action’ is implicit rather than explicit 
and lacks the appropriate level of authority to make strong decisions and 
ensure their effective implementation.  
 
The thesis argues that the implementation of existing security programmes 
and initiatives at a national level has been poor and that political will needs to 
be transformed into a greater sense of political responsibility. It was 
discovered however, that during regional security meetings a self-reinforcing 
dynamic of dominance by more resourced forum members, contrasts with 
passivity of lesser capable members. It was argued that this frustrates the 
‘buy in’ or acceptance of responsibility needed to ensure decisions are 
followed through.  
 
Forum institutions have the capacity to overcome the dominant/passive 
problem as its members meet as political equals who all have the ability and 
right to have their opinions heard. Diversity is a major characteristic of the 
region. Socially, politically and economically the Forum members differ 
greatly. A recurring question of this thesis is whether cooperation can be 
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 effective if the parties are unequally resourced. A consequence of this 
regional disparity is that the costs and distribution of benefits from regionalism 
is also diverse. This however does not have to translate into a set of negative 
assumptions. Difference is not the same as inequality. It is not a 
‘power/resource’ or ‘cost/benefit’ equality that is facilitated by the Forum, but it 
is its ability to equalise the field for political decision making. As Forum 
membership is based on political autonomy, of mainly democratic countries 
(Tonga, the exception, is moving towards greater democracy), leaders have 
their national mandate to collectively make regional decisions. The status of 
leaders therefore is the same and participation in the decision-making process 
is expected. 
 
Equilibrium is also relative in the region because what is important to one 
member may differ from the others. For instance the maintenance of trans-
national security is high on the security agendas of Australia and New 
Zealand. Upgrading border security in island countries can be viewed as a 
positive development rather than an intrusion into national sovereignty. It is 
argued in this thesis that the acceptance, or re-framing, of closer security 
cooperation depends on the process of negotiation and consultation. The 
‘Pacific Way’ of consensus seeking is a valuable regional asset. It is the 
means by which inequality can be minimised when contributions by 
participants to the decision-making process are valued for the equality of their 
position as members of the Forum, and not the resources of their countries. 
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 It is asserted in the introduction to this thesis that a mechanism is needed that 
has the authority to decide the nature of the region’s security environment. 
This should combine good regional governance structures and the maturity of 
the ‘Pacific Way’. As a regionally representative Forum institution, the FRSC 
has the essential characteristics to make effective security decisions. It is 
therefore the region’s most appropriate security mechanism. It has the 
potential to address sensitive security problems as envisaged in the Biketawa 
declaration. It is important to stress that regional consultation does not need 
to prevent action. Collective agreement on the characteristics of the region’s 
security environment is more likely to encourage effective implementation 
than an externally imposed set of security initiatives. One example cited was 
the global terrorism agenda and the imposition of its set of universal rules and 
standards. 
 
Strengthening the FRSC by raising the attendance from officials to ministerial 
level is considered by this thesis to be imperative. Without this, it is likely to 
languish in the myriad of ineffectual regional meetings. While efforts to make 
the FRSC more effective are ongoing, a deliberate step-up in the region’s 
hierarchy to ministerial level will provide it with much needed authority and 
help establish good regional governance processes to achieve security-
related goals through greater cooperation. The region, defined as the group of 
countries within the Pacific that desire to cooperate through membership in 
the Porum, therefore does have the ability to achieve the goals of the Pacific 
Vision:  
Leaders believe the Pacific region can,  
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 should and will be a region of peace,  
harmony, security and economic prosperity,  
so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. 
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 Annex 2 
Pacific Cooperation  
Voices of the Region    
 
index  
 
The Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 
2004 
 
Appendices    
 
 
1.  Review personnel  
(a) Eminent Persons’ Group members 
• Chair: Sir Julius Chan (Papua New Guinea). Sir Julius is a former Prime Minister of 
Papua New Guinea.  
• Bob Cotton (Australia).  Until mid-2003 Mr Cotton was Australia’s High 
Commissioner to New Zealand. He has recently acted as a special envoy to Papua 
New Guinea.     
• Dr Langi Kavaliku (Tonga). Dr Kavaliku is pro-Chancellor of the University of the 
South Pacific and a former Deputy Prime Minister of Tonga.  
• Teburoro Tito (Kiribati). Mr Tito is a former President of Kiribati and former Chair of 
the Pacific Islands Forum.  
• Maiava Iulai Toma (Samoa). Mr Toma is Samoa’s current Ombudsman and was 
previously Samoa’s Secretary to Government and Ambassador to the United Nations. 
He led the Forum Observer Group to the last general election in Solomon Islands.  
 
(b) Reflection Group members 
• Chair: Prime Minister Rt Hon Helen Clark.  
• Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon Phil Goff.  
• Facilitator: Michael Powles: Former New Zealand diplomat.  
• Emele Duituturaga: CEO, Ministry for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty 
Alleviation, Fiji.  
• Rae Julian: Executive Director, New Zealand Council for International Development.   
• Luamanuvao Winnie Laban, MP: Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Development 
Assistance and Trade), New Zealand Parliament.  
• Richard Mann: Manager, Planning Unit, Secretariat of the Pacific Community.  
• Hon Fiame Naomi Mata’afa: Minister of Education, Samoa.  
• Resio Moses: Senator, Federated States of Micronesia.  
• Dr S K Rao: Former Director of Strategic Planning, Commonwealth Secretariat.  
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 • Dr Jimmie Rodgers. Senior Deputy Director of the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community.  
• Greg Urwin. Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General.  
 
c) Assistants to the EPG 
• H E John Goodman: New Zealand High Commissioner, Kiribati. Assistant to Mr 
Cotton.  
• Richard Kay: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (on secondment to 
NZ Ministry of Defence). Assistant to Sir Julius Chan.  
• Jeremy Milne: New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Assistant to 
Maiava Toma.  
• John Mills: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Assistant to Mr Tito.  
• Don Stewart: New Zealand Department of Conservation. Assistant to Dr Kavaliku.    
 
(d)  Support for the EPG 
• Project director: Rene Wilson, Director, Pacific Division, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Project coordinator: Paul Willis, Deputy Director, Pacific Division, New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Review policy and briefing: Jocelyn Woodley, Senior Policy Officer, Pacific Division, 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Policy and logistics: Nicola Ngawati, Policy Officer, Pacific Division, New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Logistics and budget: Raewyn Watson, Administrative Officer, Pacific Division, New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Travel programmes: Shirley Munro-Holmes, Administrative Officer, Pacific Division, 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
• Writer: Jonathan Schwass.  
• Other support provided by New Zealand diplomatic missions.  
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 KEY TASK FORCE MEMBERS 
 
AUSTRALIA Mr Keith Scott 
Director Pacific Regional Section, DFAT 
 
Mr Chris Tinning 
Director 
Pacific Governance Section,  
AusAID, Canberra 
 
COOK ISLANDS Mr Carl Hunter 
Director, Pacific Division 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration 
 
FSM HE Mr Kodaro Gallen  
Ambassador to Fiji  
 
FIJI Mrs Litia Mawi  
Acting Deputy Secretary, International 
Economic Affairs 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Ms Anju D Keethanth
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
KIRIBATI Mrs Makurita Baaro
(686)21 183   
Secretary to Cabinet  
Office of the Beretitenti
 
NAURU HE Dr Ludwig Keke
High Commissioner  
 
NEW ZEALAND Ms Heather Riddell 
Director 
Pacific Division – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Mr Niels Holm 
Deputy Director 
Pacific Division – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Niels.holm@mfat.govt.nz" 
 
Dr Richard Kay 
Second Secretary (Regional) 
NZ High Commission, Suva 
 
NIUE To be advised 
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PALAU To be advised  
 
PNG Mr Leonard Louma (Leader)  
Deputy Chief of Staff & Special Advisor on 
International Affairs to Prime Minister 
Office of the Prime Minister 
 
Mr Peter Eafeare
Director General International Relations 
Department of the Prime Minister & National 
Executive Council 
 
RMI To be advised 
 
SAMOA  Mr Aiono Mose Sua 
Chief Executive Officer 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
Mr Terry Toomata
Assistant Chief Executive Officer 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
SOLOMON 
ISLANDS 
Mr Barnabas Anga
Permanent Secretary 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Relations 
 
TONGA Mr Va’inga Tone 
Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
TUVALU HE Mr Taukelina Finikaso  
High Commissioner  
 
VANUATU Mr Jean Sese  
Director General 
Prime Minister’s Office  
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 CROP Agencies 
 
Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA)  
 
 
Mr Feleti Teo
Director 
Forum Fisheries Agency  
 
Mr Steve Dunn 
Deputy Director 
Forum Fisheries Agency  
 
Fiji School of 
Medicine (FSchM
Dr Eddie McCaig
Acting Dean 
Fiji School of Medicine 
 
Pacific Islands 
Development 
Program (PIDP) 
Dr Sitiveni Halapua
Director 
Pacific Islands Development Program 
  East-West Center  
 
Pacific Islands 
Forum 
Secretariat 
(PIFS) 
Mr Greg Urwin
Secretary General 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
 
Mr Iosefa Maeva
Deputy Secretary General 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
 
Secretariat of the 
Pacific 
Community 
(SPC) 
Ms Lourdes Pangelinan
Director-General 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
 
Dr Jimmie Rodgers 
Deputy Director-General 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
 
South Pacific 
Applied 
Geoscience 
Commission 
(SOPAC) 
Ms Cristelle Pratt 
Director 
SOPAC Technical Secretariat 
 
Dr Russell Howorth, 
Deputy Director  
SOPAC Technical Secretariat 
 
South Pacific Board for 
Educational 
Assessment (SPBEA)  
 
Dr Visesio Pongi
Director 
South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment 
   
South Pacific Regional 
Environment 
Programme (SPREP)  
 
Mr Asterio Takesy
Director 
SPREP 
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 Mr Vito Lui  
Deputy Director  
SPREP 
 
South Pacific 
Tourism 
Organisation 
(SPTO) 
 Mr Lisiate ‘Akolo
Chief Executive 
South Pacific Tourism Organisation 
 
Mr Ross Hopkins  
Technical Adviser  
 
University of the South 
Pacific (USP)  
 
Prof Anthony Tarr
Vice-Chancellor 
University of the South Pacific 
 
Ms Esther Williams 
Pro Vice-Chancellor 
University of the South Pacific 
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 Annex 4   
Australian Treaty Series 1944 No 2 
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE  
CANBERRA  
Australian- New Zealand  Agreement 1944  
(Canberra, 21 January 1944)  
Entry into force: 21 June 1944  
AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES  
1944 No. 2 (electronic)  
(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1997  
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND   
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA and HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINION OF 
NEW ZEALAND  (herein after referred to as "the two Governments") represented 
as follows:-  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA by-  
The Right Honourable John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia and Minister for 
Defence,  
The Honourable Francis Michael Forde, Minister for the Army,  
The Honourable Joseph Benedict Chifley, Treasurer and Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction,  
The Right Honourable Herbert Vere Evatt, KC, LLD, Attorney-General and Minister 
for External Affairs,  
The Honourable John Albert Beasley, Minister for Supply and Shipping,  
The Honourable Norman John Oswald Makin, Minister for the Navy and Minister for 
Munitions,  
The Honourable Arthur Samuel Drakeford, Minister for Air and Minister for Civil 
Aviation,  
The Honourable John Johnstone Dedman, Minister for War Organisation of Industry,  
The Honourable Edward John Ward, Minister for Transport and Minister for External 
Territories, and  
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 The Honourable Thomas George de Largie D'Alton, High Commissioner for Australia 
in New Zealand , and  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND  by-  
The Right Honourable Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand , Minister of 
External Affairs and Minister of Island Territories,  
The Honourable Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence and Minister in Charge of Civil 
Aviation,  
The Honourable Patrick Charles Webb, Postmaster-General and Minister of Labour, 
and  
Carl August Berendsen, Esq., CMG, High Commissioner for New Zealand  in 
Australia:  
HAVING MET in Conference at Canberra from 17 to 21 January 1944,  
AND DESIRING to maintain and strengthen the close and cordial relations between 
the two Governments  
DO HEREBY ENTER into this Agreement.  
DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES OF AUSTRALIAN- NEW ZEALAND  
COOPERATION  
1. The two Governments agree that, as a preliminary, provision shall be made for 
fuller exchange of information regarding both the views of each Government and the 
facts in the possession of either bearing on matters of common interest.  
2. The two Governments give mutual assurances that, on matters which appear to be 
of common concern, each Government will, so far as possible, be made acquainted 
with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere by either.  
3. In furtherance of the above provisions with respect to exchange of views and 
information, the two Governments agree that there shall be the maximum degree of 
unity in the presentation, elsewhere, of the views of the two countries.  
4. The two Governments agree to adopt an expeditious and continuous means of 
consultation by which each party will obtain directly the opinions of the other.  
5. The two Governments agree to act together in matters of common concern in the 
South West and South Pacific areas.  
6. So far as compatible with the existence of separate military commands, the two 
Governments agree to co-ordinate their efforts for the purpose of prosecuting the war 
to a successful conclusion.  
ARMISTICE AND SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS  
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 7. The two Governments declare that they have vital interests in all preparations for 
any armistice ending the present hostilities or any part thereof and also in 
arrangements subsequent to any such armistice, and agree that their interests should 
be protected by representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and 
executive bodies.  
8. The two Governments are in agreement that the final peace settlement should be 
made in respect of all our enemies after hostilities with all of them are concluded.  
9. Subject to the last two preceding clauses, the two Governments will seek agreement 
with each other on the terms of any armistice to be concluded.  
10. The two Governments declare that they should actively participate in any 
Armistice Commission to be set up.  
11. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia shall set up in 
Australia, and His Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand shall set 
up in New Zealand , Armistice and Post Hostilities Planning Committees, and shall 
arrange for the work of those Committees to be co-ordinated in order to give effect to 
the views of the respective Governments.  
12. The two Governments will collaborate generally with regard to the location of 
machinery set up under international organisations, such as the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, and, in particular, with regard to the location of the 
Far Eastern Committee of that administration.  
SECURITY AND DEFENCE  
13. The two Governments agree that, within the framework of a general system of 
world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the South West and South 
Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and 
New Zealand , stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of 
Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.  
14. The two Governments regard it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should 
both be associated, not only in the membership, but also in the planning and 
establishment, of the general international organisation referred to in the Moscow 
Declaration of October 1943, which organisation is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such 
States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
15. Pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of 
general security, the two Governments hereby declare their vital interest in the action 
on behalf of the community of Nations contemplated in Article V of the Moscow 
Declaration of October 1943. For that purpose it is agreed that it would be proper for 
Australia and New Zealand  to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in 
policing such areas in the South West and South Pacific as may from time to time be 
agreed upon.  
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 16. The two Governments accept as a recognised principle of international practice 
that the construction and use, in time of war, by any Power, of naval, military or air 
installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control of another Power, does 
not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control 
after the conclusion of hostilities.  
CIVIL AVIATION  
17. The two Governments agree that the regulation of all air transport services should 
be subject to the terms of a convention which will supersede the Convention relating 
to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation.  
18. The two Governments declare that the air services using the international air trunk 
routes should be operated by an International Air Transport Authority.  
19. The two Governments support the principles that-  
(a) full control of the international air trunk routes and the ownership of all aircraft 
and ancillary equipment should be vested in the International Air Transport Authority; 
and  
(b) the international air trunk routes should themselves be specified in the 
international agreement referred to in the next succeeding clause.  
20. The two Governments agree that the creation of the International Air Transport 
Authority should be effected by an international agreement.  
21. Within the framework of the system set up under any such international agreement 
the two Governments support-  
(a) the right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own 
national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories, subject only to agreed 
international requirements regarding safety, facilities, landing and transit rights for 
international services and exchange of mails;  
(b) the right of Australia and New Zealand  to utilise to the fullest extent their 
productive capacity in respect of aircraft and raw materials for the production of 
aircraft; and  
(c) the right of Australia and New Zealand  to use a fair proportion of their own 
personnel, agencies and materials in operating and maintaining international air trunk 
routes.  
22. In the event of failure to obtain a satisfactory international agreement to establish 
and govern the use of international air trunk routes, the two Governments will support 
a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by Governments of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations under government ownership.  
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 23. The two Governments will act jointly in support of the above-mentioned 
principles with respect to civil aviation, and each will inform the other of its existing 
interests and commitments as a basis of advancing the policy herein agreed upon.  
DEPENDENCIES AND TERRITORIES  
24. Following the procedure adopted at the Conference which has just concluded, the 
two Governments will regularly exchange information and views in regard to all 
developments in or affecting the islands of the Pacific.  
25. The two Governments take note of the intention of the Australian Government to 
resume administration at the earliest possible moment of those parts of its territories 
which have not yet been re-occupied.  
26. The two Governments declare that the interim administration and ultimate 
disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia and 
New Zealand  and that any such disposal should be effected only with their 
agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.  
27. The two Governments declare that no change in the sovereignty or system of 
control of any of the islands of the Pacific should be effected except as a result of an 
agreement to which they are parties or in the terms of which they have both 
concurred.  
WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE PACIFIC  
28. The two Governments declare that, in applying the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter[1] to the Pacific, the doctrine of "trusteeship" (already applicable in the case 
of the mandated territories of which the two Governments are mandatory powers) is 
applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, 
and that the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their 
social, economic and political development.  
29. The two Governments agree that the future of the various territories of the Pacific 
and the welfare of their inhabitants cannot be successfully promoted without a greater 
measure of collaboration between the numerous authorities concerned in their control, 
and that such collaboration is particularly desirable in regard to health services and 
communications, matters of native education, anthropological investigation, 
assistance in native production and material development generally.  
30. The two Governments agree to promote the establishment, at the earliest possible 
date, of a regional organisation with advisory powers, which could be called the South 
Seas Regional Commission, and on which, in addition to representatives of Australia 
and New Zealand , there might be accredited representatives of the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and of the French Committee 
of National Liberation.  
31. The two Governments agree that it shall be the function of such South Seas 
Regional Commission as may be established to secure a common policy on social, 
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 economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well-
being of the native peoples themselves, and that in particular the Commission shall-  
(a) recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in administration in 
increasing measure with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-
government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples 
concerned;  
(b) recommend arrangements for material development including production, finance, 
communications and marketing;  
(c) recommend arrangements for co-ordination of health and medical services and 
education;  
(d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and improvement of standards of 
native welfare in regard to labour conditions and social services;  
(e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in economic, social, medical and 
anthropological research; and  
(f) make and publish periodical reviews of progress towards the development of self-
governing institutions in the islands of the Pacific and in the improvement of 
standards of living, conditions of work, education, health and general welfare.  
MIGRATION  
32. In the peace settlement or other negotiations the two Governments will accord one 
another full support in maintaining the accepted principle that every government has 
the right to control immigration and emigration in regard to all territories within its 
jurisdiction.  
33. The two Governments will collaborate, exchange full information and render full 
assistance to one another in all matters concerning migration to their respective 
territories.  
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE SOUTH WEST AND 
SOUTH PACIFIC  
34. The two Governments agree that, as soon as practicable, there should be a frank 
exchange of views on the problems of security, post-war development and native 
welfare between properly accredited representatives of the governments with existing 
territorial interests in the South West Pacific area or in the South Pacific area, or in 
both, namely, in addition to the two Governments, His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom, the Government of the United States of America, the Government 
of the Netherlands, the French Committee of National Liberation and the Government 
of Portugal, and His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia should 
take the necessary steps to call a conference of the governments concerned.  
PERMANENT MACHINERY FOR COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION 
BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND   
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 35. The two Governments agree that-  
(a) their co-operation for defence should be developed by:  
(i) continuous consultation in all defence matters of mutual interest;  
(ii) the organization, equipment, training and exercising of the armed forces under a 
common doctrine;  
(iii) joint planning;  
(iv) interchange of staff; and  
(v) the co-ordination of policy for the production of munitions, aircraft and supply 
items, and for shipping, to ensure the greatest possible degree of mutual aid consistent 
with the maintenance of the policy of self-sufficiency in local production;  
(b) collaboration in external policy on all matters affecting the peace, welfare and 
good government of the Pacific should be secured through the exchange of 
information and frequent ministerial consultation;  
(c) the development of commerce between Australia and New Zealand  and their 
industrial development should be pursued by consultation and, in agreed cases, by 
joint planning;  
(d) there should be co-operation in achieving full employment in Australia and New 
Zealand  and the highest standards of social security both within their borders and 
throughout the islands of the Pacific and other territories for which they may jointly or 
severally be wholly or partly responsible; and  
(e) there should be co-operation in encouraging missionary work and all other 
activities directed towards the improvement of the welfare of the native peoples in the 
islands and territories of the Pacific.  
36. The two Governments declare their desire to have the adherence to the objectives 
set out in the last preceding clause of any other government having or controlling 
territories in the Pacific.  
37. The two Governments agree that the methods to be used for carrying out the 
provisions of clause 35 of this Agreement and of other provisions of this Agreement 
shall be consultation, exchange of information, and, where applicable, joint planning. 
They further agree that such methods shall include-  
(a) conferences of Ministers of State to be held alternately in Canberra and 
Wellington, it being the aim of the two Governments that these conferences be held at 
least twice a year;  
(b) conferences of departmental officers and technical experts;  
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 (c) meetings of standing inter-governmental committees on such subjects as are 
agreed to by the two Governments;  
(d) the fullest use of the status and functions of the High Commissioner of the 
Commonwealth of Australia in New Zealand and of the High Commissioner of 
the Dominion of New Zealand  in Australia;  
(e) regular exchange of information;  
(f) exchange of officers; and  
(g) the development of institutions in either country serving the common purposes of 
both.  
PERMANENT SECRETARIAT  
38. In order to ensure continuous collaboration on the lines set out in this Agreement 
and to facilitate the carrying out of the duties and functions involved, the two 
Governments agree that a permanent Secretariat shall be established in Australia and 
in New Zealand .  
39. The Secretariat shall be known as the Australian- New Zealand Affairs 
Secretariat and shall consist of a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in 
Australia and a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in New Zealand , each 
under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs in the country concerned.  
40. The functions of the Secretariat shall be-  
(a) to take the initiative in ensuring that effect is given to the provisions of this 
Agreement;  
(b) to make arrangements as the occasion arises for the holding of conferences or 
meetings;  
(c) to carry out the directions of those conferences in regard to further consultation, 
exchange of information or the examination of particular questions;  
(d) to co-ordinate all forms of collaboration between the two Governments;  
(e) to raise for joint discussion and action such other matters as may seem from day to 
day to require attention by the two Governments; and  
(f) generally to provide for more frequent and regular exchanges of information and 
views, those exchanges between the two Governments to take place normally through 
the respective High Commissioners.  
41. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty's 
Government in the Dominion of New Zealand  each shall nominate an officer or 
officers from the staff of their respective High Commissioners to act in closest 
 196
 collaboration with the Secretariat in which they shall be accorded full access to all 
relevant sources of information.  
42. In each country the Minister of State for External Affairs and the resident High 
Commissioner shall have joint responsibility for the effective functioning of the 
Secretariat.  
RATIFICATION AND TITLE OF AGREEMENT  
43. This Agreement is subject to ratification by the respective Governments and shall 
come into force as soon as both Governments have ratified the Agreement and have 
notified each other accordingly.[2] It is intended that such notification will take place 
as soon as possible after the signing of this Agreement.  
44. This Agreement shall be known as the Australian- New Zealand  Agreement 
1944.  
DATED this twenty-first day of January, One thousand nine hundred and forty-four.  
SIGNED ON BEHALF OF HIS SIGNED ON BEHALF OF HIS  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE  
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND :  
[Signed:] [Signed:]  
JOHN CURTIN PETER FRASER  
F M FORDE F JONES  
J B CHIFLEY P C WEBB  
H V EVATT C A BERENDSEN  
JOHN A BEASLEY  
NORMAN J C MAKIN  
ARTHUR S DRAKEFORD  
JOHN J DEDMAN  
ED J WARD  
TOM D'ALTON  
[1] Current Notes 1945 p. 93 and 1947 p. 261; UKTS 1942 No. 5 (Cmd. 6388); Cmd. 
6321; SP 144 p. 1070; EAS 236; LNTS 204 p. 381; CTS 1942 No. 1.  
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 [2] The Agreement entered into force 21 June 1944, upon the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification.  
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AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
COMMISSION  
THE GOVERNMENTS of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America, (hereinafter referred to as "the participating 
Governments"),  
DESIRING to encourage and strengthen international cooperation in promoting the 
economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-
governing territories in the South Pacific region administered by them,  
HAVE, through their duly authorised representatives met together in Canberra, made 
an Agreement in the following terms:  
Article I  
Establishment of the Commission  
1. There is hereby established the South Pacific Commission  (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Commission").  
Article II  
Territorial scope  
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 2. The territorial scope of the Commission shall comprise all those non-self-governing 
territories in the Pacific Ocean which are administered by the participating 
Governments and which lie wholly or in part south of the Equator and east from and 
including Netherlands New Guinea.  
3. The territorial scope of the Commission may be altered by agreement of all the 
participating Governments.  
Article III  
Composition of the Commission  
4. The Commission shall consist of not more than twelve Commissioners. Each 
participating Government may appoint two Commissioners and shall designate one of 
them as its senior Commissioner.  
5. Each participating Government may appoint such alternates and advisers to its 
Commissioners as it considers desirable.  
Article IV  
Powers and functions  
6. The Commission shall be a consultative and advisory body to the participating 
Governments in matters affecting the economic and social development of the non-
self-governing territories within the scope of the Commission and the welfare and 
advancement of their peoples. To this end, the Commission shall have the following 
powers and functions:  
(a) to study, formulate and recommend measures for the development of, and where 
necessary the coordination of services affecting, the economic and social rights and 
welfare of the inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the Commission, 
particularly in respect of agriculture (including animal husbandry), communications, 
transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, marketing, production, trade and 
finance, public works, education, health, housing and social welfare;  
(b) to provide for and facilitate research in technical, scientific, economic and social 
fields in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to ensure the 
maximum cooperation and coordination of the activities of research bodies;  
(c) to make recommendations for the coordination of local projects in any of the fields 
mentioned in the previous subparagraphs which have regional significance and for the 
provision of technological assistance from a wider field not otherwise available to a 
territorial administration;  
(d) to provide technical assistance, advice and information (including statistical and 
other material) for the participating Governments;  
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 (e) to promote cooperation with non-participating Governments and with non-
governmental organisations of a public or quasi-public character having common 
interests in the area, in matters within the competence of the Commission;  
(f) to address inquiries to the participating Governments on matters within its 
competence;  
(g) to make recommendations with regard to the establishment and activities of 
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies.  
7. The Commission may discharge such other functions as may be agreed upon by the 
participating Governments.  
8. The Commission may make such administrative arrangements as may be necessary 
for the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its functions.  
9. With a view to facilitating the inauguration of the work of the Commission in 
matters immediately affecting the economic and social welfare of the local inhabitants 
of the territories within the scope of the Commission, the Commission shall give early 
consideration to the projects set forth in the resolution (appended to this Agreement) 
relating to important immediate projects adopted by the South Seas Conference at 
Canberra, Australia, on 6 February 1947.  
10. The participating Governments undertake to secure such legislative and 
administrative provision as may be required to ensure that the Commission will be 
recognised in their territories as possessing such legal capacity and as being entitled to 
such privileges and immunities (including the inviolability of its premises and 
archives) as are necessary for the independent exercise of its powers and discharge of 
its functions.  
Article V  
Procedure of the Commission  
11. Irrespective of the place of meeting, each senior Commissioner shall preside over 
sessions of the Commission in rotation, according to the English alphabetical order of 
the participating Governments.  
12. The Commission may meet at such times and in such places as it may determine. 
It shall hold two regular sessions in each year, and such further sessions as it may 
decide.  
13. At a meeting of the Commission two-thirds of all the senior Commissioners shall 
constitute a quorum.  
14. The decisions of the Commission shall be taken in accordance with the following 
rules:  
(a) senior Commissioners only shall be entitled to vote;  
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 (b) procedural matters shall be decided by a majority of the senior Commissioners 
present and voting;  
(c) decisions on budgetary or financial matters which may involve a financial 
contribution by the participating Governments (other than a decision to adopt the 
annual administrative budget of the Commission), shall require the concurring votes 
of all the senior Commissioners;  
(d) decisions on all other matters (including a decision to adopt the annual 
administrative budget of the Commission) shall require the concurring votes of two-
thirds of all the senior Commissioners.  
15. In the absence of a senior Commissioner, his functions shall be discharged for all 
purposes of this Article by the other Commissioner appointed by his Government or, 
in the absence of both, by an alternate designated by his Government or the senior 
Commissioner.  
16. The Commission may appoint Committees and, subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement, may promulgate rules of procedure and other regulations governing the 
operations of the Commission, of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies and such 
Committees as it shall establish, and of the Secretariat and generally for the purpose 
of carrying into effect the terms of this Agreement.  
17. The official languages of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies 
shall include English and French.  
18. The Commission shall make to each of the participating Governments, and 
publish, an annual report on its activities, including those of its auxiliary and 
subsidiary bodies.  
Article VI  
Research Council  
19. In view of the special importance of research for the carrying out of the purposes 
of the Commission, there shall be established a Research Council which shall serve as 
a standing advisory body auxiliary to the Commission.  
Article VII  
Composition of the Research Council  
20. Members of the Research Council shall be appointed by the Commission on such 
terms and conditions as the Commission may decide.  
21. (a) The Commission shall appoint, as members of the Research Council, such 
persons distinguished in the fields of research within the competence of the 
Commission as it considers necessary for the discharge of the Council's functions;  
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 (b) Among the members of the Council so appointed there shall be a small number of 
persons highly qualified in the several fields of health, economic development and 
social development who shall devote their full time to the work of the Research 
Council.  
22. The Research Council shall elect a Chairman from its members.  
23. The Commission shall appoint a full-time official who shall direct research and be 
charged with the general responsibility for supervising the execution of the 
programme of the Research Council. He shall be, ex officio, a member and the Deputy 
Chairman of the Council and, subject to the directions of the Commission, shall be 
responsible for arranging and facilitating cooperative research, for arranging and 
carrying out research projects of a special nature, for collecting and disseminating 
information concerning research and for facilitating the exchange of experience 
among research workers of the area. He shall be responsible to the Secretary-General 
for all administrative matters connected with the work of the Research Council and of 
its Committees.  
24. In all technical matters full-time members shall be under the direction of the 
Deputy Chairman of the Research Council. In all administrative matters they shall be 
responsible to the Secretary-General.  
25. Recommendations of the Research Council in connection with research projects to 
be undertaken shall be first submitted to the Commission for approval.  
Article VIII  
Functions of the Research Council  
26. The functions of the Research Council shall be:  
(a) to maintain a continuous survey of research needs in the territories within the 
scope of the Commission and to make recommendations to the Commission on 
research to be undertaken;  
(b) to arrange, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, for the carrying out of the 
research studies approved by the Commission, using existing institutions where 
appropriate and feasible;  
(c) to coordinate the research activities of other bodies working within the field of the 
Commission's activities and, where possible, to avail itself of the assistance of such 
bodies;  
(d) to appoint technical standing research committees to consider problems in 
particular fields of research;  
(e) to appoint, with the approval of the Commission, ad hoc research committees to 
deal with special problems;  
(f) to make to each session of the Commission a report of its activities.  
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 Article IX  
The South Pacific Conference  
27. In order to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local 
inhabitants of, and of official and non-official institutions directly concerned with, the 
territories within the scope of the Commission, there shall be established a South 
Pacific Conference with advisory powers as a body auxiliary to the Commission.  
Article X  
Sessions of the Conference  
28. A session of the South Pacific Conference shall be convoked within two years 
after this Agreement comes into force, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding three 
years.  
29. Each session of the Conference shall be held in one of the territories within the 
scope of the Commission at a place designated by the Commission with due regard to 
the principle of rotation.  
30. The Chairman of each session of the Conference shall be one of the 
Commissioners of the Government in whose territory the session is held.  
31. The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the administrative arrangements of 
the Conference.  
32. The Commission shall adopt rules of procedure for the Conferences and approve 
the agenda for each session of the Conference. The Secretary-General shall prepare 
the necessary documents for consideration by the Commission.  
33. The Conference may make recommendations to the Commission on procedural 
questions affecting its sessions. It may also recommend to the Commission the 
inclusion of specific items on the agenda for the Conference.  
Article XI  
Composition of the Conference  
34. Delegates to the Conference shall be appointed for each territory which is within 
the scope of the Commission and which is designated for this purpose by the 
Commission. The maximum number of delegates for each territory shall be 
determined by the Commission. In general, the representation shall be at least two 
delegates for each designated territory.  
35. Delegates shall be selected in such a manner as to ensure the greatest possible 
measure of representation of the local inhabitants of the territory.  
36. Delegates shall be appointed for each designated territory in accordance with its 
constitutional procedure.  
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 37. The delegations for each designated territory may include alternate delegates and 
as many advisers as the appointing authority considers necessary.  
Article XII  
Functions of the Conference  
38. The Conference may discuss such matters of common interest as fall within the 
competence of the Commission, and may make recommendations to the Commission 
on any such matters.  
Article XIII  
The Secretariat  
39. The Commission shall establish a Secretariat to serve the Commission and its 
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies.  
40. The Commission shall, subject to such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, 
appoint a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General. They shall hold office 
for five years unless their appointments are earlier terminated by the Commission. 
They shall be eligible for re-appointment.  
41. The Secretary-General shall be the chief administrative officer of the Commission 
and shall carry out all directions of the Commission. He shall be responsible for the 
functioning of the Secretariat, and shall be empowered, subject to such directions as 
he may receive from the Commission, to appoint and dismiss, as necessary, members 
of the staff of the Secretariat.  
42. In the appointment of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General and 
the staff of the Secretariat, primary consideration shall be given to the technical 
qualifications and personal integrity of candidates. To the fullest extent consistent 
with this consideration, the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed from the local 
inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the Commission and with a view to 
obtaining equitable national and local representation.  
43. Each participating Government undertakes so far as possible under its 
constitutional procedure to accord to the Secretary-General, to the Deputy Secretary-
General, to the full time members of the Research Council and to appropriate 
members of the staff of the Secretariat such privileges and immunities as may be 
required for the independent discharge of their functions. The Commission may make 
recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of this 
paragraph or may propose conventions to the participating Governments for this 
purpose.  
44. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-
General, the full time members of the Research Council and the staff of the 
Secretariat shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any 
other authority external to the Commission. They shall refrain from any action which 
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 might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the 
Commission.  
45. Each participating Government undertakes to respect the exclusively international 
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-
General, the full time members of the Research Council, and the staff of the 
Secretariat, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.  
Article XIV  
Finance  
46. The Commission shall adopt an annual budget for the administrative expenses of 
the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, and such supplementary 
budgets as it may determine. The Secretary-General shall be responsible for preparing 
and submitting to the Commission for its consideration the annual administrative 
budget and such supplementary budgets as the Commission may require.  
47. Except for the salaries, allowances and miscellaneous expenditures of the 
Commissioners and their immediate staffs, which shall be determined and paid by the 
respective Governments appointing them, the expenses of the Commission and its 
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies (including the expenses of delegates to the South 
Pacific Conference on a scale approved by the Commission) shall be a charge on the 
funds of the Commission.  
48. There shall be established, to meet the expenses of the Commission, a fund to 
which each participating Government undertakes, subject to the requirements of its 
constitutional procedure, to contribute promptly its proportion of the estimated 
expenditure of the Commission, as determined in the annual administrative budget 
and in any supplementary budgets adopted by the Commission.  
49. The expenses of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies shall be 
apportioned among the participating Governments in the following proportions:  
Australia 30%  
France 121/2%  
The Netherlands 15%  
New Zealand 15%  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 15%  
United States of America 121/2%  
Before the close of its second fiscal year, the Commission shall review the 
apportionment of expenses and recommend to the participating Governments such 
adjustments as it considers desirable. Adjustments may at any time be made by 
agreement of all the participating Governments.  
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 50. The fiscal year of the Commission shall be the calendar year.  
51. Subject to the directions of the Commission, the Secretary-General shall be 
responsible for the control of the funds of the Commission and of its auxiliary and 
subsidiary bodies and for all accounting and expenditure. Audited statements of 
accounts for each fiscal year shall be forwarded to each participating Government as 
soon as possible after the close of the fiscal year.  
52. The Secretary-General, or an officer authorised by the Commission to act as 
Secretary-General pending the appointment of the Secretary-General, shall at the 
earliest practicable date after the coming into force of this Agreement submit to the 
Commission an administrative budget for the current fiscal year and any 
supplementary budgets which the Commission may require. The Commission shall 
thereupon adopt for the current fiscal year an administrative budget and such 
supplementary budget as it may determine.  
53. Pending adoption of the first budget of the Commission, the administrative 
expenses of the Commission shall be met, on terms to be determined by the 
Commission, from an initial working fund of [sterling]40,000 sterling to which the 
participating Governments undertake to contribute in the proportions provided for in 
paragraph 49 of this Agreement.  
54. The Commission may in its discretion accept for inclusion in its first budget any 
expenditure incurred by the Governments of Australia or New Zealand for the 
purpose of paragraph 64 of this Agreement. The Commission may credit any such 
expenditure against the contribution of the Government concerned. The aggregate of 
the amounts which may be so accepted and credited shall not exceed [sterling]5,000 
sterling.  
Article XV  
Relationship with other international bodies  
55. The Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, while having no organic 
connection with the United Nations, shall cooperate as fully as possible with the 
United Nations and with appropriate specialised agencies on matters of mutual 
concern within the competence of the Commission.  
56. The participating Governments undertake to consult with the United Nations and 
the appropriate specialised agencies at such times and in such manner as may be 
considered desirable, with a view to defining the relationship which may in future 
exist and to ensuring effective cooperation between the Commission, including its 
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, and the appropriate organs of the United Nations and 
specialised agencies dealing with economic and social matters.  
57. The Commission may make recommendations to the participating Governments 
as to the manner in which effect can best be given to the principles stated in this 
Article.  
Article XVI  
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 Headquarters  
58. The permanent headquarters of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary 
bodies shall be located within the territorial scope of the Commission at such place as 
the Commission may select. The Commission may establish branch offices and, 
except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, may make provision for the carrying 
on of any part of its work or the work of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies at such 
place or places within or without the territorial scope of the Commission as it 
considers will most effectively achieve the objectives for which it is established. The 
Commission shall select the site of the permanent headquarters within six months 
after this Agreement comes into force. Pending the establishment of its permanent 
headquarters, it shall have temporary headquarters in or near Sydney, Australia.  
Article XVII  
Saving clause  
59. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to conflict with the existing or 
future constitutional relations between any participating Government and its 
territories or in any way to affect the constitutional authority and responsibility of the 
territorial administrations.  
Article XVIII  
Alteration of agreement  
60. The provisions of this Agreement may be amended by consent of all the 
participating Governments.  
Article XIX  
Withdrawal  
61. After the expiration of five years from the coming into force of this Agreement a 
participating Government may withdraw from the Agreement on giving one year's 
notice to the Commission.  
62. If any participating Government ceases to administer non-self-governing 
territories within the scope of the Commission, that Government shall so notify the 
Commission and shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the Agreement as from the 
close of the then current calendar year.  
63. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of a participating Government this Agreement 
shall continue in force as between the other participating Governments.  
Article XX  
Interim provisions  
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 64. Preliminary arrangements for the establishment of the Commission shall be 
undertaken jointly by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.  
Article XXI  
Entry into force  
65. The Governments of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America shall become parties to this Agreement by:  
(a) signature without reservation, or  
(b) signature ad referendum and subsequent acceptance.[1] Acceptance shall be 
effected by notification to the Government of Australia. The Agreement shall enter 
into force when all the abovementioned Governments have become parties to it.[2]  
66. The Government of Australia shall notify the other abovementioned Governments 
of each acceptance of this Agreement, and also of the date on which the Agreement 
comes into force.  
67. The Government of Australia shall on behalf of all the participating Governments 
register this Agreement with the Secretariat of the United Nations in pursuance of 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
This Agreement, of which the English, French and Netherlands texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly 
certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government of Australia to the 
other participating Governments.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the duly authorised representatives of the respective 
participating Governments have signed this Agreement.  
OPENED in Canberra for signature on the sixth day of February One thousand nine 
hundred and forty-seven.  
[Signatures not reproduced here.]  
 
RESOLUTION CONCERNING IMMEDIATE PROJECTS  
RESOLVED  
THAT the South Seas Conference recommends that the South Pacific 
Commission  on its establishment should give early consideration to the projects set 
forth below. The Conference does not consider that these projects are all-inclusive but 
considers them to be of great importance to the economic and social welfare of the 
local inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific. The 
Conference also considers that these projects, which are not stated in any order of 
priority, should be undertaken at an early date.  
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 Agriculture  
(a) Biochemical investigations in connection with animal nutrition.  
(b) Systematic botanical investigations.  
(c) Research into plant pests and diseases research.  
(d) A biological survey.  
(e) A study of the relationship between plants and their environment including soils 
and climate.  
Economics  
(a) An economic survey to include native industries, native fisheries, native trading 
systems and native cooperative movements and organisations.  
(b) A study of the mechanisation of production and of suitable schemes for the 
organisation of uniform grading, packing, pooling and marketing of primary products 
such as copra.  
(c) The development of schemes for the introduction to and distribution in the 
territories of potentially useful species, varieties, breeds or strains of plants and 
animals.  
(d) The taking of all possible steps, within the scope of the functions of the 
Commission, to ensure adequate shipping services within the area.  
Education and social development  
(a) A study of the most efficient methods of teaching illiterate people to read and 
write in their own languages.  
(b) A review of the research work already carried out in the field of social 
anthropology and consideration of future lines of research which would be of value to 
the territories in connection with education and social development.  
(c) A study of special educational and related activities for handicapped persons - the 
blind, the mentally backward, lepers and sufferers from other diseases.  
(d) Research in the most efficient methods of training local inhabitants for health, 
education and technical services and a survey of existing facilities therefor.  
(e) A study of the use of visual aids in education and in other developmental and 
welfare activities.  
(f) A study of the education and social development of women and girls in relation to 
the status of women in the respective communities and with a view to widening the 
cultural life and improving the domestic conditions of women.  
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 Fisheries  
Fisheries research, including surveys and the testing of methods of catching and of 
processing fish and other marine products with the special aim of improving the 
nutrition of the local inhabitants.  
Forestry  
Surveys of or research in:  
(a) forest resources in regard to areas, commercial timbers and other forest products;  
(b) forest management including utilisation of forests and forest products;  
(c) technology of wood and other forest products;  
(d) the relationship between forests and water conservation and soil conservation.  
Health and medicine  
(a) A survey of improved methods of nutrition and an investigation of the relationship 
between nutrition and dental defects.  
(b) An investigation to improve methods of village hygiene including housing.  
(c) General surveys of disease and disease-carriers, with particular research into:  
(i) the respiratory diseases (including pulmonary and surgical tuberculosis);  
(ii) leprosy;  
(iii) malaria prevention, and the dysenteries and other bowel infections;  
(iv) yaws and its relationship to syphilis;  
(v) filiarisis;  
(vi) hookworm and other intestinal parasites;  
(vii) diseases of the skin;  
(d) A study of infant and maternal welfare.  
(e) A study of the human body's response to changes of climate and environment with 
a view to the improvement of diet and general living conditions.  
(f) A study of quarantine procedures, including the existing international regulations, 
in order to meet the particular needs of the territories.  
(g) The collection and dissemination of epidemiological information.  
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 Labour  
A study of labour conditions within the territories with a view to improvement in 
accordance with the Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation 
wherever applicable.  
Library  
The establishment of an up-to-date technical and scientific reference library. [1] 
Signed for Australia 6 February 1947. Accepted for Australia 16 April 1947.  
[2] The Agreement entered into force for Australia and generally 29 July 1948.  
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AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE SOUTH PACIFIC BUREAU FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION  
The Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga 
and Western Samoa, together comprising the South Pacific Forum (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Forum"),  
RECOGNISING the need for increased co-operation in matters relating to trade and 
economic development in the South Pacific region,  
DESIRING to identify opportunities for the removal of barriers to trade between 
states within the region and also between those states and states outside the region and 
for the modification of current trade patterns,  
DESIRING also that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing a 
free trade area for the South Pacific region,  
NOTING that the collection and dissemination of information and the preparation of 
reports and studies will be essential to facilitate these ends,  
CONCERNED to ensure co-ordination of studies relating to transport services within 
the region,  
CONCERNED also to obtain advice and assistance in the operation of regional trade 
and tourism promotion services,  
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 CONVINCED of the need to work towards co-operation and co-ordination in the 
planning and siting of new industries and development projects within the region,  
CONCERNED that all these activities should, wherever possible, be undertaken in 
co-ordination with the work of other international and regional organisations,  
HAVE AGREED as follows:  
Article I  
Establishment of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation  
1. There is hereby established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation 
(hereinafter called "the Bureau").  
2. The Bureau shall be located in Suva and shall operate in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement.  
Article II  
Organisation  
The Bureau shall have an executive board to be known as the South Pacific 
Committee for Economic Co-operation (hereinafter called "the Committee") and a 
Secretariat (hereinafter called "the Secretariat").  
Article III  
Purpose  
The purpose of the Bureau is to facilitate continuing co-operation and consultation 
between members on trade, economic development, transport, tourism and other 
related matters.  
Article IV  
Membership  
1. The Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga 
and Western Samoa shall be entitled to membership of the Bureau and shall become 
members by signing this Agreement pursuant to Article XI.  
2. Other governments may be admitted to membership of the Bureau in accordance 
with Article XI.  
Article V  
The Committee  
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 1. The Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the members of 
the Bureau.  
2. The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:  
(a) to consult with the Director in the preparation of the annual budget for submission 
to the Forum;  
(b) to recommend to the Forum amendments to the Annex to this Agreement;  
(c) to approve the annual or interim report of the Director on the operation of the 
Bureau and transmit such report to the member governments;  
(d) to make recommendations to the member governments;  
(e) to lay down staff establishment and salary scales;  
(f) to give general directions to the Bureau.  
3. The Committee shall appoint a Chairman at its first and subsequent annual 
meetings who shall remain in office until the next annual meeting.  
4. The Chairmanship shall rotate annually as decided by the Committee.  
5. The Committee shall hold a meeting at least once in each calendar year and shall 
meet prior to meetings of the Forum.  
6. The Director, in consultation with and at the request of the Chairman, shall convene 
meetings of the Committee.  
7. Each representative on the Committee shall have one vote. All matters shall be 
decided by a majority of the representatives present and voting.  
8. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure.  
Article VI  
Secretariat  
The Secretariat of the Bureau shall consist of a Director and Deputy Director and such 
further staff as may be appointed by the Director in accordance with the establishment 
and salary scales laid down by the Committee.  
Article VII  
Appointment of Director  
1. The Director shall be appointed by the Forum for a term of three years under such 
conditions as the Committee may determine.  
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 2. The Director shall be eligible for reappointment. His appointment shall not, 
however, exceed two consecutive terms.  
3. The channel of communication of the Director with member governments shall be 
through their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs.  
Article VIII  
Functions of the Secretariat  
1. Subject to the direction of the Committee, the Secretariat may:  
(a) prepare studies in order to identify opportunities for a modification of present 
trade patterns in the South Pacific region, and between the region and other countries, 
having in mind the objectives of regional trade expansion;  
(b) carry out necessary investigations in connection with development of free trade 
among the Island members of the Bureau;  
(c) prepare studies of the development plans and policies of member governments in 
an effort to promote co-operation in the region; and investigate the scope for regional 
development planning aimed among other things at a rationalisation of manufacturing 
and processing industries and the achievement of economies of scale in certain 
regional enterprises;  
(d) establish an advisory service on sources of technical assistance, aid and 
investment finance, both official and private, that are available to members;  
(e) undertake studies of regional transport, as necessary, and help co-ordinate action, 
both government and private, in this sector;  
(f) advise and assist member governments with the operation of a regional trade and 
tourist promotion service;  
(g) provide a means of regular and rapid consultation among the Islands on the 
region's import requirements to enable the bulk ordering of essential imports by 
official agencies;  
(h) act as a clearing house for information on trade, production, and economic 
development in the region and in areas outside the region which are of interest to 
members;  
(i) carry out research and statistical studies on production and trade on a continuing 
basis as requested by the Committee;  
(j) prepare reports, studies and working papers;  
(k) establish means for the collection, dissemination and exchange of information and 
statistics;  
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 (1) co-operate with member governments in research projects and the obtaining and 
collating of statistics and other information;  
(m) co-operate and co-ordinate its work with that of other international and regional 
organisations;  
(n) undertake such other activities as the Committee may from time to time consider 
necessary for the attainment of the Bureau's purpose.  
2. In addition to the powers conferred expressly by this Article, the Secretariat shall 
exercise any powers delegated to it by the Committee.  
Article IX  
Budget  
1. The annual budget of the Bureau shall be prepared by the Director and approved by 
the Forum on the recommendation of the Committee.  
2. The costs of operating the Bureau shall be borne by the member governments in the 
shares set out in the Annex to this Agreement, subject to review from time to time.  
Article X  
Legal status, privileges and immunities  
1. The Bureau shall enjoy the legal capacity of a body corporate in the territories of 
member governments.  
2. The Bureau shall have immunity from suit and legal process and its premises, 
archives and property shall be inviolable.  
3. The Bureau shall be exempt from taxes, other than such as represent charges for 
specific services rendered. It shall also be exempt from taxes, duties and other levies, 
other than charges for specific services rendered, on the importation of goods 
imported for its official use.  
4. The Bureau shall be free of prohibition on importation or exportation of goods 
imported or exported for its official use.  
5. The Director and staff of the Bureau shall be entitled to immunity from suit and 
legal process in respect of things done or omitted to be done in the course of the 
performance of their official duties.  
6. The Director shall be accorded the same exemption from taxes, duties and other 
levies as is accorded to a diplomatic agent.  
7. All officers of the Bureau who are not nationals of Fiji shall be accorded exemption 
from taxes in respect of salaries received from the Bureau. They shall also be 
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 accorded exemption from taxes on the importation of furniture and effects at the time 
of first taking up post.  
8. Representatives attending meetings of the Committee shall be accorded immunity 
from suit and legal process and their official documents shall be inviolable  
Article XI  
Signature, accession, entry into force and withdrawal  
1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by the Governments of Australia, the 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa.[1]  
2. The signature of a member government shall not be taken as extending the rights 
and obligations set forth in this Agreement to the territories for whose international 
relations the member government is responsible.  
3. This Agreement shall enter into force one month from the day on which it has been 
signed by the last to sign of the seven member governments referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article.[2]  
4. Other governments may, with the approval of the Forum, accede to this Agreement.  
5. For governments admitted to membership in the Bureau in accordance with 
paragraph 4 of this Article, the Agreement shall enter into force on the date of deposit 
with the depositary Government of an instrument of accession.  
6. The depositary Government shall inform member governments of the entry into 
force of this Agreement pursuant to this Article.  
7. The original of this Agreement shall be deposited with the Government of Fiji 
which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all member governments and shall 
register the Agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
8. Any member government may denounce this Agreement by notification addressed 
to the depositary Government and such denunciation shall take effect one year after 
the day upon which the depositary Government has received the notification.  
Article XII  
Amendments  
1. This Agreement may be amended at any time by the unanimous agreement of all 
member governments. The text of any amendment proposed by a member government 
shall be submitted to the depositary Government which shall transmit it to member 
governments.  
2. If three or more member governments request a meeting to discuss the proposed 
amendment, the depositary Government shall call such a meeting  
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 3. If all member governments agree to an amendment, it shall then be open for 
ratification.  
4. An amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received 
instruments of ratification from all member governments.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their 
respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.  
OPENED for signature at Apia this 17th day of April, 1973  
[Signatures not reproduced here.]  
 
ANNEX  
SCALE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BUDGET  
Australia  1/3 
New Zealand  1/3 
Cook Islands  1/15 
Fiji  1/15 
Nauru  1/15 
Tonga  1/15 
Western Samoa 1/15 
[1] Signed for Australia 17 April 1973.  
[2] The Agreement entered into force for Australia and generally 17 May 1973.  
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 Annex 7   
 
Attachment 1 
 
“BIKETAWA” DECLARATION 
 
Forum Leaders recalled their 1995 Vision Statement, the Forum Economic 
Action Plan Eight Principles of Good Governance and the 1997 Aitutaki 
Declaration. With the aim of elaborating upon these earlier statements and in 
the interests of regional cooperation, Forum Leaders while respecting the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state 
committed themselves and their countries to a number of guiding principles 
and courses of actions: 
 
(i) Commitment to good governance which is the exercise of authority 
(leadership) and interactions in a manner that is open, transparent, 
accountable, participatory, consultative and decisive but fair and equitable. 
 
(ii) Belief in the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for all 
citizens regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief and in the 
individual’s inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic 
political process in framing the society in which he or she lives. 
 
(iii) Upholding democratic processes and institutions which reflect national 
and local circumstances, including the peaceful transfer of power, the rule of 
law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government. 
 
(iv) Recognising the importance and urgency of equitable economic, social 
and cultural development to satisfy the basic needs and aspirations of the 
peoples of the Forum. 
 
(v) Recognising the importance of respecting and protecting indigenous rights 
and cultural values, traditions and customs. 
 
(vi) Recognising the vulnerability of member countries to threats to their 
security, broadly defined, and the importance of cooperation among members 
in dealing with such threats when they arise. 
 
(vii) Recognising the importance of averting the causes of conflict and of 
reducing, containing and resolving all conflicts by peaceful means including by 
customary practices. 
 
2. Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response to 
members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all 
members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. The 
Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including 
underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnic tension, socio-economic 
disparities, and lack of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural 
values).  
 220
  
To this end, the Secretary General in the future after consulting the Forum 
Chairman should urgently initiate the following process: 
 
(i) Assess the situation, make a judgment as to the significance of the 
developments and consult the Forum Chair and such other Forum Leaders as 
may be feasible to secure approval to initiate further action; 
 
(ii) Consult the national authorities concerned regarding assistance available 
from the Forum; and 
 
(iii) Advise and consult with the Forum Foreign Ministers, and based on these 
consultations, undertake one or a combination of the following actions to 
assist in 
the resolution of the crisis:  
(a) A statement representing the view of members on the situation; 
(b) Creation of a Ministerial Action Group; 
(c) A fact finding or similar mission; 
(d) Convening an eminent persons group; 
(e) Third party mediation; 
(f) Support for appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a 
resolution; and 
(g) The convening of a special high level meeting of the Forum Regional 
Security Committee or an ad hoc meeting of Forum Ministers. 
(iv) If after actions taken under (iii) the crisis persists, convene a special 
meeting of Forum Leaders to consider other options including if necessary 
targeted measures. 
 
3. Any regional response to a crisis should take account of the guidelines set 
out in Annex A. 
Biketawa, Kiribati 
28 October 2000 
 
Annex A to Attachment 1 
(i) Actions are discussed with the authorities in the country concerned; 
(ii) The Forum and persons involved on behalf of the Forum should have 
credibility i.e. must be seen as honest and impartial brokers who are 
genuinely interested in bringing about a fair resolution; 
(iii) There must be coherence and consistency in the strategy followed; 
(iv) There must be continuity and conclusion of the process i.e. staying the 
course; 
(v) There must be cooperation with other key international and regional 
organisations and national actors and coordination of all these efforts; 
(vi) There must be a sufficient degree of consensus on the resolutions by 
those who have to implement them i.e. local players and supporters and those 
that support them (i.e. outside organisations and governments); and 
(vii) The intervention must be cost-effective. 
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